Table of Contents; Buchanan: Collected Works; Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax: Library of Economics and Liberty

Cuneiform Liberty

Navigation Bar

Public Principles of Public Debt: A Defense and Restatement

The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (with Gordon Tullock)

Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice

The Demand and Supply of Public Goods

Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory

The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan

Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes (with Richard E. Wagner)

The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution (with Geoffrey Brennan)

Geoffrey Brennan

Preface

1. Taxation in Constitutional Perspective

2. Natural Government

3. Constraints on Base and Rate Structure

4. The Taxation of Commodities

5. Taxation through Time

6. Money Creation and Taxation

7. The Disposition of Public Revenues

8. The Domain of Politics

9. Open Economy, Federalism, and Taxing Authority

10. Toward Authentic Tax Reform

Selected Bibliography

The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy (with Geoffrey Brennan)

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