Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice

James M. Buchanan.
Buchanan, James M.
(1919- )
CEE
Display paragraphs in this book containing:
Editor/Trans.
First Pub. Date
1967
Publisher/Edition
Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc.
Pub. Date
1999
Comments
Foreword by Geoffrey Brennan.
Series Contents
Foreword
Preface
Part I. The Effects of Institutions on Fiscal Choice
1. Introduction
2. Individual Demand for Public Goods
3. Tax Institutions and Individual Fiscal Choice
4. Tax Institutions and Individual Fiscal Choice
5. Existing Institutions and Change
6. Earmarking Versus General-Fund Financing
7. The Bridge Between Tax and Expenditure in the Fiscal Decision Process
8. "Fiscal Policy" and Fiscal Choice
9. Individual Choice and the Indivisibility of Public Goods
10. The Fiscal Illusion
11. Simple Collective Decision Models
12. From Theory to the Real World
13. Some Preliminary Research Results
Part II. The Choice Among Fiscal Institutions
14. The Levels of Fiscal Choice
15. Income-Tax Progression
16. Specific Excise Taxation
17. The Institution of Public Debt
18. Fiscal Policy Constitutionally Considered
19. Fiscal Nihilism and Beyond
Footnotes
Return to top