Some Aspects of the Tariff Question

Taussig, Frank William
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Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
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1st edition.

1. One of the familiar methods of enumeration is to describe the taxes which follow the consumer from the cradle to the grave; a modern use of this tactical device is in the speech of Mr. Underwood, when introducing the tariff bill of 1912-13 in the House of Representatives, August 13, 1912.

2. In this analysis I follow the method of Albert Gallatin, in his Free Trade Memorial of 1831; reprinted in the collection which I have edited, State Papers and Speeches on the Tariff, pp. 122-123.

3. See chapter xiii, pp. 202-212.

4. Cf. the remarks on a similar situation in Marshall's Principles of Economics, Book V, chapter v, § 6 (6th ed.).

5. A case of a different kind, yet analogous to those considered above in that it rests on abnormal conditions, is adduced by Professor Brentano. The Russian state, being under obligation to make heavy remittances to foreign countries on interest account, reduced its railway rates on rye when Germany raised duties on that grain; thus virtually shouldering the duty. The stolidity, lack of resource, and general immobility of the Russian peasantry are also said by Brentano to have contributed, for a considerable time, to the same result. L. Brentano, Die deutschen Getreidezölle, p. 22.

6. An exception to this statement appears in the case of tin plate. There the foreign (British) production had been largely for the American market, and the duty of 1890 did serve for some to depress the British price. See below, chapter xii, p. 176.

7. See my Tariff History of the United States, p. 418 (edition of 1914).

8. See chapter xix.

9. On this episode full figures are given in Brentano, Die deutschen Getreidezölle.

10. Cf. what is said below, chapter x, pp. 144 seq.

11. See below, chapter xix, p. 318.

12. The reader will note that I speak in this chapter merely of the difference between price with the duty and price without the duty, not committing myself on the question whether this difference constitutes or measures a national loss. The presumption is that a national loss occurs, and is measured by the enhanced price which the consumer pays on the goods produced at home (not on those imported, since here the consumer's burden is offset by the government's revenue). Those conversant with the theory of international trade need not be told that there is the further possibility that duties will disturb the equilibrium of international demand and supply, and lead to a readjustment by which the duty-levying country will gain. See the classic passage in Mill, Political Economy, Book V, chapter iv, § 6. Cf. Marshall's Memorandum (of 1908) on the Fiscal Police of International Trade, §§ 7-9; Taussig, Principles of Economics, chapter xxxvii, § 1. The possibility has been questioned, but not in my opinion on solid grounds, in a note by H. H. O'Farrell in Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1912. Some further theoretical aspects of the problem seem to me to deserve attention; but this is not the place for examining them.

Part I, Chapter II

13. J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Book V, chapter x, § 1.

14. See my Tariff History, pp. 34, 45.

15. Thus, in 1912, there was opposition to a proposed reduction in duty on sewing machines, even though they had long been exported in great quantities; because some special kinds might still be imported from Germany. The same opposition, under similar conditions, was made to proposed reductions on saws, machine tools, electrical machinery,—all of them articles of which there could be at most sporadic importations. See Hearings before the Senate Finance Committee, 1912, on Metal Duties, pp. 172, 342, 1143, 1151.

16. See for example the passage from Samuel Batchelder's writings quoted in my Tariff History, p. 143 note. Cf. a similar utterance by Posadowsky, a conspicuous figure among German protectionists, quoted by Goldstein, Der deutsche Eisenzoll (Volksw. Zeitfragen, no. 268), p. 33.

17. See Amé, Les Tarifs de douanes, vol. i, pp. 318, 338, 399.

18. Compare what is said below, pp. 153 seq.

19. Compare what is said below, chapter xxi, p. 353.

Part I, Chapter III

20. So far as money wages are concerned, the dominating industries are those which export. I have considered this problem fully in a paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics (vol. xx), from which I quote the following paragraphs (pp. 510-511):—

"Those countries have high money wages whose labor is efficient in producing exported commodities, and whose exported commodities command a good price in the world's markets. The general range of money incomes depends fundamentally on the conditions of international trade, and on those conditions only. The range of domestic prices then follows: it is high so far as the efficiency of labor in domestic commodities is small, low so far as the efficiency of labor in domestic commodities is great.

"The situation is simplest in the case,—difficult to find in the real world, but instructive for illustration of the principle,—of a country having a monopoly of a given article of export or set of exported articles. By monopoly, I mean here not that the producers within the country fail to compete effectively among themselves, but that the producers of no other country compete with them. The price of such exported articles would depend, in the manner with which the reader may be supposed familiar, on the equation of international demand. The more the consumers in other countries care for them, the higher will their prices be pushed. The less the labor with which these articles are produced at home, the higher will be the money wages resulting from these high prices. The higher money wages in the exporting industries will set the standard for money wages in the country at large; and the general high wages may or may not be accompanied, as already explained, by high domestic prices.

"Where a country exports in competition with other countries,—the well-nigh universal case,—the same forces are at work. The prices at which the exports are sold depend on the world demand for the commodity. In that world demand, or, to speak more carefully, interplay of demand, the extent to which the consumers in the several countries care for the articles imported into them determines which countries shall sell their exports on advantageous terms. Those countries whose exports are in most urgent demand will have the greatest possibility of high money incomes. Whether they will have high incomes in fact, depends on the labor cost of their exports. The wheat which is exported both by the United States and by Russia sells at the same price; but that price means large money returns in the country of machinery, efficient labor, and cheap internal transportation, and low money returns in the country which lacks these advantages."

21. See below, pp. 273 seq.

22. See a passage quoted in my Tariff History, p. 393, note.

Part II, Chapter IV

23. This duty was subject to a reduction of 20% on sugar from Cuba, whence come almost all the imports. The duty on Cuban sugar was one cent. On the Cuban rebate and its effect see below, pp. 75-76.

24. For the details of the sugar duties, and the causes which led to the changes in the several tariff acts, I refer the reader to my Tariff History of the United States. The duties were usually arranged by gradations according to the quality (saccharine content) of the raw sugar, and sundry complicated questions arose because of the tariff gradations. These, however, though troublesome for the customs administrators, have but little bearing on the protective controversy.

25. Compare the similar case with beet-sugar production; below, p. 80.

26. For the consideration of this aspect of the situation, see below, p. 110.

27. See the testimony before the Senate Committee of 1911 on Sugar Refining (Hardwick Committee), pp. 1760-1797. The new system seems to have originated in Java among the Dutch, then to have been copied in Cuba, and adopted last in Louisiana. See the testimony of a well-informed observer, Mr. Rionda, in the suit of U.S. Govt. v. Am. Sug. Ref. Co., Transcript of Record, p. 7914.

28. Both opinions were expressed to me, in the confidence of familiar talk, by persons conversant with the situation in Louisiana.

Part II, Chapter V

29. The treaty, concluded in 1875, went into effect in 1876. It was to remain in force for seven years, then to be terminable on a year's notice. In 1884 a convention renewed the treaty for seven years from the date of ratification; thereafter it was to be again terminable on a year's notice. Ratification did not take place until 1887; seven years after that date, i.e., in 1894, the arrangement once more became terminable.

It was provided in 1884 that the United States might maintain a coaling and repair station at Pearl Harbor, a magnificent bay not far from Honolulu; and Hawaii engaged to give no other power a lien or lease on any of its harbors. Nothing was done by the United States at Pearl Harbor during the treaty period, but in later years (1907-13) much work was done for improving the channel, constructing a huge dry dock and erecting fortifications.

30. Subject to a slight reduction, however, which enured to the advantage of the sugar refiners; see below, p. 108.

31. See below, pp. 104, 105.

32. C. Whitney, The Hawaiian Islands, p. 194.

33. On one great plantation, separated by mountains 6,000 feet high from the water-soaked side of the island of Kauai, electric power was developed on the mountain streams on that side, transmitted over the mountains to the drier area, and there utilized in pumping water for irrigation from artesian wells. See the American Sugar Industry and Beet-Sugar Gazette, April 5, 1906. Cf. Whitney, The Hawaiian Islandsp. 194; Bulletin Bureau of Labor, 1903, pp. 725, 726, 733.

34. Whitney, p. 198. Cf. R. S. Baker, in the American Magazine, Nov., 1911: "I have seen great fields plowed nearly three feet deep with huge steam plows; and the stories of the use of fertilizers are almost unbelievable to a person accustomed to the ordinary farming methods of the middle West." The statistics of Hawaiian trade given in the U.S. Reports on Commerce and Navigation show that the islands imported annually (e.g., in 1910 and 1911) a million dollars' worth of fertilizers, chiefly phosphate.

35. "Hawaii, with a climate unexcelled, and a soil capable of producing the majority of both temperate and tropical products, nevertheless imports the bulk of its food. Although in the fifties, and a bit later, Hawaii supplied the Pacific coast with wheat and potatoes, it now spends abroad over one million dollars annually for food deficits of man and beast, the greater portion of which could be and should be raised on the islands. Of this amount nearly $300,000 goes for hay and grain, and $80,000 for dried fish, although the waters surrounding the islands teem with fish!... Hawaii could greatly increase both the quality and quantity of its cattle-raising by pursuing the industry more intelligently and less extravagantly. Corn is necessary to put the stock on the market in prime condition; but although there is scarcely a cattle range where corn would not flourish at a very small outlay of either time or money, the cattle men get their corn from California and pay two cents a pound for it!" Whitney, Hawaiian America, pp. 159, 173.

In 1911 the islands imported from the United States,

Meat and Dairy Products $897,000
Breadstuffs (including flour) 1,950,000
Fish (chiefly canned) 390,000

36. See Professor Katherine Coman's History of Contract Labor in the Hawaiian Islands, Publ. Amer. Econ. Assoc., 3d series, vol. iv (1903).

37. Report on Hawaii, Bulletin Department of Labor, no. 66 (Sept., 1906).

38. Some 10,000 Portuguese in all were brought in under contract, most of them between 1880 and 1885. "The Portuguese were brought in for the purpose of supplying plantation laborers, but most of them are engaged in skilled or semi-skilled occupations and even when the demand for field labor was most pressing, the second generation of Portuguese were leaving the islands.... While many Portuguese remain on the plantations till old age, they do not care to remain field laborers all their life." Report on Hawaii, Ibid., pp. 423, 429.

The Portuguese have tended in more recent years (1904-12) to drift to California; see note by V. S. Clark, in Publ. Amer. Statist. Assoc., June, 1913, p. 466.

39. Coman, p. 48.

40. The following tabular statement shows what striking changes have taken place in the population of the islands. The total population is supposed to have declined enormously since their discovery; and beyond doubt it declined very rapidly until the date of reciprocity (1876). It is estimated to have been 300,000 in the eighteenth century. In 1832, when the first census was taken, 130,000 were enumerated (Coman, p. 7). For some later years these are the census figures:

1853 1872 1884 1896 1900 1910

Total Population 73,138 56,897 80,578 109,020 154,001 191,909
Pure Hawaiian 70,036 49,044 40,014 31,019 29,799 26,041
Part-Hawaiian 983 1,487 4,218 8,485 7,857 12,506
Foreign born Chinese 361 1,938 17,937 19,382 21,746 21,674
Foreign born Japanese .... .... 116 22,329 56,230 84,207*
All other 1,755 4,428 18,293 27,805 38,369 47,481

* Including Koreans.

It will be seen that the total population declined until the reciprocity period was reached; that the native born Hawaiians (including all born in the islands, whether or no of the original stock) declined in numbers steadily, both before reciprocity and after; and that the marked growth in the total since reciprocity has come chiefly from the appearance, successively, of the Chinese and Japanese.—The figures are taken from Bulletin of the Department of Labor, 1903, p. 369, and from the 13th Census Bulletin on the Population of Hawaii.

Since 1910 a new element has appeared in Hawaii,—the Philippinos; these constituted in 1910-12 the most numerous Asiatic immigrants to the islands. Publ. Amer. Statist. Assoc., June, 1913, p. 466.

Part II, Chapter VI

41. Statements to this effect have been made to me by persons conversant with sugar planting and with the natural conditions in Porto Rico.

42. "The average annual rainfall throughout the dry [southern] zone is forty-six inches, varying between twenty and sixty inches. The average amount is insufficient for the cultivation of cane, and a rainfall approaching the minimum is a destructive drought." Report, of the Governor of Porto Rico (Commissioner of Interior's report), 1911, p. 139. Cf. Report for 1909, p. 84, for an account of the physical geography of the island.

43. By 1911, bonds to the amount of $4,000,000 had been authorized for irrigation works. A map of the proposed systems is in the Report of the Governor of Porto Rico for 1911.

44. Report of the Governor of Porto Rico (Treasurer's Report), p. 85.

45. Ibid.

46. Philippine sugar was and is of lower grade (i.e., less saccharine content) than that usually imported; hence the duty collected on it was less than the figure stated in the text, and the remission of one-quarter was less. These differences, however, affected simply the method by which the duty per pound of raw sugar was adjusted to the content of pure sugar.

47. The same policy was adopted in the tariff of 1909 as regards tobacco and cigars from the Philippines: free admission of a limited quantity. In general, Philippine products "which do not contain foreign materials to the value of more than twenty per cent of their total value" were made free of duty. Rice, however, remained on the dutiable list.

48. This same notion appears in the legislation which regulated the financial relations between Porto Rico and the United States during the transitional years immediately after the conquest of that island, 1898-1901. The revenue from duties collected on imports from Porto Rico was put into a "trust fund" to be used for the benefit of the island, and in due time was so used, for roads, schoolhouses, and the like. (W. F. Willoughby, Territories and Dependencies of the United States, pp. 113, 114.) The assumption evidently was that the duties had brought a burden, not on American consumers, but on the islanders, and was no longer to be left on them once they became a part of us.

49. It was particularly provided that "no sugar imported from Cuba... shall be admitted into the United States at a reduction of duty greater than twenty per cent [of the rates of 1897]... and no sugar, the product of any other foreign country, shall be admitted by treaty or convention into the United States, while this convention is in force, at a lower rate than that provided by the tariff act... of 1897." In the tariff act of 1913 provision was made for putting an end to this restriction on the tariff legislation of the United States.

Cuba admitted a large list of United States articles at reductions of 25, 30, and 40 per cent; the most important being in the schedule which granted a reduction of 30 per cent. The treaty was to remain in force for five years, thereafter terminable on a year's notice.

Most Cuban sugar is of the grade (testing 95°) which was dutiable under the tariff acts of 1897 and 1909 at 1.65 cents; 20 per cent of this is .33 cent; the net duty on Cuban sugar was thus 1.32 cents.

50. See p. 16 above.

51. Until about 1909 the planters seem to have got the full benefit of the "differential" on Cuban sugar. Thereafter, as their increased output pressed on the American market during the spring months, the American purchasers began to get part of it. By 1912 and 1913 the Cubans seem to have lost even the whole, at least during part of the season; this is to be inferred from the fact that considerable quantities of Cuban sugar then were sold in England. See the Record in the suit of U.S. Govt. v. Am. Sug. Ref. Co., pp. 7926, 7929

52. The head of the well-known firm of sugar brokers, Willett and Gray, estimated that for the years from 1903 to 1911 the amount remitted on Cuban sugar was divided between Cuban planter, American refiner, and American purchaser in these proportions:

Total remission (on the basis of 96° sugar) $0.337
Received by the Cuban planter $0.097
" " " refiner .063
" " " consumer .177


"Consumer" here signifies the purchaser from the refiner (wholesale dealer). Hardwick Committee Report (1911), p. 3551.

Part II, Chapter VII

53. "It is certain that it [the tariff act of 1890] gave new hope to both operators and growers, and between the time this act went into effect, in October, 1890, and the following June, some $6,000,000 had been invested in beet-sugar factories in this country.... This small bounty, even for a brief time, was a wonderful stimulus to the struggling industry." G. W. Shaw, in Bulletin no. 149 (The California Sugar Industry) of the University of California, 1903, p. 17. Cf. p. 55 above, on the Louisiana situation.

54. On the bounties which several states have given, see a note by Mr. P. T. Cherington, in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 1912, p. 381.

55. A series of Special Reports on the Progress of the Beet-Sugar Industry was issued by the Department, and from these I shall quote freely in the following pages. The "Special Agent," though by no means a scientific person, acquired and diffused much information.

56. H. W. Wiley, The Sugar Beet, p. 5. This pamphlet has been published in several editions by the Department of Agriculture; my references are to the edition of 1908 (Farmers' Bulletin 52).

In the Department's Report on the Sugar-Beet Industry for 1910 and 1911, at p. 29, a statistical statement is given of the millions of acres in the country (including such states as Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ohio) adapted to sugar-beet raising; and the complaint is made that "if one farmer in four of these states were to plant a three-acre patch and give it the care that could readily be bestowed on so small a plot, it would be unnecessary for us to buy foreign sugar,"—a mercantilist utterance of the sort often found in the Department's publications.

57. Professor G. W. Shaw, of the University of California; among his various writings see the pamphlet on Sugar Beets in the San Joaquin Valley, p. 6; Bulletin, no. 176, Agricultural Experiment Station, University of California.

58. The Sugar Beet, p. 20.

59. Report on Progress... 1909, p. 19. The same story appears in all the accounts of beet-sugar growing. See for example the statements of Mr. Hathaway, of the Michigan Beet-Sugar Company, before the Committee on Ways and Means in 1909; Tarif Hearings of 1909, p. 3311.

60. The Sugar Beet, pp. 21, 22.

61. Ibid., p. 22 (1908).

62. Report on Progress... 1906, p. 38.

63. Report for 1910 and 1911, p. 64.

64. Report on Progress... 1906, p. 24. A correspondent writes me from California (1912): "Otherwise than in the performance of such labor as can be done with teams, very few Americans undertake hand labor in the beet fields."

65. Tariff Hearings of 1909, p. 3418. "Americans will not do that work; not one in fifty," said a Colorado beet grower, testifying (in 1911) before the House Committee to investigate the American Sugar Refining Co.; Hearings, p. 3192. Compare a similar passage in Report of Kansas State Board of Agriculture for September, 1906 (a special report on sugar beets), p. 20.

66. V. Clark, in Bulletin Department of Labor, September, 1908, p. 483.

67. Report on Progress... 1904, p. 37. Compare the Report of the Kansas State Board of Agriculture, cited above, p. 19. A correspondent writes me from Bay City, Michigan: "We secure the laborers in such centers as Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, and Pittsburgh, and these laborers when brought to Michigan make a contract with the farmer to take care of his beets at a certain sum per acre, averaging about $20 per acre.... It is safe to say that about two-thirds of the beets are taken care of by outside labor. In our own case [a large sugar company] we probably brought in about 18oc, laborers." On some smaller beet tracts in Michigan, the farmers and their families do the work themselves, employing no "outside" labor.

68. The form of contract used by the Great Western Sugar Co. of Colorado is printed in the Hearings of the Committee to investigate the American Sugar Refining Co. (1911), p. 3186.

69. See the excellent analysis by Professor H. C. Taylor, in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, xxii, p. 179 (1903). Cf. the same writer's Agricultural Economics, pp. 65 seq., and Carver's Rural Economics, p. 100. Professor Taylor, in a recent paper (The Place of Economics in Agricultural Education and Research, p. 96; published by University of Wisconsin, 1911)states more explicitly his conclusion that "it is hardly probable that the sugar beet will ever be able to compete with corn on even terms in the corn belt of the United States."

70. Tariff Hearings of 1909, p. 341.

71. Report on Progress... 1904, p. 56.

72. My colleague, Professor T. N. Carver, states to me: "Corn silage will furnish fifty per cent more feed, acre per acre, than any root crop. Moreover it costs half as much, or less than half, to grow an acre of silage and feed it as it does to grow an acre of any root crop and feed it. The only chance for beet-root cake is to sell it as a by-product, the balance being covered by the profits on sugar."

73. Progress of the Dairy Industry in Wisconsin, by H. C. Taylor and C. E. Lee, p. 7; Bulletin no. 210 of the Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Wisconsin (1911).

74. Mr. C. N. Smith, in the Tariff Hearings of 1909, p. 3317.

75. Professor G. W. Shaw of the University of California, in the pamphlet already referred to, p. 6.

76. I quote again from Professor Shaw's instructive pamphlet, at pp. 16, 17.

77. Report on Progress... 1909, p. 37.

78. Report on Progress... 1904, p. 46.

79. "The exceptional soil and climatological conditions in California seem peculiarly adapted to the production of beets with a high sugar content. While their reported yield per acre is not so great as that of some other states, the sugar content is decidedly in excess of any other, so that with an acreage considerably less than that of Michigan the total yield of sugar is much more. The calculated yield per acre for the past season was very nearly 3,310 pounds. Many of the California soils are very retentive of moisture, so that with an annual rainfall far below that of the central and eastern part of the country beets can be grown successfully without irrigation. The little rain which they have is usually so nicely distributed through the early and middle seasons of growth as to leave almost ideal conditions for the period of ripening, with its accompanying storage of sugar in the cells. This ripening process is also materially assisted by the alternation of cool nights and warm days, a condition which seems best suited to the formation and storage of sugar in this plant." Report on Beet-Sugar Industry in 1910 and 1911, p. 19.

I take some satisfaction in recalling that, when discussing the beet-sugar situation as early as 1889, I referred to the unusual possibilities of California. "It is not impossible," I wrote then, "that the extraordinary combination of soil and climate in California may bring about a development which could not be attained in other parts of the country." Quarterly Journal of Economics, iii, p. 266, note.

80. References to the vicissitudes of the weather, similar to that quoted in the text, abound in the Department of Agriculture's Reports on Progress, e.g., Report for 1903, p. 139; for 1904, p. 113; for 1909, p. 46. Concerning the effect on the quality of the beets, see Report for 1903, p. 140; for 1904, p. 57.

A typical statement is that of a recent report: "Normally, the length of the growing season is sufficient and the rainfall is ample and suitably distributed throughout spring and summer, with dry, increasingly cool, fall weather to afford conditions needed for maturing sugar. It is to be noted, however, that in the case of the last crop (1911) this normal condition of affairs was seriously altered. A fine growing season was followed by an unusually rainy ripening and harvesting period, so that what had given promise of being the greatest crop ever produced turned out very poor in quality, although of fair tonnage." Report on Beet-Sugar Industry in 1910 and 1911, p. 22.

81. See for instance Report on Progress... 1901, pp. 132 seq.

82. See Ballod, in Verhandlungend. Vereins f. Sozialpolitik, 1909, p. 143, and Esslen, Das Gesetz des abnehmenden Bodenertrags, pp. 226, 237.

83. Cf. above, p. 62.

84. See chapter ii, p. 28, above.

85. Shaw, The California Sugar Industry (1903), p. 17.

86. The Sugar Beet (1908), p. 38. Similar statements have been made to me in conversation by persons engaged in beet-sugar making. Others, however, no less well informed, have expressed to me a doubt whether any appreciable improvements have been made by the American makers, especially when compared with what the Germans have done.

87. There was and is bickering, inevitably, between the farmers who grow the beets and the sugar manufacturers; the farmers maintaining that the manufacturers beat down the growers and pocketed the bulk of the profits for themselves. Very likely this was the case; but the growers got quite enough to make beet culture worth while, as is proved by its rapid extension. See Hearings on the American Sugar Refining Co. (Hardwick Committee) 1911, pp. 3313 and passim.

88. Considered in the preceding chapter, pp. 76 seq.

89. Figures of this sort are not so easy to compile as one might suppose. They must be put together from scattered statements in the Treasury Department Report on Commerce and Navigation and in the Statistical Abstract.

Domestic production is reckoned by seasons, not by fiscal years, and some adjustment is necessary for comparison with the imported (non-domestic) supply.

In any year it will be found that there are slight discrepancies between the figures given in the various sources. For the present purpose, the discrepancies signify nothing. The figures, which I have intentionally given in round numbers, state the outcome without any substantial deviation from statistical accuracy.

Part II, Chapter VIII

90. Thus, to give some typical figures, the duties on sugar were:

On raw On refined Differential
1789 1 cent 3 cents 2 cents
1802 2½ cents 7 " 4½ "
1816 3 " 10 @ 12 " 7 to 9 "
1842 2½ " 6 " 3½ "
1861 (March) ¾ " 2 " 1¼ "

On some of the early problems of legislation and administration, see C. S. Griffin, "The Taxation of Sugar, 1789-1861," in Quarterly Journal of Economics, xi, p. 296.

91. In the years preceding 1883, sugars having high saccharine content were artificially colored dark in order to bring them in at a lower rate of duty. Long contests in the courts ensued, the government trying to collect higher duties, while the importers contended that under the language of the statute color alone, irrespective of saccharine content, settled the rate of duty. The importers finally won their case; hence the final application of the polariscope tests in the act of 1883. On this episode see D. A. Wells, Report on the Assessment and Collection of Duties on Imported Sugars (New York, 1878); "How Congress and the Public deal with a Great Revenue Problem," Princeton Review, November, 1880.

92. Thus in the tariff acts of 1897 and 1909, all sugar below 16 Dutch standard was assessed for duty as raw sugar, on a scale graduated by the polariscope test. Sugar testing 75° (75 per cent of saccharine content) paid 95/100 of a cent. For each additional degree, the duty became 35/1000 of a cent higher. Hence sugar testing 96° (which is the grade most largely imported) paid 1.685 cents per pound. If there were such a thing as raw sugar testing 100°, the duty on it would be 1.825 cents per pound. The duty on refined sugar, i.e., "all sugar above number 16, Dutch standard, or which has gone through a process of refining" was 1.95 cents in 1897, and 1.90 cents in 1909; leaving a differential (as stated in the text) of 0.125 cents in 1897, and of 0.075 in 1909.

The word "differential" is sometimes used in discussions of the sugar situation to designate not the additional duty on refined sugar, but the difference in price between raw sugar and refined. To avoid confusion, I shall use "margin" to designate this latter amount, reserving "differential" to indicate the refiner's protection under the several tariff acts.

93. An official in a refining company has given me the following figures showing the capacity of a refinery under his charge (not one of the largest) at the following dates:

in 1870, 250,000 lbs. (about 700 barrels) daily
in 1880, 450,000 " ( " 1,300 " ) "
in 1890, 700,000 " ( " 2,000 " ) "
in 1900, 1,250,000 " ( " 3,600 " ) "

94. For brevity, I shall hereafter follow popular usage in designating the American Sugar Refining Company, as "the trust."

On the history of the trust, see a monograph by Vogt, "The Sugar Refining Industry" (University of Pennsylvania), 1908; and on the earlier phase, up to 1900, J. W. Jenks, The Trust Problem, pp. 130 seq. Much information is to be got from the Report of the Industrial Commission of 1898 on Trusts and Industrial Combinations (1900); in the evidence before the Senate Committee of 1894; in the Hearings before the Committee on the Investigation of the American Sugar Refining Co., usually spoken of as the Hardwick Committee (1911-12); and in the voluminous testimony given in the suit instituted by the Government (in 1912-15) for the dissolution of the trust.

95. Report of the Industrial Commission (of 1900), i, p. 101. On this earlier period, see the excellent account in Jenks, The Trust Problem (1900), pp. 133 seq., where is also a chart showing in much detail the fluctuations in the prices of raw and refined sugar.

96. The cost of refining is usually stated to be 5/8 cent a pound, or 62½ cents per cwt. This is "cost" in the accountant's sense; including all direct and indirect outlays, but not including anything for return on the investment in the way of interest or profit. The amount by which the margin exceeds this "cost" is the source of profit for the refiner. The figure commonly given for cost (5/8 cent) is, of course, a rough and approximate one. It is much affected by the refinery's "running full": the more complete and steady is the utilization of the great plant, the lower is the cost per unit. I suspect that 5/8 cent is a liberal estimate of cost for a large refinery well managed and utilized to full capacity. But it seems to be impossible, under existing trade conditions, to run a refinery continuously to its full capacity.

Looking at the figures given for prices of raw and refined sugar, it will be seen that the margin varied from maxima of 1.42 in 1882 and 1.26 cents in 1888 to a minimum of .5 cent in 1899. The former figures meant a very large margin for profit; the latter meant no profit at all. During the later years (1902-10) the margin varied from .75 to .90 cent; or, in round numbers it exceeded cost, and contributed to interest and profits, by an amount varying from 1/8 to -8/10 cent per pound. I doubt whether it could be proved that, allowing for interest and "reasonable" business profits, this brought a price in excess of total normal cost. Compare what is said below, chapter xii, p. 210, on "cost."

The figures given are averages for the successive years. Such figures might be misleading, since there might be variations within each year, concealed in the averages, that would affect the significance of the table and chart. But in this case more minute and detailed tabulations lead to no changes in the results. A chart showing the price figures month by month has been made for me by Mr. H. L. Perrin of Boston University, who has carried on an investigation of the trust's history under my guidance, and no deviations were found that would modify the conclusions stated in the text. I am glad to acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. Perrin.

97. It is not easy to make out precisely what was the situation of the refiner (i.e., the trust) during the period when the tariff act of 1894 was in force. The sugar duties of that act were regarded as a surrender to the trust; see my Tariff History of the United States, p. 308. It has been said that the ad valorem duty of forty per cent then imposed on raw sugar worked to its advantage. For some figures on the profits of refining under the several tariff acts of 1890, 1894, 1897, see the testimony of Mr. W. P. Willett before the Hardwick Committee (1912), pp. 3548-3549.

98. See p. 77, above.

99. The Cuban remission was not in terms limited to raw sugar; it would have applied to any refined sugar imported from Cuba; but in fact none came thence to the United States.

It is this situation which probably accounted for the indifference with which the refiners acceded to the reduction of the differential in the tariff act of 1909.

100. See above, p. 60.

101. In the holding company (The Western Sugar Refining Company) which took over the California refinery built by the trust and the Spreckels refinery, each party held one-half of the stock. The refinery which had been built by the trust was immediately closed, and was ultimately destroyed by the San Francisco earthquake. The Spreckels plant sufficed to refine all the sugar consumed on the coast. See Hardwick Committee Hearings (1911), pp. 927-932.

In 1911 the trust sold its stock in the Western Sugar Refining Co. (to the Spreckels interests); this being part of the policy of conformity to law adopted by the later managers.

102. In the earlier period, until about 1890, the Hawaiian planters were not united, and accepted varying prices for their sugar. Later they combined, and made contracts for a year or series of years with the trust, stipulating that all planters should get the same price,—a fraction below the New York price. In 1912 the reduction from the New York price was ¼ cent for sugar delivered at San Francisco, 1/10 cent for sugar delivered at Atlantic ports. The trust contended that its obligation to take at once all the Hawaiian sugar offered made some such reduction reasonable; and the willingness of the Hawaiians to enter on the arrangement for sugar delivered at the eastern ports (1/10 cent reduction) doubtless rests on this circumstance. It is not clear that during the later years of the period the arrangement was such that the Hawaiian planters had ground for complaint. See on this subject, the statement of Willett, in the record of the suit of the U.S. Gov't v. Amer. Sug. Refining Co., i, p. 83 (1912); testimony before the Hardwick Committee (1911), pp. 89-90, and 3610; and the pamphlet by F. C. Lowry, Our High Tariff on Sugar (published in various editions, 1909-1912; see the edition of 1909, p. 4).

103. Whether the Louisiana planters were "oppressed" by the trust during the later years is not easy to make out. Their spokesmen naturally thought so; see the testimony before the Hardwick committee (Hardwick Report, p. 1841). The representatives of the trust pointed out (ibid., p. 133) that they engaged to take the whole amount offered by any planter, at the stipulated reduction from the New York price, and to hold it and assume the risk of depreciation; all of which served to make the arrangement a reasonable one. See also the testimony of Mr. Atkins in the suit of U.S. v. Am. Sug. Ref. Co., Transcript of Record, p. 6318.—It must be remembered that during the later period the price of refined sugar in the Mississippi valley could no longer be kept up, being subject to the competition of other refiners and also to that of the beet-sugar makers of the west.

104. Cf. p. 60, supra.

105. In this sketch of the Sugar Trust, I have confined myself to those operations which had to do directly with the protective tariff. The furious speculation in sugar stock and its manipulation by insiders, the political corruption or semi-corruption practised by the early managers, the trust's methods of competition, the much-discussed episode of the capture of the Philadelphia (Segal) refinery,—all belong to the history of the trust problem, in which this particular combination could be the subject of a veritably sensational chapter. The frauds on the revenue through underweighing are also outside the scope of the present volume. They are connected with the administrative side of customs duties, and with the unsavory political conditions of the closing years of the nineteenth century. On the death in 1907 of H. O. Havemeyer, who had maintained through his life a curious despotic control of the trust, its management came into other and better hands, and a new phase began.

Part III, Chapter IX

1. The figures of production, at quinquennial intervals, are (in 1,000 tons of 2,240 lbs.):

Great Britain United States Germany
1860 .... .... 545
1865 .... .... 988
1870 5,963 1,665 1,391
1875 6,365 2,024 2,029
1880 7,749 3,835 2,729
1885 7,415 4,044 3,687
1890 7,904 9,203 4,658
1895 7,703 9,446 5,464
1900 8,960 13,789 8,384
1905 9,608 22,882 10,700
1910 10,012 27,304 14,556

2. For an account of the industry during this period I refer to my Tariff History of the United States, pp. 123-125.

3. During the earlier years, bituminous coal was much used in the blast-furnaces without being first coked. But soon this crude procedure was given up, and the coal was used in the form of coke.

4. The production of pig-iron by fuel at quinquennial intervals is given below. By way of illustrating the trend over a long period, the year 1855 has been taken as the starting-point. The figures, as in the previous table, indicate thousands of gross tons:

Anthracite Bituminous Charcoal
1855 341 56 303
1860 464 109 248
1865 428 169 234
1870 830 508 326
1875 811 846 367
1880 1,614 1,741 480

and Coke
1885 250 1,059 2,389 357
1890 249 1,937 6,388 628
1885 56 1,214 7,950 225
1900 40 1,677 11,727 384
1905 ... 1,674 20,965 352
1910 20 629 26,528 396

Charcoal iron has qualities that make it advantageous for certain uses, and hence it continues to be produced in small quantities.

5. It should be noted that in the Marquette region, also, iron ore was secured at the first working and for many years thereafter by open cuts. But the extraction of ore on a great scale has proceeded by underground operations.

6. Variously spelled: Mesabi, Mesaba, Messabi, Messaba.

7. The United States Geological Survey, in its successive admirable Reports on the Mineral Resources of the United States, has followed the history of the iron fields of Lake Superior, as, indeed, of all the mineral resources of the country. In the issue for 1895-96 (forming vol. iii of the Seventeenth Annual Report of the Survey) a summary description is given, with convenient sketch maps showing the location of the several fields.

The relative importance of the fields, the order in which they were developed, and their relation to the iron ore production of the whole country, are shown by the following figures:

Iron Ore Production (in millions of gross tons)
1880 1890 1900 1910
Menominee .6 2.3 3.3 4.2
Marquette 1.4 3.0 3.5 4.4
Gogebic . . 2.8 2.9 4.3
Vermilion . . .9 1.6 1.2
Mesabi .. .. 7.8 29.2
Total Lake Superior 2.0 2.5 19.1 43.4
Total United States 7.1 7.6 27.6 51.2

8. Jevons, The Coal Question, second edition, chap. xv. Jevons in that chapter looked for important changes in the United States, chiefly from the wider use of anthracite in iron making. The fact that "the Americans are, of all people in the world, the most forward in driving canals, river navigations, and railways," was noted by him as sure to affect the American iron trade; but even his keen imagination and wide knowledge could not foresee how much and in what directions this "driving" would operate.

9. "A happy application of anthracite coal to the manufacture of iron, the discovery of new beds of bituminous coal, the erection of iron works in the vicinity of the most easterly beds now existing, and the improved means of transportation which may bring this at a reasonable rate to the sea-border, may hereafter enable the American iron master to compete in cheapness with the foreign rolled iron in the Atlantic district.... The ultimate reduction of the price of American to that of British rolled iron can only, and ultimately will, be accomplished in that western region which abounds with ore, and in which is found the most extensive formation of bituminous coal that has yet been discovered in any part of the globe, and this also lying so near the surface of the earth as to render the extraction of the mineral less expensive than anywhere else." Albert Gallatin, "Memorial to the Free Trade Convention" (1832), as reprinted in State Papers and Speeches on the Tariff, pp. 179, 180.

10. The production of coke was (in tons of 2,000 lbs.)

United States Connellsville region
1880 3.3 millions 2.2 millions
1890 11.5 " 6.5 "
1900 20.5 " 10.4 "
1910 41.7 " 19.7 "

In the second column I have combined in a single figure the production of the older Connellsville region and that of the "lower district" which came to be of importance after 1900. See Mineral Resources of the United States, 1911, Part II, pp. 215, 256, 259.

11. "Few people who have not actually run a blast-furnace realize what it means to fill the capacious maw of one of these monsters with raw material. A stack of 200 tons' daily capacity, running on 50 per cent ore, must have delivered to it each day something more than 400 tons of ore, 250 to 300 tons of coke, according to the character of the metal required, and over 100 tons of limestone,—say 900 tons of raw materials. Add the 200 tons of pig-iron shipped out, and we have a daily freight movement of 1,100 tons, taking no note of the disposition of the slag. This is 55 carloads of 20 tons each [A modern ore car will carry 50 to 60 tons; and coal cars have been introduced carrying 90 tons.—F. W. T.].... Starting up a furnace of ordinary capacity calls immediately for the labor, from first to last, of nearly a thousand men; for the use of at least a thousand railway cars, and many locomotives; for perhaps several steamers and vessels on the lakes." A. Brown. "The Outlook in the American Iron Industry," in the Engineering Magazine, October, 1899, p. 88.—By 1910, the daily capacity of a "modern" iron furnace had again been doubled, reaching 400 tons a day, and bringing a corresponding increase in the ore and fuel required.

12. "Every extra handling means more cost.... Formerly it was necessary to trim the cargoes; and this had to be done by hand, and gave employment to a great many men at exceedingly high wages. The work, however, was killing while it lasted. Now trimming is in most cases done away with, because the immense size of the freighters renders them stable in any weather; and, if there is any great inequality in the trim of the boat, it is rectified by shifting the water ballast from one compartment to another." Peter White, The Mining Industry of Northern Michigan, in Publ. Mich. Pol. Sci. Assoc., iii, p. 153.

13. Of the enterprises merged in the Steel Corporation, the two largest, before 1900, were the Carnegie Company, and the Federal Steel Company, the latter dominated by the firm of J. P. Morgan & Co. Both carried on vertical combination on a great scale,—mining the coal and ore, transporting them on railways and vessels of their own, and operating great iron and steel works. The Carnegie works centered about Pittsburgh, the Federal about Chicago. The American Steel & Wire Co. illustrated both vertical and horizontal combination. The same was the case with the so-called "Moore properties": the National Steel Company with its affiliations, the Sheet Steel, Tin Plate, and Steel Hoop companies. The Bridge (structural steel) and Tube companies had no raw-material supplies of their own, and so represented horizontal combination only.

The history of the great consolidation has often been told. The authoritative account is in the Report of the Commission of Corporations on the Steel Industry, Part I (1911). An excellent summary is in Berglund, The United States Steel Corporation, in Columbia University Studies (1907).

14. In this table the figure for eastern Pennsylvania is for the iron smelted in the state with anthracite, or anthracite and coke mixed, while that for western Pennsylvania is for the bituminous (coke) iron. The separation by fuels, it is true, does not indicate with complete accuracy the geographical distribution. But the iron smelted in Pennsylvania east of the Appalachian chain was formerly smelted almost entirely with anthracite, and is still smelted mainly with a mixture of anthracite and coke; and, at all events, this was the only mode in which the statistics at hand made it possible to separate the eastern and western parts of Pennsylvania.

In the southern district, Virginia and Maryland are near the seaboard, and might be constituted a group apart from the other states there included. But the iron industry in them, as in the others, is of recent growth, and depends both for ore and fuel on different sources of supply from those of the northern seaboard region. By far the most important iron producing state in the southern district of the table is Alabama.

15. The increase in this district is due entirely to the development of great steel plants in Buffalo, N. Y., using Lake ore and Pennsylvania coal, and therefore belonging industrially rather to the central district than to the eastern.

16. See Fitch, The Steel Workers, pp. 102-103.

Part III, Chapter X


(Per gross ton of 2,240 lbs.)
Pig-Iron Steel Rails
Act of July 14, 1870 $7.00 $28.00
" June 6, 1872 6.30 25.20
" March 3, 1875 7.00 28.00
" March 3, 1883 6.72 17.00
" October 1, 1890 ("McKinley") 6.72 13.44
" August 27, 1894 ("Wilson") 4.00 7.84
" July 24, 1907 ("Dingley") 4.00 7.84
" August 5, 1909 ("Payne-Aldrich") 2.50 3.92
" " 1913 free free

The war duty on pig-iron had been $9.00 a ton; it was reduced to $7.00 in 1870. Steel rails as a separate item appeared for the first time in 1870. The reductions of duties in 1872 were part of the "horizontal" 10 per cent reduction made on most manufactured articles in that year, repealed in 1875.— For the history of the various tariff acts and the way in which the iron and steel duties were dealt with in them, the reader is referred to my Tariff History of the United States.

18. See chapter ii, p. 19, above.

19. The production of these special brands varies greatly, within the country and without, apparently from the sporadic and easily exhausted pockets of the peculiar ore. But the domestic production, on the whole, has been rapidly increasing. See the Report of the American Iron and Steel Association for 1898, p. 40.

20. See the Appendix to D. A. Wells's Recent Economic Changes, pp. 469, 470.

21. That such an interplay would have lessened the fluctuations in prices is made more probable by the fact that the ups and downs of industrial activity are not precisely synchronous in the international sphere. The speculative revival in 1870-73 began in England and on the Continent earlier than in the United States. The American revival in 1879-80, on the other hand, preceded the European, as did also that of 1886-87. In 1889-90—certainly so far as iron went—the European demand again showed renewed strength earlier than the American; and the same was true in the period 1897-99.

22. See an instructive article by J. S. Newberry in the International Review for November, 1874, i, especially pp. 778-780, where it is pointed out that at that date "the ingenious, enterprising, and energetic Americans" were still "far outdone by their English relatives."

23. A careful and detailed survey of the development of the German iron industry is given by G. Goldstein, in a series of articles published in the Verhandlungen des Vereins zur Beförderung des Gewerbefleisses, Berlin, 1908-09. An excellent brief account, with extracts from the speeches of those who advocated protection to the iron industry because "young," is in the same author's paper, Der deutsche Eisenzoll; Ein Erziehungszoll, Volkwirtschaftliche Zeitfragen, Berlin, 1912. On later developments, among them the growing importation of ore, see an article by E. Günther, in Schmoller's Jahrbuch, Heft 3, 1914.

24. Professor M. Sering in his Geschichte der Preussisch-Deutschen Eisenzölle von 1818 zur Gegenwart (Schmoller's Forschungen, iv) traces the history of protection to iron, with special regard to the period 1840-70, and concludes that in this earlier period there was successful application of protection to young industries; intimating also that the German iron industry was well on its feet when he wrote (1882) and that there was no good ground for duties as high as those enacted in 1879. Compare, for the United States before the civil war, what I have said in my Tariff History of the United States, pp. 123 seq.

25. I venture to reprint here some passages from my presidential address of 1904 before the American Economic Association, on the "Present Position of the Doctrine of Free Trade," Papers and Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Meeting, pp. 54 seq.

"Not only the spirit of freedom and enterprise within the community has its effect, but that spirit with reference to other communities also. The political position of a country and its martial success seem to have a reflex effect on the industrial success of its citizens in time of peace.

"Here the recent development of Germany is apposite. Her industrial advance during the last thirty years [1870-1900] is one of the striking phenomena of our time, and leads naturally to speculation as to its causes. No doubt these causes are varied, as in all such cases. The thorough organization of popular education and of scientific education is one cause. The stimulating effect of free trade within the country, as established by the Zollverein since 1834, is another: though this gain had been enjoyed by France throughout the nineteenth century, and by England for centuries before. Much is due to the whole change in the political and social atmosphere which came with the crumbling of petty absolutism, and which was consummated with the foundation of the German Empire. But to all this must be added the new spirit which came over the country after the war of 1870. Germany emerged from the conflict with a new sense of strength and confidence. The new feeling communicated itself to the field of peaceful industry. Vigor, enterprise, and boldness showed themselves. Large enterprises in new fields were launched and successfully conducted, and great captains of industry came to the fore. A spirit of conquest in all directions seems to have spread through the people, bred or at least nurtured by the great military conquest of the Franco-German war.

"Is it fanciful to suppose that consequences of the same sort have appeared in other countries also after victorious wars? England emerged from the Napoleonic wars with a great feeling of pride and power. She alone had never yielded to the great conqueror. The period which followed was that of her most sure and rapid economic advance. She then established the hegemony in the industry of the civilized world which she maintained through the century. The northern part of the United States, after the civil war, felt a similar impulse. That struggle had been on a greater scale than was dreamed of at the outset, and its outcome proved the existence of unexpected power and resource. It is probably no accident that the ensuing years showed a spirit of daring in industry, and sudden and successful activity in commercial enterprises.

"No one is more opposed than I am to all that goes with war and militarism. It is with reluctance that I bring myself to admit that the same spirit which leads to success in war, may also lead to success in the arts of peace. Yet so it seems to be. Men being what they are, nothing rouses them so thoroughly as fighting. The temper which then pervades a community, communicates itself by imitation and emulation, and shows itself in all the manifestations of its activity. A great war lifts the minds of men to large undertakings, and takes its place with other factors in stimulating the full exercise of the powers of every individual."

26. J. S. Mill, Essays on some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, p. 148; see also his System of Logic, Book VI, ch. vii, §§ 2, 3, 4.

27. In the article "Volkswirthschaft" in the Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, reprinted in the volume Ueber einige Grundfragen (1898), Mill is referred to as trying to prove his theorem "with the inept example [groben Beispiele] that the general inquiry, whether a system of protection makes a country rich, can lead to no result. He fails to see that he puts his question wrongly; i.e., in terms too general. Specialized investigations, such as Sering's on the German iron duties, Sombart's on the tariff policy of Italy, and others of recent times, show that inquiries which examine properly the facts in detail may prove, with reasonable certainty, when protective duties operate to promote prosperity." Ueber einige Grundfragen, p. 296. Cf. what Schmoller says in his Grundriss, ii, Book IV, especially pp. 647 seq. (1st edition).

28. Chapter ii, p. 27 .

29. Grundfragen, p. 293.

30. The figures are derived from the American Iron and Steel Association Reports. They are for gross tons (2,240 lbs.).

31. The figures are derived from the American Iron and Steel Association Reports, and from British periodicals. They give the prices of two grades of iron which are fairly comparable in the two countries,—foundry iron and Bessemer steel.

Part III, Chapter XI

32. I am indebted for the preparation of this chart to Mr. E. P. Coleman, Jr., who investigated the copper industry under my guidance while an undergraduate in Harvard College.

33. See p. 140, above.

34. See the vivid account of the enterprise in the Letters and Recollections of Alexander Agassiz, chapter iv. On the general significance of risk, especially in metalliferous mines, compare Einaudi, La Rendita Mineraria, § 13, pp. 47 seq., and Taussig, Principles of Economics, chapter xliv, ii, pp. 92 seq.

35. The following figures, giving in round numbers the production of copper, indicate what was the position of the Michigan mines in 1860-80. For comparison I have given figures for later years also. By 1890 Michigan had lost its dominant position among the copper producing districts; the discoveries in Montana and Arizona (to mention the chief) completely changed the situation.

COPPER PRODUCED (in millions of pounds)
and Hecla
Total in
Total in
United States
1860 .. 12 16
1870 14 26 28
1880 32 51 60
Montana Arizona Utah Total
United States
1890 60 100 112 34 ... 260
1900 78 142 270 116 19 606
1910 73 220 283 297 125 1,080

Part III, Chapter XII

36. Accounts of the steel rail pools of this earlier period are to be found in the Iron Age, November 16, 1893; February 11, 1897; January 1, 1901. On the general prevalence of such agreements in the iron and steel trade see Belcher, "Industrial Pooling Agreements," in Quarterly Journal of Economics, xix, p. 111 (1904).

37. See the chart on p. 140.

38. See for example the testimony in the government suit of 1912-13 against the Steel Corporation, Transcript of Record, pp. 1674-1681. There was apparently no written agreement, but all the essentials of a pool. An arbitrary figure ($17 or $18 a ton) was fixed, presumably an approximation to prime cost; everything received above this by each member was paid to a representative of the pool, who divided the money among the members according to fixed allotments. This arrangement was kept up until 1904, possibly even to a later date.

39. See the testimony in the Steel Corporation suit, pp. 92, 337.

40. The steadiness of price was not in reality so complete as the chart, based on the "official" quotations, would indicate. During 1903 there was heavy demand for steel rails, and the mills were unable to fill the orders that poured in from the railroads. The contract price remained $28.00, but not for prompt delivery. Premiums were paid for "spot" rails; in other words, the market price went up. Considerable importations took place during this year, chiefly to ports on the Pacific Coast,—the only importations of consequence since 1887. This flurry subsided within a year.

41. See what is said below on exports and "dumping," pp. 202 seq.

42. See an article by E. S. Meade, "Price Policy of the Steel Corporation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, 1908, xxii, p. 452.

43. On this topic, I have been greatly aided by the research of one of my students, Mr. D. E. Dunbar, the results of whose work are shortly to be published in book form as one of the Hart Schaffner & Marx prize essays.

44. The precise duties, with ad valorem equivalents (on the basis of foreign prices) for the specific duties of 1875 and 1890, were:

1862 25 per cent ad valorem
1872 15 "
1875 1.1cents per lb. (equivalent to 20 per cent)
1883 1 " " 30 "
1890 2.2 " " 70 "
1894 1.2 "
1897 1.5 "
1909 1.2 "
1913 15 per cent ad valorem

A duty of 2.5 cents a pound had been provided (i.e., probably meant to be imposed) in 1872, but had never gone into effect, because of the Treasury ruling referred to in the text.

45. That is, by 1894. The tin plate duty, though imposed in 1890, did not go into effect until July 1, 1801.

46. I append at the close of this chapter statistics on the tin plate situation.

47. For example, in the middle of 1913, the constituent elements in the cost of production for a ton of tin plate stood in round numbers as follows:

Sheet bars (including freight, wastage, and the like) $31.00
Cost of Rolling $20.00
Cost of Tinning $25.00

I derive these figures from information privately given.

48. On this earlier stage, see the good account in Jenks, The Trust Problem (1900), pp. 157 seq., where is also an elaborate chart showing the course of prices 1888-99.

49. The tin plate stock was exchanged for stock of the Steel Corporation on these terms:

U.S. Steel Corporation
For every $100 of Preferred Stock Common Stock
Tin Plate Preferred Stock 125 ...
" Common " 20 125

50. See the next chapter, pp. 208 seq.

51. Thus in 1901, a writer in the (English) Iron and Coal Trades Review, May 2, 1901, speaks of "labor-saving appliances thoroughly exploited in America.... There is not a single point about the Welsh tin plate trade that can be said to compare favorably with the American." It should be said, however, that an unmistakable bias against the trade unions runs through this paper. A correspondent of the London Economist (January 29, 1910) remarks that "the English manufacturers sullenly clung to their old methods" for a considerable period, but "eventually scrapped their worst mills" and regained prosperity. The Iron and Coal Trades Review for March 28, 1913, printed an extended paper, read before the South Wales Institute of Engineers, by Mr. H. Spence Thomas, in which the Welsh industry is described and some comparison made with the American. "American practice gives 1,500 to 2,000 boxes per mill per week, whilst the English average is only half of this quantity." "In America all the pots are handled by overhead cranes,... by these mechanical means America is a great way ahead of the generality of our English works." In the discussion on this paper (p. 488) there was reference by several speakers to the difficulty of introducing improvements in face of the workmen's opposition. One referred to an episode in his own experience: "he put up an electric crane to do work for annealers that had hitherto been done by themselves; yet not one penny had been got off the annealers' wage bill" [the annealers were paid by the piece]. Still another said that "they were handicapped by the disinclination of the workmen as a whole to cooperate. If this could be secured, he felt they could do as well in the matter of output and economy as was now done in America."

On the restriction of output by the men (to 36 boxes per eight-hour shift), see Jones, The Tin Plate Industry, pp. 182 seq. This limit, easily within their powers, was slowly and reluctantly given up, in 1900-02. On opposition to labor-saving devices, ibid., p. 185; and on American improvements, p. 132.

52. Mr. Jones, in his excellent book on the Tin Plate Industry (pp. 99, 100), is disposed to admit that protection to young industries was in this case applied in the United States with success; and adds that "if in spite of the difference in the general level of prices in the two countries, the money costs of production differ so little, it is obvious that the net amount of human energy employed in tin plate manufacture is much lower in America than in Wales."

53. I have come across nothing to indicate whether the Standard Company got a rebate or "drawback" from the Steel Corporation, such as the latter concern gives to manufacturers who use its products in export business. Presumably it secured the "drawback," like others.

54. On the sugar refining trust, see above, chapter viii, pp. 100-114.

55. In 1898, and thereafter, virtually all the imported tin plate was reëxported under drawback.

Part III, Chapter XIII

56. The exports of certain kinds of iron and steel implements are given below for selected years. The figures are taken from the Statistical Reports of the American Iron and Steel Association, and are for calendar (not fiscal) years. The figures are not given with regularity in the Reports, nor in much detail for the earlier period; hence the apparently arbitrary selection of years. They stand for millions of dollars (3.2 = $3,200,000).

Exports of 1872 1877 1890 1895 1904 1910
Machinery not otherwise specified 3.2 3.5 9.4 12.1 22.9 25.2
Saws and tools ("edge-tools" for 1877) .. .9 1.8 2.0 5.6 8.5
Builders' hardware .. .. 2.1 2.8 5.5 7.3
Sewing machines 2.4 1.6 2.9 3.0 6.0 8.1
Locomotives .. .6 1.0 2.1 4.7 2.8
Agricultural implements 1.7 2.0 3.3 5 .3 21.6 31.3

57. Chapter iii, pp. 37-45.

58. The total production of machine tools in the United States was in 1909 about $40,000,000 in value, the exports $4,500,000, the imports $200,000. (Senate Hearings of 1912, p. 128.) In these same Hearings, the manufacturer who spoke for the machine tool makers remarked:

"The American engineer, with his inventive ability, supported by the progressive and aggressive spirit and enterprise of American capital, was the pioneer in bringing the modern machine tool to its present high productive capacity. He not only gave to American industry in all its forms, but also to the industries of the world, the instruments by means of which the cost of all manufacturing has been greatly reduced.... As one characteristic of the American tool builder, he is constantly inventing and perfecting new machinery, to his credit; he takes the lead in the world along the line of creating new machinery." (P. 177.) And yet he presently said (p. 182):

"We are claiming that our exports to Europe are largely confined to highly specialized and highly organized machines, such as are not as yet made to compete with the German machine; that the Europeans are making excellent machines of the kind and type that we shipped over there ten years ago; that they are manufacturing those machines today at a cost very much under ours, and the removal of the tariff would not bring into this country immediately the highly organized machines, because they are not making them over there, but it would bring into this country a type of machine which probably seventy-five per cent of this trade is engaged today in making."

See also the instructive testimony of the manufacturers of printing presses concerning the imitation of exported American presses, with the usual jeremiads about the disasters to be expected when these should be made with foreign cheap labor; ibid., pp. 271, 273.

59. An American manufacturer of sewing machines, testifying before a tariff committee in 1912, remarked that the Singer Sewing Machine Company had been compelled (by German duties on American machines) to manufacture in Germany, but found it could not do so as cheaply there as in the United States. "The plant may be the same and the machinery the same and the buildings the same, but the conditions in each country are not the same." (Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance, 1912, pp. 352-355.) Similarly the International Harvester Company was induced by German and Russian duties on its American-made agricultural implements to establish factories for making these same implements in Germany and Russia, yet found it impossible to make them as cheaply in these countries of lower wages. I have been assured of this by officials of the Company.

60. The same manufacturer (just referred to): "I can see, by examining the [German] machine, the handwork, the parts that had been filed, and the fact that they do not go so far with interchangeable construction as we do in this country." Hearings, p. 355.

61. See the testimony of the one American manufacturer of the full-fashioned machine, Senate Tariff Hearings of 1912, pp. 919 seq.

62. The anvil situation has been thus explained to me by persons engaged in the trade.

63. Professor Lloyd, writing of the English file industry in his excellent book on The Cutlery Trade (1913), remarks at p. 59 that "hand cutting [of files] is likely to survive for small work and miscellaneous orders; but while the older process still claims to produce a superior article, it cannot be maintained that the method possesses any important advantages, whether technological or commercial." An American file manufacturer who exported a quarter of his output to all parts of the world exhibited to a congressional committee a file of which there were considerable imports; and, as might be expected, this was a "high grade file... on which there is very much labor." Senate Hearings of 1912, pp. 481, 482.

64. See my Tariff History of the United States, pp. 343 seq.

65. See Professor Lloyd's book, just referred to, on The Cutlery Trades, pp. 55, 208, 387, on the many patterns of pocket knives and the consequent difficulty of applying machine methods. Cf. pp. 40-41, 394, on table knives. Here again I am indebted for confirmatory information to persons engaged in the trade.

66. The following are the figures for 1904-13 of the exports by the Steel Products Co. (i.e., the Steel Corporation), compared with the total exports of iron and steel.

Year Total Exports
(Fiscal years)
Exports by
Steel Products Co.
(Calendar years)
Year Total Exports
(Fiscal years)
Exports by
Steel Products Co.
(Calendar years)
1904 $111.9 mill. $31.4 mill. 1909 $144.9 mill. $41.1 mill.
1905 134.7 32.7 1910 179.1 53.1
1906 161.0 43.9 1911 230.7 69.5
1907 181.5 47.2 1912 268.1 92.0
1908 184.0 33.3 1913 306.0

See the figures given before the Stanley Committee (Report, p. 2749), and those given in the government suit against the Steel Corporation (Defendants' Exhibit, ii, p. 38). The two sets of figures agree, except for 1905, for which I have taken the second-named source of information.

67. For an account of the Canadian legislation see a paper by Professor A. Shortt, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. xx, p. 250.

68. I quote again from the paper cited at p. 155, above.

69. Thus a member of Lister & Co., a great British silk manufacturing firm, admitted occasional sales for export at lower than home prices, but said "this class of business has many objectionable sides," "causes irregular work," tends to spoil reputation because quality and costs are cut keenly, and so on. See Report of the (Chamberlain) Tariff Commission, ii, Part 6, paragraph 3326. Similarly, the President of the U.S. Steel Corporation spoke of this sort of dumping as a "sporadic business," "an uneconomic practice, and one that does not develop continuous business." (Testimony of the Government suit against the Steel Corporation, 1913, x, p. 3843.)

70. See, e.g., Taussig, Principles of Economics, ch. 15, §§ 4, 5.

71. The Steel Corporation built the first steel structure in Buenos Ayres in 1905, and from that date until 1913 built every steel structure in the city. The European steel makers offered lower prices per ton, but "we were endeavoring to get a higher ton price by giving a lighter structure that will answer for a greater amount of work." (President Farrell of the Steel Corporation, testifying in the Government Suit against the Corporation, Evidence, x, p. 3795.) This is the sort of steel work which has been most skilfully developed by American engineers and steel makers; in other words, in which they manifest a comparative advantage.

72. See the interesting account of the growth of the Steel Corporation's export business given by Mr. Farrell, in his testimony (just cited) in the Government Suit, pp. 3783 seq. Cf. his testimony before the Stanley Committee, Report, pp. 3748 seq. Mr. Farrell had been organizer and president of the Steel Products Co. (the export subsidiary), before being made president of the Steel Corporation itself.

Among the documents introduced by the Steel Corporation in the Government Suit (Defendant's Exhibits, ii, no. 41) is a tabular statement showing for a large list of articles whether export prices were more or less than the domestic. For a considerable number the export prices were not less, but more,—there was no dumping; such were finished structural work, spring steel, steel piling, axles. As a rule export prices were lower. The figures, however, are to be used with caution, since they state merely prices realized f.o.b. at the works, and give no indication whether expenses of transportation to destination were borne by the Steel Corporation (directly or indirectly) or by the purchasers.

Part IV, Chapter XIV


SILKS (millions of dollars)
Census of Gross Value of Product Value of Product (Deducting Intermediate Products Counted Twice) "Value Added by Manufacture" (Deducting Cost of Material) Imports
1850 7.8* . . . . . . . 17.7
1860 6.6* .... ... 33.0
1870 12.2 .... 4.4 24.2
1880 41.0 . . . . 18.6 31.3
1890 87.3 69.2 36.3 37.4
1900 107.2 92.4 44.8 26.8
1905 133.3 118.5 57.4 28.7
1910 196.9 172.2 89.7 33.1
* Chiefly sewing silk, fringes, etc.; see Census Report of 1860 on Manufactures, pp. 94-103.

The figures of product are taken from the Census Reports, and refer in each case to the year preceding; thus, the census enumeration of 1910 gives the facts for the industry as it stood in 1909. The imports are given for the fiscal years ending in the census year; thus, the figure for 1910 is that of the fiscal year 1909-10.

The census figures for the earlier years can make no pretensions to statistical exactness. Beginning with 1890 they can be used with reasonable confidence in their accuracy. They are taken from the Census Bulletin of 1910, Statistics of Silk Manufacture.

2. The comparison would stand thus; the first column giving the "net" domestic product, with deduction for duplication due to increased specialization, i.e., column 2 of the previous table; the second column giving the imports supplemented by 60 per cent, i.e., the figures in column 4 of the preceding table, with 60 per cent added.

Year Domestic Product
Per cent of
Imports to
Domestic Product
1870 $10.00 $38.7 387%
1880 34.50 50.1 145
1890 69.10 59.9 86
1900 92.40 42.9 46
1905 118.50 45.2 38
1910 171.60 53.0 30

This comparison, needless to say, can make not the slightest pretence to statistical accuracy; but it shows the general trend, and is more accurate than would be one based on the bare Treasury figure for imports.

How far the imports, when compared with the domestic product, should be enlarged by adding the duties, raises some nice questions. Evidently they should be thus weighted if we wish to compare what is paid by consumers for the domestic supply with what is paid by consumers for the imports. It is not so clear that the same correction should be made if we wish merely to compare the quantities supplied. If the prices of domestic goods are raised to the same extent as those of imported goods,—by the full amount of the duties,—the correction must be applied in the same way and to the same extent as in comparing consumers' payments. If the prices of domestic goods are quite unaffected by the duties, then no weighting or correction at all would seem to be called for. Neither extreme,—complete effect of the duties in raising price of the entire domestic output, or complete absence of any effect at all,—is likely to appear in fact. Hence a comparison of the quantitative relation of the imported and domestic quotas can rarely be deduced from the statistics of the money value of the two.

3. Those who may be interested in this little-known episode will find a full account in a volume on Silk Culture in the United States, New York, 1844.

4. The efforts of the Department extended through two periods, one from 1884 to 1891, and another, more important, from 1902 to 1908. They were on a considerable scale; large quantities of cocoons were raised, and thousands of mulberry seedlings planted. See the Yearbook of the Department for 1903, and also an article by Dr. L. O. Howard, in the Cyclopaedia of American Agriculture, iii, p. 641.

5. In Lombardy "the wives of the peasants engage in the business, as the wives of American farmers in their domestic work"; in Japan it is "usually an auxiliary industry of the farmers"; in China, "the vast mass of silk produced comes from China houses where all members of the family take part in the work." I quote from Sericulture in Italy, Japan and China, published by the Silk Association of America (1905), pp. 5, 11, 18.

In France, as is well known, bounties have been given since 1892 on raw silk; a compromise between the demands of the producers in the south for protection and those of the manufacturers for cheap material. Because of the method by which it was allotted, the bounty seems to have stood in the way of technical advance in the industry; at all events, the output of raw silk has barely held its own. The bounty was extended in 1909, without change of method, for a twenty-year period, i.e., till 1929. Hungary has also encouraged raw silk production, by supplying eggs gratis, buying and distributing cocoons, and building filatures which are let to reelers on cheap terms. See Antonelli, in Revue Economique Internationale, March, 1910.

In Switzerland the production of raw silk has steadily declined since 1870 and now maintains itself only in the Italian cantons. Reichesberg, Handwörterbuch d. Schweiz. Volkswirtschaft, p. 962. I have no doubt the explanation is the same as for the American situation: the industry lacks a comparative advantage in Switzerland also.

6. See the discussion of beet growing, chapter vii, p. 88 and passim.

7. "Spinning" would seem here to be a misnomer; the term is not usually applied to the process of unwinding from the cocoons, nor even (see p. 228, below) to the subsequent preparation of the raw silk for weaving.

8. Sericulture, p. 9.

9. The Grant reel, which originated in the well-known Cheney mills. Cf. Mason, The Silk Industry, p. 12. The reels are not manufactured in the United States; the design is simple, and the reels are made in various parts of the world, wherever used.

10. See the passages from Wyckoff quoted by me in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, iii, pp. 271-273 (1889); also in my Tariff History of the United States, 4th edition, pp. 381 seq.

11. Quarterly Journal of Economics, iii (1889), pp. 273-276.

12. Silk throwing in Italy and France was long carried on in small quasi-handicraft establishments with the aid of water-power; hence called in France "moulinage." It is still in France an industry on a very small scale; petty factories with an average of less than 2,000 spindles, working universally on orders from the manufacturers. Beauquis, Histoire économique de la soie, p. 150. In England, though silk throwing has ceased, the Silkthrowsters' Company, established in 1629, still maintains a nominal existence among the Livery Companies of London.

13. See below, pp. 270, 273 on the automatic loom and ring spinning. In the Census of 1900, it is stated in the Report on Silks (p. 218) that the cost of converting one pound of raw silk into organzine was lowered from $4.50 in 1870 to 60 @ 75 cents in 1900. On the employment of women and children, see ibid., p. 209.

14. Allen, Silk Industry of the World, p. 29.

15. See below, p. 273.

16. The much-discussed strike of 1913 among the Paterson silk operatives, in which the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.) took so active a part, began among the broad silk weavers, in opposition to the introduction of a three loom and four loom weaving system.

17. The Silk Association Reports show that new looms were installed in the United States as follows:

Broad Goods Ribbons
1901 2,328 356
1902 5,500 213
1903 3,797 450
1906 1,268 383

The extraordinarily rapid growth between 1900 and 1905 is shown by the following census figures:—

No. of Establishments Capital
1890 472 $51 millions
1900 483 81 "
1905 624 109 "

18. The following figures state the number of hand and power looms in the two branches of the industry.

Power Hand Power Hand
1875 1,428 1,005 1,260 809
1880 3,103 1,629 2,218 1,524
1890 14,866 413 5,956 1,334
1900 36,825 164 7,432 9
1905 47,725 0 8,400 0

Allen, Silk Industry of the World, p. 31.

The comparatively slow increase in the number of looms for narrow goods between 1890 and 1905 is to be interpreted in the light of the circumstance that each individual loom became larger, quicker, more automatic. The longer persistence of hand looms in this branch of the industry (1,334 such looms as late as 1890) is more apparent than real. These looms were used in 1890 mainly for trimmings, a special and limited branch of the narrow goods trade,—one which proved a decadent part of the silk manufacture. See below, p. 247.

19. On labor conditions, see Mason, Silk Industry, pp. 50 seq.; and the Federal Report on Woman and Child Wage-Earners, 1912, iv; summarized in the Survey, May 18, 1912. In Pennsylvania only 9 per cent of those employed in the silk mills of the state are men; 67.8 per cent are women, 23.2 per cent are children.

20. See on this subject the account in Mason, Silk Industry, pp. 15 seq. On the continued endeavors of the American manufacturers to improve the quality of Chinese raw silk, see Thirty-eighth Report of the Silk Association, pp. 24, 25. "A great proportion of the Canton silks cannot be economically handled by the American manufacturer on account of defective reeling.... We suggest that the system which has improved the working qualities of Japan silks, i.e., re-reeling the skeins, if used in Canton, would so vastly enhance the value of Canton filatures that the American buyers would gladly pay such additional price as to more than compensate the reelers." L. Duran, in his trade book on Raw Silk (1913), writes: "It is gratifying to see the Japanese reelers doing their utmost to improve the quality of their silks" (p. 114).

Part IV, Chapter XV

21. The descriptions of European conditions which follow rest on scattered notes gathered from various sources, and make no pretense of exhaustiveness. So far as I know, this interesting phase of recent industrial history has received scant attention.

22. Allen, Silk Industry of the World, p. 41. The figures for Germany are not for the whole of that country, but only for the district of Crefeld, the chief manufacturing center.

23. On the German transition, see H. Brauns, Der Uebergang von der Handweberei zum Fabrikbetrieb, Schmoller's Forschungen (1906), pp. 33-37, 44. Cf. Bötzkes, Seidenwarenproduktion and Seidenwarenhandel (1909), p. 28.

24. In Basel there were in 1908

In household use 4,057 looms
In factories 1,750 "

Three-quarters of the household weaving was done by women; and agriculture was the main occupation of those engaged in weaving. See Thürkauf, Die Basler Seidenindustrie, pp. ix, 77, 181. For Switzerland as a whole I find these figures for 1905 (Bötzkes, p. 25):—

Power looms 14,915
Hand looms 13,041

25. A well-informed American (or Americanized?) observer wrote thus of the French silk industry in 1913:—

"Until 1875 the looms of Lyons were exclusively worked by hand. At present there are yet about 15,000 jacquard hand looms in Lyons and surrounding villages, making special kinds of goods, mostly high-class brocades. In more recent years, especially the last two decades, a number of manufacturers have built large mills in order to weave larger quantities of pile fabrics, but the majority of manufacturers are still placing orders outside 'à façon.'...

"How long Lyons will retain her present supremacy over her formidable competitors is a hard thing to guess. Silk manufacturing is growing in such enormous proportions in the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, that perhaps they may manage eventually to put the French out of business through cheaper workmanship and larger output. The economists say that the silk business in Lyons has not progressed during the last decade, but they still recognize that it is in Lyons alone that can be found the highest grades of silks and the most beautiful designs (one has only to pay a visit to the Lyons Art Museum to be convinced of this assertion). The royalties and courts of all nations, for their pageants, cannot find elsewhere silks sold at hundreds of francs per yard and worth it."—L. Duran, Raw Silk, pp. 75, 77.

Beauquis, Histoire économique de la soie, p. 245, gives the following figures for the Lyons region:

Hand looms Power looms
1873 105,000 6,000 (1875)
1888 75,000 19,000
1903 60,000 38,000

26. See the interesting map prefixed to Thürkauf, Die Basler Seidenindustrie; Cf. p. 211. See also, on the general possibilities, Brauns, loc. cit., p. 130, and Wilbrandt, Die Weber in der Gegenwart (1906), pp. 95, 109.

27. On the eighteenth century, see the memoranda in Held, Zwei Bücher zur sozialen Geschichte Englands, p. 560. On the continuance of the "cottage factories" through the middle of the nineteenth century, see the Report of the (Chamberlain) Tariff Commission, "Evidence on the Silk Industry," paragraph 3390. A former silk manufacturer of Coventry remarked, "The cottage factories were generally built to hold two or three looms, and generally the husband, wife, or eldest son or daughter used to attend the two or three looms.... I have seen the High Street in front of our warehouse crowded with carriers' carts [bringing silk goods from the neighboring villages] for several hundred yards up the street." This Tariff Commission, organized under the leadership of Joseph Chamberlain as part of the "tariff reform," i.e., protectionist movement, is not to be confounded with official commissions.

28. On the remnant of the Spitalfields industry, see Booth's Life and Labour in London, vol. iv, ch. viii (edition of 1897); and an excellent paper by Mr. F. Warner, a silk manufacturer, in the Journal of the Society of Arts, 1903-04, pp. 124, 131. Mr. Warner remarks, "In the Spitalfields the weavers, draughtsmen, jacquard machinists, loom builders, card cutters, and other mechanics, possessing a knowledge which had for generations been handed down from father to son... were competent and skilful." But he adds that the "manufacturers" were inefficient, and had "no taste, natural or acquired."

29. See the Report of the (Chamberlain) Tariff Commission, "Evidence on the Silk industry," paragraph 3260. The whole of the evidence in this publication is instructive.

30. For example, the town of Leek; see Report of the Tariff Commission, paragraph 3275.

31. See the Report of the Tariff Commission, paragraphs, 3377, 3378 3396, 3398; Warner's paper, cited above, p. 128.

32. Cf. what is said below of cotton and woolen spinning, pp. 290, 357.

33. Mr. Warner, in the paper already cited, said (pp. 128, 130, 136): "Silk throwing as a separate industry is now but little carried on in this country.... Spun silk is a very large industry, and our spinners make the finest qualities and counts in the world, and their products are extensively used in the lace trade of Calais, St. Etienne, Lyons." The growth of the spun silk industry is due largely to the inventive genius of Lister (raised to the peerage, after the British fashion of enoblement, under the title of Lord Masham). The firm, Lister & Co., has a world-wide reputation; it turns out not only spun silk goods, but tapestries, velvets, pile fabrics, for which much reeled silk is used. It not only perfected spinning, but made a patent loom, described as an "automatic" loom, which the Germans are said to have copied when the patent ran out. Tariff Commission Report, paragraph 3319.—The head of the firm, Lister, also took a leading part in the development of the British worsted manufacture; see below, p. 339.

Very few fabrics are made entirely of spun silk. The yarns are used mainly as cotton is used in silk manufacturing,—for admixture. They supply the pile for cotton-back pile fabrics; and they are used as warp or as weft (filling) with reeled silk.

34. For an account of the early history of the sewing silk manufacture, see Wyckoff, Silk Manufacture in the United States (1883), pp. 32 seq. See also the book of 1844 on Silk Culture in the United States (noted above, p. 223) at p. 9. The invention of the first machines began as early as 1828. The Census of 1850 reported sewing silk made to the value of $1,209,000; that of 1860, to the value of $3,600,000. In the Census of 1860, (Report on Manufactures, p. xciv), it is said that the chief seat of the industry is Connecticut, "where sewing silk was first made by machinery upwards of twenty-five years ago." An acquaintance whose memory goes back to ante-bellum days has told me of the highly-developed quasi-automatic machinery which he then saw in operation in the sewing silk mills.

35. In the Tariff Commission Report (Chamberlain) on the Silk Industry, there are many complaints of the extinction of the Coventry ribbon industry; see paragraphs 3239, 3392, 3511. "Previous to the French treaty there were about seventy rich manufacturers in the ribbon trade; now (1905) there are six very poor ones" (paragraph 3511). "Ribbons and silks are practically all foreign-made now" (paragraph 3471).

36. Bötzkes, p. 26.

37. On pile fabrics in general (velvets, plushes, and the like), I have found it difficult to get satisfactory information. As has already been remarked, these were subjected to high specific duties as early as 1890 (see p. 218, above, and my Tariff History, p. 269); one of the provisions in the McKinley tariff which is said to have been a return for heavy contributions by manufacturers to Republican campaign funds. A considerable industry developed in the United States, yet imports continued on a large scale. Rapid changes in fashion here introduce a peculiarly complicating factor. In Europe, the English have the lead in manufacturing plushes, the Germans and French in velvets. In both classes, and especially in velvets, the more expensive qualities tend to be imported into the United States. I have been told by well informed and apparently unbiased observers that the Americans made distinct improvements in the machinery for pile fabrics. What stage in the rivalry between domestic and foreign producers has been reached in this industry it is not easy to make out. Nor is it easy to find indications on the problem more particularly considered in the next following chapter,—the prospects of an eventual surpassing of the foreigners by the developing American industry.

38. Some figures on the domestic production and the imports of silk laces:—

Value of Product
1880 $433,000
1890 261,000
1900 803,000 $3,000,000
1905 745,000 5,000,000

Part IV, Chapter XVI

39. See chapter ii, above, p. 23.

40. See chapter xiii, p. 197, above.

41. See chapter xiv, p. 230. A Coventry (England) manufacturer said in 1905 that in 1870-80 "a great number of looms and other machinery were sent to America, and at Paterson (N. J.) there are in full operation the very same kinds of looms and other machinery as were used in Coventry thirty and sixty years ago." Tariff Commission Report, paragraphs 3275, 3391. It is quite true, I am told, that some old English looms, solidly built, continued to be used thus long, even though it would have paid to substitute new and more efficient looms. The ribbon looms in use at Coventry in 1860 seem to have been made in Basel and exported thence to England. Timmins, The Resources... of Birmingham (London, 1866), p. 187.

42. Cf. what is said below, chapter xxi, p. 343, on woolen and worsted machinery.

43. The throwing machine ("spindle") was an adaptation of the ring spindle which has played so important a part in the American cotton manufacture. "A little after Rabbeth's invention [of a much-improved ring spindle for cotton] Mr. John E. Atwood of Stonington, Conn., made a sleeve whorl spindle in which the bolster and step were made in one piece, and attached 'in a yielding manner' to the surrounding shell or bolster case. This structure has gone into use to an extent of hundreds of thousands in silk spinning, but not extensively in cotton spinning.... In silk spinning... the process is entirely different from that necessary in spinning cotton. The silk is spun off the spindle and the cotton is wound upon it." See the historical account of cotton spindles given by W. F. Draper, in Proceedings, Twenty-sixth Anniversary Meeting New England Cotton Manufacturers Association, p. 31.

44. Allen, Silk Industry of the World, p. 27. The leading American firm that manufactures this machinery writes me: "For a number of years we have been exporting throwing machinery to various silk producing European and Asiatic countries. It seems to be a constant trade, although not large, but is gradually extending into different fields of silk manufacturing."

45. For reference to the high-speed automatic ribbon loom, invented in the United States in 1899, see Allen, Silk Industry, p. 29, and Census Report on Manufactures, 1900, p. 209. A large American firm making ribbon looms writes to me thus (1913) "For a number of years we exported our ribbon looms to Europe—to Switzerland, France, and Germany—but we are now represented in Europe by a large manufacturing concern who build our machinery over there from our models."

46. On broad looms, the spokesman of the industry wrote thus in 1900 (Allen, Silk Industry, p. 27): "In weaving perhaps there has been more progress in improved machinery the last decade than in the three preceding decades. The improvements have produced a loom of very high efficiency, equipped with mechanical devices designed for saving time, labor, material, such as numerous multipliers, two weave, leno, swivel, embroidery motions, and many others, all arranged to work automatically. Special mention should be made of the improvements by which all classes of taffeta effects, formerly made on hand looms only, are now made on power looms" (the italics are mine; the passage deserves emphasis).

Here again I can refer to correspondence (1913) with a great loom making firm. "We commenced exporting silk looms many years ago and as soon as they became established in some of the foreign countries they were copied and are being made there today, exact copies of our machine. The labor cost is so much less there that it is impossible for us to continue to export, although we have sent from time to time quite a lot of machinery into the different countries, but as above stated, as soon as they get well established they get a local maker to manufacture.... Were it not for the fact that we have been able, by an enormous expenditure of money and skill to invent improved machinery, we should never have been able to take the position we have amongst the silk manufacturers of this country." It should be added that this firm, like most makers of machinery, expressed its objections to "any appreciable change" in the tariff as it stood in 1912.

Another manufacturer (one making silk fabrics, not machinery) writes me that "in the knitting industry,—silk underwear, hosiery, neckties,—the American machinery is vastly superior to the foreign machinery, against which there is still a considerable prejudice abroad. This prejudice will undoubtedly be broken down within another decade." Here is again the assertion of superiority, and again the fear that it will not be maintained. Cf. the same state of mind among the makers of other machinery, chapter xii, p. 196, above.

47. A conversant American dealer writes me: "In the finishing departments... a good deal of machinery is imported. This is largely due to the fact that new fabrics are brought out abroad, many of which require special apparatus to produce the desired results in the finishing, and it takes some time before the American producer of finishing machinery begins to manufacture such apparatus. This machinery may be of such limited usefulness that its manufacture is never taken up here at all, and at other times the usefulness of such machinery may be transitory. The ordinary run of finishing machinery, such as spraying machines, paper dryers, can dryers, tentering frames, calenders, singeing machinery... are largely made on this side of the water, and there must be few of such machines now (1913) imported." An importer of finishing machinery confirms these statements.

48. These inquiries have been addressed chiefly to jobbers and to the managers of silk departments in the large retail establishments. Both manufacturers and importers are likely to be biased, even though not consciously; the importers are often the representatives of foreign manufacturers.

49. "Where labor enters most largely, we are visibly outclassed.... With plain goods, made on a large scale, the unit of labor cost is much decreased. Where a mill is running many hundreds of looms on the same fabric, three or four looms to a weaver, and at high speeds, both the weaving cost and the general expense item fall to a really low figure, and it is in these directions we must look [for possible exports].

"There are many fabrics such as liberty satins, cotton back satins, crêpes de chine, taffetas, etc., that have been so specialized on here as to encourage the belief that their cost is so low that an export business might be done in them." From a chapter on "Finding Foreign Markets" in Chittick, Silk Manufacturing and its Problems (1913), p. 324.

The exports of silks, as recorded in the Treasury statistics, were as follows:—

To Great Britain To Canada Total, to all countries
1909 $13,000 $503,000 $847,000
1910 50,000 722,000 1,097,000
1911 200,000 915,000 1,538,000
1912 210,000 1,159,000 1,993,000
1913 200,000 1,354,000 2,391,000

The only countries besides Great Britain and Canada to which any considerable quantities went, were Cuba and Mexico. The exports to Great Britain were chiefly of knitted silks, for which some newly-devised American machinery had caused a considerable foreign market (cf. p. 254., above). Those to Canada have been explained to me as due largely to mere propinquity; a Canadian merchant whose stock is depleted can send a buyer to New York and get what he wants over night, disregarding for such sporadic purchases a comparatively high price. With all allowance for these exceptional circumstances the recent increase in exports of silks remains striking and apparently significant.

50. The ordinary "double deck" loom for ribbons is about 16 feet wide. These wide looms are "single deck." The modern ribbon loom weaves a great number of ribbons side by side in long parallel strips.

51. Notwithstanding occasional suggestions that American silk manufacturers should in some way combine, and cease their "senseless" competition, nothing in the nature of a trust or combination has appeared in the industry. In the Thirty-ninth Report of the Silk Association, p. 46, are some expressions of vain longing for a curtailment of competition. In Germany, the Kartel has become, in the silk manufacture as in others, a permanent part of industrial organization; yet, it would seem, mainly as a "condition" Kartel, not one effective in raising prices. Beckerath, Kartelle der Seidenweberei-industrie, p. 187 et passim.

Part IV, Chapter XVII

52. For an account of this earlier period in somewhat more detail, I refer the reader to my Tariff History of the United States, pp. 25-36, 135-142, and to M. T. Copeland, The Cotton> Manufacturing Industry of the United States, chapter i. I shall have frequent occasion to refer to Dr. Copeland's able volume, which makes it unnecessary to consider in detail some important matters on which he has told the whole story.

In my Tariff History, p. 34 and elsewhere, I have stated, with less qualification than I should now make, the conclusion that the duties of 1816 were not clearly needed for protection to the then young industry. As intimated in chapter ii of the present volume (see p. 22), I am disposed to allow a longer time for the trial of protection to young industries, and to admit the probable usefulness not only of the imposition of duties in 1816, but of their retention in 1824, 1828, and 1832.

53. Such was the opinion, for example, of Samuel Batchelder, the well-known manufacturer and chronicler, expressed in letters written to the Boston Commercial Advertiser in 1861.

54. The marked increase of the maximum rate in 1909 was due to still another refinement in the elaboration of the specific duties. In previous acts there had been a dragnet clause on cotton cloths: all cloths above a certain value were subjected to one ad valorem rate. This ad valorem rate had been 25 per cent in 1861, 35 per cent in 1864, 40 per cent in 1883, and again 40 per cent in 1897 and 1909 (45 percent in 1890). In 1909 it was further provided that the very finest and most expensive goods, if valued over 25 cents a yard, should be charged 12½ cents a yard, but in no case less than 40 per cent.—This dragnet clause, or omnibus ad valorem duty, on cotton cloths is not to be confounded with the similar dragnet clause on miscellaneous cotton manufactures "not otherwise provided for," to which reference is made in the text.

55. On the changes of duty in 1909, see an instructive article by S. M. Evans, in the Journal of Political Economy, December, 1910, "The Making of a Tariff Law"; and a careful analysis by M. T. Copeland, in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 1910. For an elaborate statement of the duties on cottons from 1890 to 1909, see the Tariff Board's Report on Cotton Manufacture (1912), pp. 290 seq.

The Tariff Board Report gave abundant illustrations of the high range of the duties on cottons until 1913, pointing out that in most cases the duties on cotton cloths were higher than the total "conversion cost" of the goods,—i.e., higher than the total expenses of production over and above the raw material. See the Board's introductory statement or analysis, pp. 10-14, and more detailed statements at pp. 440, 458, 503 passim.

56. The plan on which the duties on cotton goods were fixed in 1913 is indicated by the following tabular statement:—

Duty on Yarns Duty on Plain,
Made from
Such Yarns
Duty on Cloths,
that are Bleached,
Printed, Dyed,
Woven with
Mercerized, etc.,
Made from
Such Yarns
Yarns, numbers 1 to 9 5 percent 7½ per cent 10 percent
" " 10 " 39 7½ " 10 " 12½ "
" " 40 " 49 10 " 12½ " 15 "
and so on, until
Yarns, numbers 80 to 90 22½ " 25 " 27½ "
Yarns above number 100 25 " 27½ " 30 "

This is a symmetrical arrangement; the duty on plain cloths is always 22 per cent higher than that on the yarns with which they are woven, and the duty on cloths printed, etc., is always 22 per cent higher still. The symmetry, however, is more in appearance than in reality. The arrangement left the duties on some cheap cloths in effect higher than on many dear cloths; since raw cotton enters so largely in the price of the former, and causes an ad valorem duty to be high in relation to manufacturing (or "conversion") cost.

57. See Copeland, p. 16. These are the census figures, published in the enumerations of the stated years, but referring to the conditions of the years severally preceding (e.g., the figure of 1910 gives information on the industry as it stood in 1909).

58. In comparing domestic and foreign supply, attention must be given to the effect of the duties in adding to the price paid by consumers for the foreign goods. How far allowance should be made, and can be made, for this circumstance has been considered in the similar case of silks; see p. 222, note, supra.

59. Quoted by Copeland, p. 21. The situation appeared to be the same in the census figures of 1910, from which I have compiled the following figures (Bulletin on Cotton Manufactures, 1910, p. 16):—

Yards Value
Total woven cotton goods 6,348 millions 456 million dollars
Of which coarse or medium (as enumerated in the text) 5,436 275

60. Copeland, p. 21. The figures of 1910 (Census Bulletin, p. 20), again tell the same story:—

Cotton yarn produced, No. 20 and under 1,014 million lbs.
" " " No. 21 to 40 866 " "
" " " No. 41 and over 157
" "
Total 2,037 " "

The proportion of fine yarns (forty-one and over) was reported even less in 1910 than in 1905.

61. Thus in 1910 the New England states were reported to produce three-quarters of all the fine yarn, and Massachusetts alone over two-fifths (41.5 per cent). Yet in Massachusetts the coarse and medium counts still very greatly exceeded the fine (Census Bulletin, p. 20).

Coarse cotton yarn in Massachusetts (20 and under) 175 million lbs.
Medium " " " (21 to 40) 283 " "
Fine " " " (41 and over) 65 " "

62. Also designated "frame spinning."

63. Copeland, p. 70; Census Bulletin of 1910, p. 22. No separation of the two kinds of spindles was made in the census of 1880.

64. A detailed account of the development of ring spinning is in a paper by W. F. Draper in Transactions New England Cotton Manufacturers' Association, no. 50 (1891). The date of first invention is there given as 1828; other dates near this are also given (cf. Copeland, p. 9). The Draper Company took the lead in manufacturing ring spindles, incorporating improvements of their own into the most promising of previous spindles; and spindles of their make came into use by the million. Compare what is said below (at p. 276) of the same company's primacy in developing the automatic loom.

65. Census Bulletin of 1910 on Cotton Manufactures, p. 22.

Ring Spindles
Mule Spindles
Massachusetts 7.2 2.1
Rhode Island 2.3 1.4
South Carolina 3.7 .02
North Carolina 2.8 .06
Georgia 1.7 .07

66. W. F. Draper's paper, p. 38.

67. Copeland, p. 67.

68. See my Tariff History of the United States, p. 29, and the reference there given.

69. Ibid., p. 138; Copeland, p. 83; see also James Montgomery, The Cotton Manufacture of the United States (Glasgow, 1840), p. 101.

70. See above, p. 230, on silks, and below, p. 362, on woolens.

71. "In simple terms, these inventions cover a shuttle changing device, a filling hopper from which bobbins or cop spindles containing filling yarn are automatically transferred to the loom shuttle,—a peculiar shuttle which can be threaded automatically by the motion of the loom,—devices that act to stop the loom, or prevent damage in case the shuttle is not in proper position to receive new filling or the hopper is exhausted, and a warp stop motion to prevent the loom from making poor cloth when not watched by the weaver." George O. Draper, "Development of the Northrop Loom," in Transactions of the New England Cotton, Manufacturers' Association, no. 59, p. 91. Cf. Copeland, pp. 84-88.

72. The weaver's act of thus sucking the thread carries bits of lint and dust into the lungs, and the irritation increases the danger of tuberculosis. "A weaver on eight common looms stands a chance of inhaling cotton fibre about one thousand times a day. It is no wonder they are a shortlived, consumptive class." Ibid., p. 100. The danger, which persists on the ordinary power looms, is real, though often exaggerated. It is in accord with frequent experience in matters of this kind that mechanical devices for threading the shuttles, even when put freely at the weavers' disposal and with urgent advice to use them, are left unused; it is easier and quicker to suck.

73. The practice in mills varies. In one mill which I visited, each weaver was in charge of thirty automatic looms, there being separate staffs of magazine-fillers and oilers. In another, twenty looms were allotted to each weaver, but he (or she) was compelled to see to the charging of the magazines. When the Northrop loom was first put on the market, its makers predicted that a weaver could manage twenty-four looms and also attend to his magazines. Something depends on the character of the fabrics.

A loom fixer can attend to about 150 ordinary looms, 100 automatic looms; this item of expense is higher for the automatics.

74. The Northrop loom is associated with the name of the Draper Company, whose works are at Hopedale, Mass. The experiments that led to it were spread over a period of seven years. The first loom was ready for trial in 1889. A number were run experimentally at Hopedale in 1893; the demonstration mill referred to in the text was constructed at Burlington, Vt., in 1894. An interesting and authoritative account of the history of the invention was given by Mr. G. O. Draper in the paper already referred to in the Transactions of the New England Cotton Manufacturers' Association., no. 59.

Both Messrs. W. F. Draper and G. O. Draper, in the two papers quoted, referred to the importance of the patent system in stimulating and sustaining invention. No less than 373 patents for ring spindles were taken out between 1870 and 1903 (so stated by Copeland, in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. xxiv, p. 127), and 60 for automatic loom devices (Draper, in Transactions, no. 59, p. 90).

It is a curious fact that an important part, perhaps the most important, in these inventions was taken by men who had had no previous experience in weaving rooms. "Neither Mr. Northrop, Mr. Roper, or Mr. Stimson [three among the inventors] ever had any practical knowledge of weaving. Mr. Northrop had never examined a loom prior to our [the Draper Company's] start, and Mr. Roper had probably never seen one." G. O. Draper, as cited above, p. 92. Similarly, one of the important improvements in the ring spindle came from a clergyman, the Rev. Mr. Allen. W. F. Draper, in Transactions New England Cotton Manufacturers, no. 50, p. 34.

It may be noted also that Cartwright, the inventor of the power loom, "if he had ever seen weaving by hand, had certainly paid no particular attention to the process." Memoir of Cartwright (1843), p. 57.

75. See the account in Dr. Copeland's article on "Progress of the Automatic Loom," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. xxv, p. 746 (August, 1911), to which also I refer for the other matters here noted.

Part IV, Chapter XVIII

76. Tariff Board Report on Cotton Manufactures (1912), "Letter of Submittal " (Summary), p. 9. Elaborate figures are given elsewhere in the Report, pp. 398 seq. A chart opposite page 416 shows the differences between "labor costs" and "total conversion costs." The differences become progressively greater as the yarns become finer; they are least on the coarse yarns, greatest on the fine. The phenomenon is in harmony with the general trend in all these comparisons; it is in the finer and more tenuous qualities that the Americans show no special effectiveness. The comparison between mule spun yarns in England and ring spun yarns in the United States was explained by the Board on the ground that mule spinning was the prevalent method in the former country, ring spinning in the latter; but, as noted in the text, it introduces an element of doubt, making the results not absolutely comparable.

77. See Copeland, pp. 289, 299. Ring spindles were found to run a trifle faster in the United States than in Europe,—10,000 revolutions per minute compared to 9,000. A spinner in the United States commonly had in charge 750 to 1,000 spindles; in England 400 to 800; in Germany on the average, 500. There was no more breakage and interruption in the United States. Wages per week were $6.50 to $7.50 in New England, about $6.00 in the South. In England they were $3.75 to $5.50; in Germany, $3.75 to $4.25. Money wages thus seemed to vary almost precisely in proportion to the effectiveness of labor, i.e., to the comparative advantage; the "labor cost" was virtually the same in all three countries.

78. This general statement seems to me not justified by the Board's own figures, as cited earlier in the text. It holds doubtless for some kinds of spinning, and especially for the finer mule spun yarns.

79. Report, "Letter of Submittal," pp. 11, 13. See also pp. 479 seq.

80. Report, p. 12.

81. The exports in 1850-60 ranged from $7,000,000 to $10,000,000; the census reported the total value of the domestic product (manufactures of cotton) as $62,000,000 in 1850, $116,000,000 in 1860.

82. An excellent analysis of the export trade in cotton goods is in Copeland, chapter xii.

83. In chapter xvi, above, p. 251.

84. W. F. Draper's paper in Transactions, American Cotton Manufacturers' Association, no. 50 (1891), p. 41.

85. For some reference to the German automatic looms, see the article by Dr. Copeland, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. xxv, p. 747.

86. See Copeland, p. 79.

87. Copeland, pp. 320-326, for some interesting figures and comments. For Switzerland, I find it stated (in 1911) that the "great technical novelty, the Northrop loom, though introduced finds its way into use very slowly... it is adapted to the mass production of simple goods, but not to the Swiss industry, which is mobile and subject to great changes in detail; it is least adapted to fine or fancy fabrics." Reichesberg, Handwörterbuch der Schweizerischen Volkswirtschaft, vol. iii, p. 895.

88. I quote from a private letter, written by a person highly conversant with the American industry, who had also made inquiries on the spot in England.

89. Cf. what was said in chapter xii, p. 185, of the similar attitude of the English tin plate workers.

90. See chapter xiii, pp. 197 seq.

91. See chapter iii, pp. 44 seq., above.

92. See chapter xiv, pp. 232 seq.

93. A good indication is given by the exclusive use of ring spindles in the south, see the figures given in the preceding chapter. Ring spindles, it will be recalled, can be operated by young girls, mule spindles by men only.


Spinning Spindles
Cards Jack Spindles Ring Mule Looms
No. Per cent No. Per cent No. Per cent No. Per cent No. Per cent

Domestic 11,200 83.7 510,000 85.8 4,000,000 99.9 119,000 16.9 127,000 99.7
Foreign 2,182 16.3 84,000 14.2 3,000 .1 584,000 83.1 300 .3

Report of Tariff Board on Cotton Manufactures, p. 473. The figures are for "the mills from which such data were obtained"; by no means all of the American mills, but representative of the whole.

Jack spindles (also called "fine roving spindles") are used where fine yarn is to be spun from sea island and other long fibre cotton; they make the roving (attenuated sliver) fine enough for spinning high counts of yarn. They are roving spindles, not spinning spindles.

95. The Tariff Board (Report, p. 11), after explaining that with plain looms, whether ordinary or automatic, the output per weaver per hour is greater in the United States, remarks: "In the case of other methods of weaving, such as dobby, jacquard, box dobby, box jacquard, lappet, etc., the difference in output is by no means so great. In the case of dobby looms (without automatic attachment) on some classes of fabric, the American weaver will tend eight or more looms against four in England; but with the more complicated weaves the ratio seems to be nearer that of six to four, and in the case of certain fancy fabrics, where the number of looms tended is necessarily four or less, the output per weaver is about the same in both countries."

96. Cf. the statement regarding mule spinning, quoted in chapter xvii, p. 271.

97. Chapter xvii, p. 271.

98. Wealth of Nations, Book IV, chapter ii (vol. i, p. 423 of Cannan's edition).

99. See chapter xxi, p. 353.

100. This is maintained,—though without the use of the phrase "young industries,"—by W. F. Draper, in the paper on the development of spinning machinery already cited; Transactions New England Cotton Manufacturers' Association, no. 50.

Part IV, Chapter XIX

101. The literature on the wool duty is voluminous. Two recent contributions are of signal importance, and supersede those of earlier date: Professor C. W. Wright's Wool-growing and the Tariff, in Harvard Economic Studies (1910); and the Report of the Tariff Board on Wool and Woolens (1912), vol. ii. To both of these frequent reference will be made. Among the earlier discussions, reference may be made to a frank statement from the wool manufacturers' point of view, by Mr. S. N. D. North, then Secretary of the Wool Manufacturers Association, in the Bulletin of that Association, December, 1900.

102. The following tabular statement shows what the wool duties were from 1867. It will be observed that the duties on classes I and II (clothing and combing wools) were split into two, according to the value of the wool, in 1867 and in 1883, but not thereafter. The duties on class III (carpet wool) were similarly split, according to value, throughout; they were ad valorem in the act of 1890, but specific in all the other acts.

Act of Class I, Clothing Wool Class II, Combing Wool Class III, Carpet Wool

1867 Value up to 32c.-10c. per lb., plus 11% Same duties as on Class I Value up to 12c.-3c. per lb.
Value over 32c.-12c. per lb., plus 10% Same duties as on Class I Value over 12c.-6c. per lb.
1883 Value up to 30c.-10c. per lb. Same duties as on Class I Value up to 12c.-2½c. per lb.
Value over 30c.-12c. per 1b. Same duties as on Class I Value over 12c.-5c. per lb.
1890 11c. 12c. Value up to 13c.-32% ad valorem
Value over 13c.-50% ad valorem
1894 Free Free Free
1897 11c. 12c. Value up to 12c.-4c. per lb.
Value over 12c.-7c. per lb.
1909 Same as 1897 Same as 1897 Same as 1897
1913 Free Free Free

103. See the account of carpet wools in the Tariff Board Report on Tool, pp. 413 seq.

104. On the extent to which carpet wool was used in this way, see Tariff Board Report On Wool, pp. 413, 436.

105. In the tariff bills introduced by the Republicans during the 62d Congress (1911-13) it was proposed that the duty on carpet wools should continue to be collected on its importation, but that the carpet manufacturers should get a drawback of the amount paid in duties to the same extent (99 per cent) as if they exported carpets; thus securing virtual exemption for so much of the wool as was actually used in carpet making. This proposal, of course, had no chance of adoption, during the Congress of 1911-13; then the Democrats controlled the House, the Republicans the Senate, and no tariff legislation was possible. But it represented the consistent protectionist policy.

106. "The merino is beyond question the most cosmopolitan of the sheep tribe. No breed has passed into all countries and thriven as the merino, and still further no other breeds have been able to become so closely identified with their environment as to become the progenitors of native families as in the instance of the merino. This would seem to be due to the migrating habits that characterize the merino in Spain, where the flocks are driven towards the north in summer and southward in winter, thus becoming inured to all the variations of a diversified country." Craig, Sheep-Farming in North America, p. 34. On the hardiness of the merino and its tendency to herd in large numbers (hence less need of shepherding) see Tariff Board Report, pp. 605-607. Cf. the note to p. 315, below.

107. Cf. what is said below, at p. 327.

108. The proportion of imports to domestic product is shown summarily by the following figures:—

Average Imports,
Per Year, of Wool,
Classes I and II
Domestic Product,
Per Year
Period 1884-90 26 mill. lbs. 321 mill. lbs.
" 1891-93 (under the McKinley tariff) 45 " 329 "
" 1895-97 (under the Wilson tariff, wool free) 153 272 "
" 1900-06 (duty restored) 65 " 297 "
" 1907-12 (duty restored) 95 " 314 "

109. "The superior purity of the Australian wools, their softness, lightness, and lustre, are attributed to the climatic conditions of that country....Spanish merinos were introduced, and it soon became noticeable that the wool from the Australian flocks was of a finer quality than that grown upon the sheep fed upon the pastures of Spain. Dr. Bowman considers that an even temperature and a certain amount of moisture are necessary for the retention of lustre [that is, for sheep of the English mutton types], and he cites New Zealand wool as illustrative of this relationship.... It is known that some soils color wools so that they cannot be washed white. Territory wool has a characteristic bluish tinge that detracts greatly [?] from its market value. Scott asserts that the best wool growing land is generally that on a sandstone foundation, as it gives the wool the quality of being bright and clean, while he considers that volcanic or limestone soils are thought to favor harshness." Craig, Sheep-Farming in North America, pp. 38-39.

110. On skirted wool, see Wright, pp. 284-286, and Tariff Report on Wool, p. 337. It is a. curious fact that American wool not only comes to market quite unassorted, but is often fraudulently or carelessly mixed with rubbish, twine and scraps. "Australian and New Zealand wool is packed more honestly than American wool" (I quote from the Textile World Record, June, 1908). American cotton is also said to come to market in bad condition. "Poor ginning [of American cotton] injures the staple; baled cotton is left uncovered and is damaged by the weather; the bagging is the heaviest and poorest that ingenuity can devise and it is charged at the same price as cotton....An Egyptian bale is a model of neatness and compactness, with a light and strong covering, held together by proper hoops, and both bagging and hoops are deducted as tare." (From the presidential address of Mr. J. R. MacColl, before the Cotton Manufacturers' Association, April, 1906.) I suspect these defects in both domestic materials are ascribable to the unbridled individualism of the American planter and wool grower. Some form of coöperative organization for sales might bring improvement.

111. Thus for 1912 we should have the following figures:—

Imports (fiscal year, 1911-12):—
Class I 69,300,000
Class II 10,900,000
Total Imports, clothing wool 80,000,000 lbs.
Domestic Product (calendar year, 1912) , . 304,000,000 "

Charges on the domestic consumer:—

On 80 million lbs., imported wool, at 11c. $8,800,000
On 304 million lbs., domestic wool:—
if reckoned at 11c. lb. $33,400,000
if reckoned at 8c. lb. 24,300,000

Some figure between the last two would seem to give with a sufficient approach to accuracy the prima facie national loss from protection to wool.

From statements made to me by wool dealers I gather that practically all the imported wools of class I (which greatly preponderate in the imports) are skirted.

112. I take these figures from Wright, Appendix Table II. They are derived from Census reports, but no one supposes them to be more than approximations to the truth, especially for the earlier periods. They are sufficient approximations, however, to indicate the general trend.

113. "The decline in the number of sheep with the advent of the farmer is nowhere more noticeable than in California." In 1880 that state had 7,500,000 sheep; in 1910, only 2,250,000. Tariff Board Report on Wool, p. 602.

114. The history and explanation of the displacement of wool growing by tillage constitute the main theme of Professor Wright's volume, so often referred to in the preceding pages (Wool-growing and the Tariff). See particularly, pp. 135 seq., on the middle west in 1840-60; pp. 250 seq., on the opening of the far west; and pp. 258 seq., on the general competition between wool growing and other agricultural operations. Instructive maps, showing the westward movement of wool growing, are in a paper by Professor H. C. Taylor, published by the Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station, June, 1911.

For some further illustrations of the working of the principle of comparative advantage,—grain and dairying being found more profitable than sheep,—see the Tariff Board Report on Wool, pp. 563 (Illinois), 571 (Wisconsin), 581 (Nebraska).

115. See the elegant analysis of this case, as well as of the case of joint demand, in Marshall's Principles of Economics, Book V, ch. vi, §§ 1, 4 (6th edition).

116. Report, p. 377. Cf. also the Summary, at p. 10.

117. See the analysis of the Tariff Board's figures made by Mr. W. S. Culbertson (who had been himself a member of the Board) in American Economic Review, March, 1913, p. 66. It should be added that for the Ohio region, though the variation from extreme to extreme was great, most of the figures fell within a smaller range (12 to 27 cents). For the western region, however, the varying figures of cost were distributed from highest to lowest without noticeable concentration in a middle range.

118. "The Southwest is still, as it has always been, the home of the range merino. But little of the mutton blood has been introduced into the flocks of this region, and the indications are that for obvious reasons,—climate, range, etc.,—these conditions will continue to exist for many years to come." Tariff Board Report, p. 602.

119. The sentence quoted is from the Tariff Board Report, p. 10. On the Ohio situation in general, see pp. 548 seq. A certain note of impatience with the merino wool producers of this region is discernible in the Report. After pointing out that well-managed sheep farms on which wool was not the chief source of income rarely failed to show a profit, the Report goes on (p. 548): "Why, then, do not all of the sheep breeders of the Ohio valley follow this system? The answer is that on hill farms especially it is not easy to grow the corn necessary to fatten lambs. Then, the owners of many flocks have not learned to adapt their systems of agriculture to this practice; they have long been accustomed to looking to wool for their chief profit from sheep breeding." The truth seems to be that this sort of wool growing was a survival from the frontier days of Ohio, maintained, precariously and beyond its time, first by the civil war demand for wool and then by the high duties. Cf. Wright, pp. 148, 183, 247.

120. See p. 306, above.

121. See Tariff Board Report, p. 10. The possibilities of increase in foreign supplies are considered in the Report at pp. 490, 522 et passim. There were in 1910 less than one hundred million sheep in Australia; it is supposed the number can be increased without difficulty to at least one hundred and fifty million (p. 492).

122. Compare what was said in chapter i, pp. 14 seq., on extractive commodities, and in chapter v, p. 63, on the Hawaiian sugar situation.

123. In 1898 Germany imported ten times as much wool as was produced at home (177 mill. kilograms against 17 mill.). Michaelis, in Handbuch der Wirtschaftskunde Deutschlands, vol. iii, p. 629.

Part IV, Chapter XX

124. On the history of the compensating system I have summarily repeated here what is said more fully in my Tariff History of the United States, where the various modifications of the system are described in detail for the successive tariff acts.

125. The development of the system is shown by the following figures, which state the duties on "woolen cloths," the typical class of goods and the one still most important in Schedule K.

Duty on Woolen Cloth
Year Duty on
Per Pound
Compensating (Specific)
Per Pound
ad valorem
1861 3c. 12c. 25%
1864 6c. 24c. 40%
1867 12c. 50c. 35%
1883 10c. Costing up to 80c. per lb., 35c. 35%
" over 80c. " 35c. 40%
1890 11c. Costing up to 30c. per lb., 33c. 40%
" 30 @ 40c. " 38½c. 40%
" over 40c. " 44c. 50%
1894 Free No compensating duty Costing up to 50c. per lb., 40%
" over 50c. " 50%
1897 11c. Costing up to 40c. per lb., 33c. 50%
" 40 @ 70c. " 44c. 44c. 50%
" over 70c. " 44c. 55%
1909 11c. Same duties as in 1897 Same duties as in 1897
1913 Free No compensating duty 35%

The wool duty is here stated approximately; for details see the table given above, p. 297. On the splitting of the compensating duty which begins in 1883 and is maintained until 1913, see. p. 330 below.

126. This I judge to have been the case, at all events, as regards woolen cloths of the kind chiefly made at that time within the country. The compensating duties on dress goods (levied by the yard, and not by the pound, and therefore not easily subject to check) seem to have been designedly excessive even from the start. See the Tariff Board Report, p. 148. Cf. ibid., p. 184, for a curious manipulation and increase in the duty on rugs in 1897,—fairly to be dubbed a "joker."

127. Cf. what was said in the preceding chapter, p. 306.

128. See the excellent generalized statement in the Tariff Board Report, Summary, p. 12. Elsewhere (p. 89) it is remarked that "a fleece from an Angora goat or Lincoln sheep may shrink in scouring only 10 or 20 per cent, leaving 80 or 90 per cent of clean wool; a Cape or Australian merino fleece, on the contrary, may shrink as high as 50 to 70 per cent, yielding only 20 to 30 per cent of clean wool."

129. It was by parading the exceptional cases that the representatives of the woolen manufacturers were able in later years to make a show of validity for the basis of four to one in the compensating system. See, for example, their statement before the Ways and Means Committee in 1909; Tariff Hearings of 1909, p. 7257. The stubbornness of the Association of Wool Manufacturers in clinging not only to the principle but the details of the act of 1867 (they interposed a veritable non possumus to all proposals for change) must be regarded as a strange piece of political ineptitude. As late as 1911, the President of the American Woolen Company made the following extraordinary statement in an address to his fellow-manufacturers: "Schedule K, much maligned, much misunderstood, if properly understood would be the most appreciated of any schedule in the tariff; and if all schedules in the tariff were as scientifically based and as well poised and balanced as Schedule K, it would be the most remarkable document, next to the Constitution of the United States, that the human mind has ever produced"! I quote from a pamphlet reprint of the address.

I have not referred in the text to another episode which played a considerable part in the attacks on Schedule K. Throughout the period of wool duties, the ordinary or normal duty (about eleven cents a pound) was double on wool which had been washed, and triple on wool scoured. Hence most imports were of unwashed wool. But on combing wool (class II) the duty was the same whether washed or unwashed; though still triple when scoured. Hence wool of class II was almost always imported in the washed state. This exceptional treatment of combing wool was the occasion of not a little controversy. It was sought to be justified on the ground that such wool in fact was almost always washed on the sheep's back, and could not well be imported in any other condition; and also justified frankly on the ground that in 1867, when the exception was instituted, the branch of the manufacture using such wool (the worsted branch) was of small dimensions and in its early stages, and so deserving of special consideration. In any case, the discrimination proved of less importance than might have been expected, because almost all wool actually combed, and actually used in the worsted manufacture, came to be not strict "combing wool" as defined in the tariff, but cross-bred wool classed in the tariff as "clothing wool." Nevertheless some millions of pounds of strict combing wool were imported each year, and in occasional years much more; and as regards this, the compensating arrangement never could pretend to be accurate. — Cf. what is said in the Tariff Board Report, p. 89.

130. Cf. p. 388, below.

131. The importance of these substitutes or "adulterants" is shown by the fact that little more than half of the woolens made in the country was all wool. The Tariff Board gave the following figures, based on census returns (Report, pp. 220, 224, 226, 230):—

Worsteds: 1900 1910
Value of total goods $120.3 mill. $312.6 mill.
" " all-wool goods 60.5 " 160.9 "
Value of total goods 118.4 " 107.1 "
" " all-wool goods 57.3 " 60.0 "

The quantity of the various materials used in

Wool (in scoured condition) 60
" (yarn) 8
68 mill. lbs.
Camel, alpaca and other hair 18
Rags 38
Shoddy 20
Noils and waste 24
Cotton (including cotton yarn) 38
138 mill. lbs.

I have condensed these figures from the table in the Board's Report, p. 228. There was a marked increase in the use of the substitutes between 1900 and 1910: one among the indications that the woolen branch of the industry was in a declining and precarious state.

132. See the tabular statement on p. 325. Cf. the Tariff Board Report, p. 124.

133. I said as much in an essay published in 1885; reprinted in my Tariff History (pp. 208 seq.).

134. In the spring of 1894, when the tariff bill of that year was being debated and the abolition of the compensating system was impending, the American Cotton and Wool Reporter wrote (May 24, 1894): "The specific duty under existing law is more than compensatory. It furnishes a large measure of protection, and in fact is the substance of the protection on medium and low-grade goods.... The proper thing to do now for the manufacturers is to confess to a little deception regarding the make-up of the specific duty, admit the truth, and ask for recognition of the actual facts. The protection was needed, and the only sin committed was in the way it was obtained."

135. See the Summary, p. 13; and such a concise statement as this (p. 125): "If all wools lost 75 per cent from greasy wool to cloth, this four-to-one ratio would be perfect as a basis for compensation, but only in making the best fabrics from heavy-shrinking wools is so much compensation necessary. Cotton-mixed woolens, cotton warp worsteds, in fact the majority of woolen and worsted fabrics made in the United States do not require compensation equal to four times the duty on class I wool."


(Millions of Dollars)
Woolens Worsteds Total Woolens and Worsteds Total, all Manufactures of Wool Imports of Manufactures of Wool
1860 $61.9 $3.7 $65.6 $73.4 $43.1
1870 155.4 22.1 177.5 199.3 34.5
1880 160.6 33.5 194.1 238.1 33.9
1890 133.6 79.2 212.8 270.5 56.6
1900 118.4 120.3 238.7 297.0 16.2
1905 142.2 165.7 307.9 381.0 17.9
1910 107.1 312.6 419.7 507.2 23.0

The figures of domestic product in the fourth column are for all the manufactures of wool, including carpets, blankets and flannels, and some minor branches, as well as the two leading ones. With these figures (in column four) the imports should be compared, since the figures are for all the imports, not those of worsted and woolens alone. Both in the domestic product and in the imports the woolens and worsteds dominate. — The figures are derived from the Census Bulletin of 1910 on the Woolen Manufacture; see also the Report of the Tariff Board, pp. 190, 226.

137. The best unit of productive capacity is, for woolens, the set of cards; for worsteds, the combing machine. Between 1900 and 1910 the numbers of these were reported as follows: —

Sets of Cards
in Woolen Mfg.
Combing Machines
in Worsted Mfg.
1900 6,498 1,317
1905 5,753 1,440
1910 5,079 1,978

The data confirm the conclusion that the woolen branch was virtually stationary till about 1900, and thereafter declined; while the worsted branch grew rapidly and continuously.

138. The National Association of Wool Manufacturers, the compact and influential organization which represented the industry before Congress and the public, was dominated for many years by the worsted makers. This was natural, not only because of the size and rapid growth of their branch, but because the individual enterprises in it were on a larger scale, and were conducted by the more ambitious and dominating personalities. During the period of general tariff revolt which followed the act of 1909, the manufacturers of carded woolens formed an independent organization of their own, protesting against the favored treatment given to their rivals by the wool duty and the compensating system. See the Statement of the Carded Wool Manufacturers.

139. See the Tariff Board Report, p. 85; cf. Clapham, The Woolen and Worsted Industries, pp. 9, 142.

140. See the excellent account of the inventions in Burnley, History of Wool and Wool-combing. Cf. what is said by Clapham, The Woolen and Worsted Industries, p. 136. Among the conspicuous inventors were Donisthorpe, Lister, Holden, Heilmann, and Noble,—all English, with the exception of Heilmann (an Alsatian). The start was made by the versatile and indefatigable Cartwright as early as 1790; but it was not until half a century later that machines constructed on his principle were brought to working efficiency. At still later dates various minor improvements were added. Lister (Lord Masham) played in the main the rôle of the business man, appreciating and guiding the inventors, and profiting handsomely. The whole episode is typical of the course of mechanical progress in modern times.

141. Clapham, p. 131.

142. The Tariff Board Report gives the following figures (p. 220):—

1899 1909
Worsteds $647,000 $965,000
Woolens 114,000 182,000

The increase in the average output in woolen mills between 1899 and 1909 is ascribed to the disappearance of a large number of small country mills.

143. Clapham, pp. 134 seq.: "The commonest type of woolen mill... combines all processes, from opening the new wool to dyeing,—when it is piece-dyed,—and finishing the cloth." So the Tariff Board reports (p. 220) that "in the woolen industry the typical mill combines all processes from raw wool to finished cloth."

Part IV, Chapter XXI

144. The Tariff Board stated in its Summary (p. 16) that "87 per cent of all the machinery [in worsted mills], from the scouring of the raw wool through to the finished yarn, was imported." More in detail (pp. 1026 seq.), it appeared that

of the Noble combs (English system) 85% were imported
" French combs (Continental systems) 100% " "
" Bradford drawing frames 90% " "
French drawing frames 100% " "
" mule spindles 100% " "
" frame spindles 92% " "

In spinning worsted yarn, both mule spindles and "cap" spindles are used; in spinning woolen yarn, mules alone. "Cap" spindles are in principle similar to ring spindles, and like them are often spoken of as "frame spindles." Ring spinning proper has never been found applicable to worsteds, still less to woolens. Cap spindles are largely used in England, and indeed predominate in the English worsted manufacture; whereas the mule alone is used in the French worsted industry. Cf. Barker, Textiles (London, 1910), pp. 101, 111.

145. Cf. what is said below, p. 363, note.

146. Tariff Board Report, p. 1042.

147. "In American worsted and woolen mills the weavers, male and female, operate one or two looms as a rule, excepting where worsted dress goods are made with cotton warps. Cotton warp being stronger than woolen or worsted makes it possible to use automatic or weft-replenishing looms, so that one weaver can operate as many as twelve looms in the manufacture of worsted dress goods." Tariff Board Report, p. 1045. This has been confirmed to me by conversations with the head of a large company which has put in the automatic looms. I have been told, again by a large manufacturer, that the automatic loom has been used with success for all-wool worsteds also.

148. Thus the Arlington mills, one of the largest and most conspicuous of the American worsted establishments, has erected a huge and highly efficient plant for saving the grease formerly lost in the process of scouring wool and securing thereby a valuable by-product. The same thing is done in Germany, where wool scouring with utilization of grease is a separate specialized industry. In accord with the American tradition this is done in the Arlington mills as part of great integrated operations, on a larger scale than in Germany, and probably with higher efficiency. It is said also that the labor force necessary for spinning and for tending combs has been cut down in this establishment; but whether in greater degree than in foreign countries does not appear. See a small advertising pamphlet, entitled "Tops," published by the Arlington mills (1898), pp. 56, 96. The Tariff Board concluded that the cost (in money) of converting wool into tops was nearly twice as great in the United States as in England; in other words, found no indication of special effectiveness in the United States. Report, pp. 639 seq.

149. See Clapham, The Woolen and Worsted Industries; and Michaelis, "Die Woll Industrie," in Handbuch der Wirthschaftskunde Deutschlands, vol. iii.

150. There may be an exception in the cotton manufacture as regards the production of yarn, in which the New England Cotton Yarn Company is carrying on an experiment at once in combination and in specialization; and perhaps another exception is the Cotton Duck Consolidation. See Dewing, Corporate Promotions and Reorganisations, chs. xii, xiii. On silks, compare what was said above, chapter xv, pp. 246, 254.

151. The duty on woolens under the tariff of 1846 was 30 per cent. But wool also was dutiable at 30 per cent, which lessened the net protection for woolens. Just how much net protection remained would be difficult of calculation. In 1857 the rate on woolens was reduced to 24 per cent; but wool having a foreign value of twenty cents or less was admitted free.

The history of the woolen manufacture before the war is little known; it offers a promising field for investigation. Some indications of its position in 1846-60 I have gathered in my Tariff History, pp. 144, 159 note. On imports and domestic production in 1860, see, the figures given above, p. 333.

152. The figures are as follows (Tariff Board Report, p. 1042):—

Per cent Manufactured in
United States Foreign Countries
Carding machines, woolen 92.2% 7.8%
" " worsted 50.3% 49.7%
Mule spindles, carded wool 85.7% 14.3%
" " combed wool .0% 100.0%
Spinning frames (cap spindles) 8.4% 91.6%

On combing machines, cf. the figures already given, p. 343, note. On cap spindles, cf. the footnote to p. 343, above.

153. The figures for the various machines here mentioned were as follows (Tariff Board Report. p. 1042):—

Manufactured in Years in Operation
United States
Foreign Countries
Per cents
Number Per cent Number Per cent Less than 5 Years 5 @ 15 Years 15 @ 25 Years Over 25 Years
Carding machines, woolen 399 92.2 34 7.8 9.6 31.0 12 4 47.0
" " worsted 331 50.3 327 49.7 26.3 33.2 32.9 7.6
Mules, carded wool 504 85.7 84 14.3 8.0 59.0 20.2 12.8
Mules, worsted .... . . . . 370 100.0 24.9 35.9 36.2 3.0
Spinning frames (for cap spindles) 113 8.4 1,233 91.6 20.3 49.6 12.9 17.2

154. "The explanation of the great use of foreign machinery in the mills (in some departments its exclusive use) given by the establishments visited was that while the importation of these machines increased their cost more than 60 per cent above that of their foreign competitors in the woolen and worsted industry, it was necessary to buy abroad, since with the exception of looms and some few other machines American manufacturers had not been able to furnish machines approaching in result the work done by the foreign machines." Tariff Board Report, p. 1043.

155. Compare what has been said on this topic in chapter ii, pp. 28, 29.

156. Mr. S. N. D. North, then Secretary of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers, wrote in 1894:—

"Many manufacturers will find themselves compelled to change altogether the character of their products.... At present it seems as though the hardest struggle was before the mills which have been engaged in making the medium cassimeres and similar goods for the masses. These mills have had the American manufacture to themselves and they have been able to determine in large measure the character of the goods made to supply it. That great advantage will no longer be theirs. It follows that radical adjustments will be necessary; much machinery which sufficed for the old conditions of manufacturing will be found to be useless. Many mills will have to be reëquipped throughout; there are many in which it will be found cheaper to abandon them altogether than to incur the expense of a complete overhauling.... It has been charged against our manufacturers that they are behind those of other countries in their knowledge and application of modern economies. The charge has been that the high protective tariff has saved them from the necessity of learning those lessons to which the attention of foreigners has largely been directed of late years. There is probably some truth in this statement, though not so much as those who make it believe." Bulletin Wool Manufacturers, xxiv, p. 258.

157. This is the general conclusion reached by Mr. T. 'W. Page, one of the members of the Tariff Board, an able economist quite without bias. In an address reported in the Wool Manufacturers' Bulletin (June, 1913, p. 172) he summed up the situa tion thus: "Some of our industries are more prosperous than others; they afford higher profits and higher wages, and can hold their own in competition with the world. The woolen industry is not one of these. It appears to have no single advantage not enjoyed in equal or greater degree by the same industries abroad, and it lacks many important advantages possessed by other industries at home."

158. Cf. what was said on the Cotton Manufacture, pp. 271, 279, 289.

159. It is worth noting that in France (and I believe in Germany also) the mule only is used: cap spinning of worsted yarns is confined to England and the United States. Clapham, The Woolen and Worsted Industries, pp. 51 seq.; Barker, Textiles, p. 101. Cf. also the note to p. 343, above. England's relation to the Continent is analogous to that of the United States to Europe in general; the machine tends to dominate, and processes that involve direct labor tend to give way.

160. See the series of letters printed in the Tariff Board Report, pp. 1666, 1073, 1074. I select a few passages from the abundance of illustrative material. "A good weaver must be quick, with nimble fingers, good eyesight, clean and methodical." "What will make a good weaver will make a good workman in almost any line, especially mechanical." And precisely because such a man has mechanical aptitude, he is drawn away into other occupations where his qualities tell to the full and where in consequence he gets higher pay. "The best weavers go into some other line of industry where the pay is better. Many of our 'stars' of past years went into the wire fence industry. Many more, during the past three or four years, have gone into the automobile industry." Another manufacturer says that "as to our expert weavers, they seldom stay longer than three years."

161. As regards weavers in cotton mills I am confirmed by private communications from persons engaged in the manufacture of the finer grades of cotton goods.

162. The figures are from the census returns of 1910. In England also the weavers on worsted looms are chiefly women, those on woolen looms chiefly men. See Report on the Woolen and Worsted Industries, etc., by W. A. G. Clark, made to the Department of Commerce and Labor, 1900, p. 49.

163. See, for example, the Tariff Board Report on Cottons, ii, p. 495. Conversations of mine with manufacturers have confirmed the statement.

164. The small fulling mill of colonial times finished the home-spun and home-woven cloths of the country folk.

165. Clapham, The Woolen and Worsted Industries, p. 74.

166. See the sketch of the rates of duty given in chapter xx, p. 325. The ad valorem (protective) rate on the dearer goods was pushed up a notch in 1890, and still another in 1897, reaching 55 per cent in the latter year.

167. The account given by the representative of this firm seems to me so instructive on various aspects of the textile situation that I quote from it with some freedom.

"Many European woolen enterprises have existed for generations, and even those of more recent origin can draw their help from mills which have had such a long existence. The employers, and in very many cases their fathers and grandfathers before them, have been born and brought up in the business; and as a rule the children and grandchildren of the workpeople are also trained to the same trade.

"And what is true of the firms, and the workers and their families, is also true of the communities. The older seats of the woolen industry, like Bradford and Huddersfield in England, parts of the Rhine province, the Lausitz, Silesia and Saxony in Germany, Roubaix, Tourcoing, Elboeuf and Sedan in France, to mention a few of the best known, having gathered about them for centuries a group of trained and efficient workers, possess an inestimable advantage over the centers of the woolen industry in America, the latter being, in comparison with those of Europe above named, themselves still in their childhood and their workers more or less migratory.... The operatives in American woolen mills, in spite of the very much higher wages paid, are largely drawn from the ranks of unskilled labor. And whence does this unskilled labor come? There is little of it among native-born Americans. It is taken from the steady flow of immigrants into this country....

"When establishing our enterprise in Passaic, N. J., we were obliged, in order to be able to compete, not only as to price, but also with respect to quality and technical perfection, with the best European mills, to import most of our machinery, because a great deal of American spinning, weaving, dyeing, and finishing machinery is not yet so highly developed as the European. This is especially true of the machinery used in what is known as the French system of worsted spinning, which is being adopted more and more each year. [The French use the mule exclusively, and a drawing system of their own; the whole adapted to making soft fabrics from fine wool of comparatively short fibre. See Barker, Textiles, p. 247; Tariff Board Report, p. 1031.] Also our entire woolen spinning machinery had to be imported to enable us to compete with the best European manufacturers.

"A great part of our looms could be bought here, while others had to be imported on account of special requirements; but those purchased in this country were nearly as expensive as the imported ones, so that in buying them we had to bear our share of the protection of the textile machinery of this country. Dyeing and finishing machinery used in our mill also had mostly to be imported." From a memorial to Congress, by J. Forstmann, reprinted in Bulletin Wool Manufacturers, September, 1921, pp. 416-417.

168. I am glad to record that my general conclusions are similar to those reached by Mr. T. W. Page of the Tariff Board and stated by him in the address already referred to; see Bulletin Wool Manufacturers, June, 1913, p. 169.

End of Notes

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