Cyclopædia of Political Science, Political Economy, and the Political History of the United States

Edited by: Lalor, John J.
(?-1899)
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1881
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New York: Maynard, Merrill, and Co.
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1899
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Includes articles by Frédéric Bastiat, Gustave de Molinari, Henry George, J. B. Say, Francis A. Walker, and more.
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SECESSION

III.175.1

SECESSION (IN U. S. HISTORY). The constitutional apology for the right of secession by one of the states of the American Union may be very briefly dismissed; it is entirely dependent upon the theory of state sovereignty. (See that title.) Grant that the states are still individually sovereign; that their citizens owe a primary allegiance and obedience to their state, and a secondary obedience to the federal government because their state remains a member of the Union; that the Union is a voluntary confederacy, not a nation: and the right of secession must be admitted as a matter of course. The advisability of secession, the propriety of severing the ancient relations with friendly and confederate states, is entirely a matter for the state's decision: when the decision is made, every law-abiding citizen is bound by his allegiance to his state to obey it. (See ALLEGIANCE, III.) However fallacious the doctrine of state sovereignty and its progeny, secession, may be, there is at least this apology for the action of the seceding states in 1860-61: that the doctrine of state sovereignty, in both its premises and its consequences, had been familiar almost from antiquity; that its technical language had been used constantly, even by those who would have scouted its logical consequences, and that the system of negro slavery, with all its countless influences, had shut out the south from that educational process which had made state sovereignty either a meaningless formula, or a political heresy, in the north and west. (See NATION.) It must be noticed, however, that the right of secession has never been admitted by any department of the national government: joint or separate resolutions have been passed by the two houses of congress, asserting the sovereignty of the states; decisions have been made by the supreme court of much the same character; but the right of secession itself has never been admitted. Leaving the theory of state sovereignty to be considered under its appropriate head, it is the object of this article to trace the more practical idea of secession in our history: I., as a mere incident of particularism, of state sovereignty; II., as complicated with slavery; and III., in practice.

III.175.2

—I. The union of 1643 (see NEW ENGLAND UNION) experienced in miniature most of the perils to which the perfected and national Union was afterward exposed: nullification attacked its commercial regulations, and even put a veto on its wars; but its final disappearance was due not so much to any secession as to the inherent weakness of its nature, and the dislike of the crown. With the introduction of the attempt at a more general union in 1754 (see ALBANY PLAN OF UNION), the idea of secession first comes plainly into view. The plan of Franklin contemplated its establishment by act of parliament, a very unusual acknowledgment of the power of parliament over the colonies. In explanation of this feature of his plan, he states the various interests of the colonies, and their jealousy of one another, and adds: "If ever acts of assembly in all the colonies could be obtained for that purpose, yet as any colony, on the least dissatisfaction, might repent its own act, and thereby withdraw itself from the union, it would not be a stable one, or such as could be depended on; for, if only one colony should, on any disgust, withdraw itself, others might think it unjust and unequal that they, by continuing in the union, should be at the expense of defending a colony which refused to bear its proportionable part, and could therefore one after another withdraw, till the whole crumbled into its original parts." The theory of secession could hardly be more exactly stated; in its final application in practice it was only improved in one respect, the passage of the ordinances of secession by state conventions, instead of by the assemblies.

III.175.3

—Accession to, and secession from, any union, were of course equally unconstitutional, without the king's consent, while the colonies remained a part of the British empire. But, as the American revolution itself was frequently appealed to in after years, as the first great example of, and precedent for, secession, it may be well to lay stress here on one essential difference between them, that the former was an exercise of the undeniable right of revolution, a revolt of an unrepresented fraction of the empire against the usurpations of parliament, and afterward against the king for sustaining parliament; while the latter was attempted to be justified as a constitutional right of the states, which could not rightfully be resisted by any other state, by all the other states, or by the federal government. A revolt of a territory, unrepresented in the federal government, against what it might consider the usurpation of the federal government, and its attempt to establish a separate government, might claim the American revolution as a precedent; the seceding states in 1860-61 could not. A revolutionist hazards his life upon the issue, with the pains and penalties of treason as a possible result; a secessionist claims all the advantages of revolution, without any of its responsibilities or dangers.

III.175.4

—Notwithstanding the early and general dissemination of the theory of state sovereignty, its practical consequence, the right of secession, was for some years unheard of, perhaps unthought of. Until 1783 the common dangers of war were a fence outside of which none of the thirteen states dared to stray; after 1783 the authority of the congress of the confederation was so weak a fence that none of the states cared to give it importance by formally demolishing it. The ugly word "secession" first appears in the convention of 1787, July 5, though it then referred to the states as represented in the convention itself: Gerry remarked that, unless some compromise should be made, "a secession, he foresaw, would take place." The subsequent ratification of the constitution by eleven of the thirteen states, on the original refusal of Rhode Island and North Carolina to ratify, has often been appealed to as a brilliant example of peaceable secession; and so it must be considered, if the ratifications were really, as they purported to be, the acts of "sovereign states." The articles of confederation had expressly provided that no change should be made in them unless with the assent of the legislatures of every state; and yet, in the face of this covenant, eleven of the states not only formed a new government, but inserted in it a provision for future amendment by three-fourths of the states. On the theory that the states were sovereign until the adoption of the constitution, how can such a proceeding be anything but a secession, albeit of the majority from the minority? But another power was present in the ratification, the power which had held the states together even before the adoption of the articles of confederation, the sovereign power of the nation, of the national people as distinguished from the people of the state. Its non-recognition by the state conventions can not alter the fact of its already established existence; and, without its existence, the assumptions of the continental congress, from 1775 until the ratification of the confederation in 1781, would be even a more colossal sham than the ratification of the constitution. The historic truth is, that the people of the nation, which had alone validated the revolutionary acts of the continental congress, and which had tolerated the articles of confederation, had now at last interposed to bring order out of chaos; that it was disposed to deal very tenderly with the rights and even with the prejudices of the peoples of the several states; that it chose to maintain state lines in the ratifications; but that, when nine of the states, including a heavy majority of the territory, wealth and population of the nation, had expressed their decision in favor of the new form of government, factious opposition was to cease. It is true that the status of the possible non-ratifying states was carefully ignored everywhere, as being what the "Federalist" called a "delicate question"; but it is impossible to suppose that two, or even four, recalcitrant states would ever have been allowed to escape from the national jurisdiction. Gouverneur Morris' warning in the convention of 1787, July 5, "This country must be united; if persuasion does not unite it, the sword will," which provoked so much contrary feeling, was the simple truth. The forms of ratification would never have been neglected; but ratification, willing or unwilling, would have been extorted from Rhode Island and North Carolina by a pressure increasing continually until finally successful. The passage of the senate bill, May 18, 1790, to prohibit bringing goods, wares and merchandise from the state of Rhode Island "into the United States, "and to authorize a demand of arrears of money from the said state, is a fair example of the sort of pressure which would have been increased indefinitely but for the ratification by the state on the 29th of the same month. The nation has always been thus gentle and considerate in allowing the assertion of state sovereignty in non-essentials; in essentials state sovereignty must yield or be crushed.

III.175.5

—Under the constitution the Union was at first spared any internal dissensions of such magnitude as to suggest secession as a remedy. Projects for separation from the Union were undoubtedly on foot before 1795 in Kentucky (see that state), and in western Pennsylvania (see WHISKY INSURRECTION); but these were rather the product of frontier freedom from restraint than the consequence of state sovereignty. Soon after 1795 a series of articles were published in the "Connecticut Courant," urging "the impossibility of union for any long period in the future," and laying down the permanent dogma that "there can be no safety to the northern states without a separation from the confederacy." These letters met no general approval in the north, and the election of Adams to the presidency in 1796 took away for the time their moving cause, a fear of southern domination in the federal government. The idea of state sovereignty, with secession as a possible consequence, next appeared, on the other side of Mason and Dixon's line, in 1798. (See KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS.) The author of the Kentucky resolutions, Jefferson, explains his feeling on the subject of secession at some length in his letter of June 1, 1798, to John Taylor. "If, on a temporary superiority of the one party, the other is to resort to a scission of the Union, no federal government can ever exist. It, to rid ourselves of the present rule of Massachusetts and Connecticut, we break the Union, will the evil stop there? Suppose the New England states alone cut off, will our natures be changed? Are we not men still to the south of that, and with all the passions of men? Immediately we shall see a Pennsylvania and a Virginia party arise in the residuary confederacy. If we reduce our Union to Virginia and North Carolina, they will end by breaking into their simple units. Seeing that we must have somebody to quarrel with, I had rather keep our New England associates for that purpose." The objections, it will be noticed, lie to the advisability, not to the right, of secession. This defect, however, was common to most of the public men of the time; and for years afterward state sovereignty, with all its consequences, was the first refuge of a minority. The existence of the nation was hardly recognized, even by the courts, for twenty years after 1798 (see NATION, JUDICIARY); though its existence was not often denied in such plain language as that employed by Tucker, in his edition of Blackstone in 1803. After summing up, to his own satisfaction, the proofs that Virginia had always been a sovereign state, and enumerating the powers which Virginia had delegated to the federal government, he thus concludes: "The federal government, then, appears to be the organ through which the united republics communicate with foreign nations and with each other. Their submission to its operation is voluntary: its councils, its engagements, its authority, are theirs, modified and united. Its sovereignty is an emanation from theirs, not a flame by which they have been consumed, nor a vortex in which they are swallowed up. Each is still a perfect state, still sovereign, still independent, and still capable, should the occasion require, to resume the exercise of its functions, as such, to the most unlimited extent. But, until the time shall arrive when the occasion requires a resumption of the rights of sovereignty by the several states (and far be that period removed when it shall happen), the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the states individually is wholly suspended, or discontinued, in the cases before mentioned; nor can that suspension ever be removed, so long as the present constitution remains unchanged, but by the dissolution of the bonds of union: an event which no good citizen can wish, and which no good or wise administration will ever hazard." Herein is contained, for the first time, the sum and substance of the doctrine of secession.

III.175.6

—When the idea of secession next appeared, it was again in the north, and closely connected with the question on which it was finally put into practice in the south, the territories of the United States. The acquisition of Louisiana (see ANNEXATIONS, I.), in 1803, was very objection able to the federalist politicians of New England. They had been beaten in the contest with the south alone: to re-enforce the southern line of battle with six, nine or a dozen future states, peopled by "the wild men on the Missouri," seemed simply suicidal, a condemnation of New England to perpetual nullity. They therefore resisted the annexation to the utmost, and claimed that, as the constitution was made only for the original territory comprised within the United States, an extension of territory was unconstitutional without the consent of all the states. "Suppose, in private life, thirteen men form a partnership, and ten of them undertake to admit a new partner without the concurrence of the other three, would it not be at their option to abandon the partnership after so palpable an infringement of their rights? How much more so in the political partnership." The annexation was consummated; but it was not until Jan. 14, 1811, on the enabling act for the first of the dreaded new states, Louisiana, that Quincy, of Massachusetts, fairly declared, in the house, the federalist conception of its consequences. "It is my deliberate opinion, that, if this bill passes, the bonds of this Union are virtually dissolved; that the states which compose it are free from their moral obligations; and that, as it will be the right of all, so it will be the duty of some, to prepare definitely for a separation, amicably if they can, violently if they must." Quincy was called to order, but the house decided that he was in order. Ex-President Adams, in reply to a copy of the speech, could only say that "prophecies of division had been familiar in his ears for six and thirty years."

III.175.7

—In the meantime the opposition to the democratic administration, confined chiefly to the New England politicians on the annexation question, had become more popular with the introduction of the restrictive system. (See EMBARGO, III.) It is beyond question that some project of secession had been mooted in New England in 1803, though probably confined to a very few; and that Burr's candidacy for governor of New York in 1804 was a part of it. (See BURR, AARON.) By taking in the great state of New York, and by yielding the leadership-in-chief to a New York democrat, who was highly popular with the democrats of New England, it was hoped that a new republic might be formed, compact, homogeneous, and strongly defended by nature in every direction. Burr's defeat had much to do with the failure of this project, but the indifference of the people of New England probably more. The strong and general popular feeling which was aroused by the embargo revived the project. How many took part in it is uncertain; they were probably very few. The whole truth is probably expressed in a letter of Joseph Story, afterward supreme court justice, Jan. 9, 1809: "I am sorry to perceive the spirit of disaffection in Massachusetts increasing to so high a degree; and I fear that it is stimulated by a desire, in a very few ambitious men, to dissolve the Union." Henry's letter, of March 7, 1809 (see HENRY DOCUMENTS), goes further, and details the federalist programme as follows: that, in the event of war, "the legislature of Massachusetts will declare itself permanent until a new election of members; invite a congress, to be composed of delegates from the federal states; and erect a separate government for their common defense and common interest." Henry's assertions, however, are usually only proof that the contrary is the truth, and that is probably the case here. It is only certain that the accounts of the feeling in the eastern states, as given by John Quincy Adams and Story, caused a panic among the democratic leaders, and ended the embargo.

III.175.8

—During the war of 1812 the feeling in New England grew still higher. Ultra federalists undoubtedly used language aiming directly at secession; the student will find a large collection of such utterances in Carey's "Olive Branch," as cited among the authorities. Indiscreet references to "the New England nation," occasional flauntings of a flag with five stripes and stars, the firing of "New England national salutes" of five guns, and other similar indications, when combined with the general discontent in New England (see CONVENTION, HARTFORD), kept the administration in a chronic state of alarm. The discussion of secession in any form by the Hartford convention has been denied by its president and secretary; its journal shows no trace of it; and Mr. Goodrich has collected every available proof to the contrary. It appears certain that no such active design was considered or desired by its members; but a few of the opening sentences of its report are at least suggestive. "If the Union be destined to dissolution, by reason of the multiplied abuses of bad administrations, it should, if possible, be the work of peaceable times and deliberate consent. Some new form of confederacy should be substituted among those states which shall intend to maintain a federal relation to each other. But a severance of the Union by one or more states, against the will of the rest, and especially in a time of war, can be justified only by absolute necessity." The report concluded by advising, that, if no attention should be paid to their remonstrances, and the war should continue, a new convention should be called in the following June, "with such powers and instructions as the exigency of a crisis so momentous may require."

III.175.9

—With the close of the war of 1812 the first period of the history of secession ends. It continued immanent in the doctrine of state sovereignty; but nothing occurred to call it to active life. It was threatened as a possible alternative to its illegitimate brother, nullification (see that title), but was never enforced. Secessionists proper in South Carolina had a contempt for nullification, and composed the so-called "Union party" of 1831-3 in that state. Indeed, Jackson's nullification proclamation was offensive to them, as laying down "the tyrannical doctrine that we have not even the right to secede."

III.175.10

—II. Throughout its subsequent history secession is always connected with slavery or the opposition to slavery. The right to secede, after it had been completely formulated by Tucker in 1803, was asserted again and again for the next thirty years, but always as a mere particularist formula, a corollary of state sovereignty. The most striking of these. and particularly as coming from the north, is that of Judge Rawle, of Pennsylvania, in his commentaries on the constitution, as cited below, in 1825. "The secession of a state from the Union depends on the will of the people of such state. * * The state legislatures have only to perform certain organical operations in respect to it. To withdraw from the Union comes not within the general scope of their delegated authority. But in any manner by which a secession is to take place, nothing is more certain than that the act should be deliberate, clear and unequivocal; and in such case the previous ligament with the Union would be legitimately and fairly destroyed. * * In the present constitution there is no specification of numbers after the first formation. It was foreseen that there would be a natural tendency to increase the number of states. It was also known, though it was not avowed, that a state might withdraw itself. The number would therefore be variable. Secessions may reduce the number to the smallest integer admitting combination. They would remain united under the same principles and regulations, among themselves, that now apply to the whole. For a state can not be compelled by other states to withdraw from the Union, and therefore, if two or more determine to remain united, although all the others desert them, nothing can be discovered in the constitution to prevent it." It is notable that, so late as Nov. 9, 1860, Horace Greeley upheld "the practical liberty, if not the abstract right, of secession," only insisting that the step should be taken "with the deliberation and gravity befitting so momentous an issue." It is true that these two utterances are almost the only ones from a representative northern man after the war of 1812 in support of the theory of secession; and that all the other utterances which have been laboriously collected are simply the expression of state feeling, of state opposition to the annexation of Texas, the fugitive slave law, and similar measures, without any apparent thought of the right of secession which was involved in it. Nevertheless, it is painful to consider the result which would have followed in 1860-61, if the action of the seceding states had been slow, calm, and the evident outcome of popular desire, instead of hasty, violent, and the work of the politicians. In that event, the issue of the struggle would have been painfully doubtful.

III.175.11

—Secession came in again with Texas, whose independent existence was itself a brilliant instance of successful secession from the Mexican republic. As the probability of its annexation grew stronger, the language used in advocacy of or in opposition to it grew with it. March 3, 1843, John Quincy Adams and a few anti slavery whigs issued an address to their constituents, warning them that the annexation project had never been given up, and that it would result in and fully justify a dissolution of the Union. Through this and the following summer, on the other hand, "Texas or disunion" became a frequently expressed sentiment in the south, particularly in South Carolina, but this died away as the success of annexation became assured. But even this did not drive the northern states into any action looking to secession, or a dissolution of the Union, though this was unofficially suggested. In January, 1845, at an anti-annexation convention in Boston, Wm. Lloyd Garrison urged the calling of a Massachusetts convention to declare the Union dissolved, and to invite other states to join with her in a new union based on the principles of the declaration of independence. "Although," says May, "his motion was not carried by the convention, it was received with great favor by a large portion of the members and other auditors, and he sat down amidst the most hearty bursts of applause." But the final annexation of Texas, operating against the feelings of the most thoroughly nationalized section of the Union, was insufficient to call forth any dangerous or even irritating desire for a dissolution of the Union. That was reserved for the question of the settlement of the new territories (see WILMOT PROVISO).

III.175.12

—CO-OPERATION. The theory of secession involved the right of any state to withdraw from the Union singly; and yet the silent proof of its inherent fallacy is that single secession was never attempted, and probably never thought of. In 1847 Calhoun had endeavored unsuccessfully to obtain the "co-operation" of the slave states in the following programme: 1, the calling of a slave state convention; 2, the exclusion of the sea-going vessels of the northern states from southern ports; 3, the prohibition of railroad commerce with the northeastern, but not with the northwestern, states; 4, the present maintenance of the freedom of trade on the Mississippi; 5, the continuance of this interstate embargo system until the northwest should be "detached" from the eastern states, and should unite with the south in opening the new territories to slavery. Calhoun's programme opened the way, however, for a bolder idea of "co-operation" in 1850, according to which a number of slave states were to secede in company, for mutual defense, if any prohibition of slavery in the new territories should be enforced. But the southern states held to the resolutions of the Georgia state convention of 1850, declaring that the state accepted the compromise of 1850, but would resist, even to secession, such anti-slavery legislation as the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or in the territories, or of the interstate slave-trade. There can be no doubt that South Carolina was ready to secede in 1850, but not alone. Her state convention of April 26, 1852, declared her right to secede, but forbore to exercise it, out of deference to the wishes of other slaveholding states, that is, because no other slaveholding state wished to secede with or after her. Co-operation was, therefore, never practically attempted, because of the compromise of 1850, by which the Wilmot proviso was really enforced in California, by its admission as a free state, while nothing was said of it in the organization of the territories of Utah and New Mexico, and the fugitive slave law was accepted by the south as a make-weight. (See COMPROMISES, V.) But, though this attempt at secession by a section was unsuccessful, there had grown up an alienation between the north and the south which boded no good for the future. Calhoun's last speech in the senate, March 4, 1850, described the manner in which many of the multitudinous cords that bound the Union together had already snapped. Of the five great Christian denominations which had been national in their organization, two, the Methodists and Baptists, had split into two sectional parts; and the Presbyterians were evidently close to the point of division. Political bonds were also stretched almost to breaking, and their preservation depended on the willingness of the northern states to satisfy the south by not excluding slavery from the territories. "If you," says Calhoun, who "represent the stronger portion, can not agree to settle the great questions at issue on the broad principle of justice and duty, say so; and let the states we both represent agree to separate and depart in peace. If you are unwilling we should part in peace, tell us so, and we shall know what to do." The last sentence shows the remarkable underlying consciousness in every advocate of secession, of the truth so forcibly stated by Webster three days afterward: "Secession! Peaceable secession! Sir, your eyes and mine are never destined to see that miracle. The dismemberment of this vast country without convulsion! The breaking up of the fountains of the great deep without ruffling the surface! Peaceable secession is an utter impossibility." (See, in general, UNITED STATES, II., 5.)

III.175.13

—This underlying consciousness, that secession meant war, was for some time sufficient to make any attempt at open secession hopeless ab initio, and no such attempt was made. Indeed, the south had been very well satisfied with the compromise of 1850; and the impediments to the execution of the fugitive slave law (see FUGITIVE SLAVE LAWS, PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS), while they excited great discontent in the south, were not commonly looked upon as reasonable cause for secession. Those final causes were three in number, with a supplementary cause, "coercion," which will be stated in the next section. 1. Nothing is more noteworthy in the extreme southern states than the sudden development of large estates, the freezing out of small planters, and their emigration after the absorption of their property. "In a few years large estates are accumulated as if by magic." In large sections of each state the population consisted almost wholly of negroes, with the few whites owning or managing them. But in all these states representation was on the basis of the "federal population": that is, three-fifths of the negroes were represented, while the voting and office-holding pertained to the few whites. Thus, apart from the natural influence belonging to the wealthy class of the population, the counties in the "black belt" were practically the pocket boroughs of the slave-owners therein. These thus held far more than their fair share of power in state legislatures and conventions, and in some states absolutely controlled them. With every year, from 1850 to 1860, the power of this class was growing stronger, and their desire for secession for the protection of their property in slaves was not weakened. (See SLAVERY, IV.) 2. But there was still another and much larger class in the south, owning few or no slaves, not wedded to the protection or extension of slavery, but high-spirited, and determined not to submit to oppression, or, above all, to the evasion of a fair compromise. The results of the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill (see that title) served to bring these into the secession programme. They had never asked for the abrogation of the Missouri compromise; but, when it had been abrogated by fair agreement, it seemed to them an unworthy evasion to turn Kansas and Nebraska into free states by organized, not voluntary and natural emigration from the north. This was the class to which was addressed the argument which A. H. Stephens says carried Georgia, the key-stone of a successful secession, out of the Union: "We can make better terms out of the Union than in it." 3. The Harper's Ferry insurrection (see BROWN, JOHN) had a silent influence everywhere. Those who desired secession were active, persevering, and in earnest; those who did not, were at the best negative; for they saw one great chance of good, even in a successful secession, a release from national association with future John Browns, and the ability to protect themselves from such invasions by open and national warfare.

III.175.14

—With so many influences at work in its favor, it is matter for wonder that secession in 1860-61 was only forced through by the influence of the first two classes over the delegates to the state conventions, and that the popular demand for secession was so conspicuous by its absence that the conventions, except in Texas, did not venture to submit their ordinances to popular vote. For, in a popular vote, be it remembered, the "federal representation" disappeared; only the votes of the whites went for anything; and the total vote of the state might very easily show that their nominal representatives did not really represent them. There must have been an enormous mass of Union feeling in the south, blind, leaderless, and rendered powerless first by the belief that their primary allegiance was due to the state, and then by the organization of the new national government at Montgomery, but still genuine and hearty.

III.175.15

—III The threat that secession would have followed Fremont's election, in 1856, was probably only an electioneering device. When his election seemed probable, Gov. Wise, of Virginia, called a meeting of southern governors at Raleigh, for Oct. 13; but only three governors appeared, those of Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina, and these did nothing. The meeting was of some influence, however, upon the northern vote. (See REPUBLICAN PARTY, I.) Practical secession was hardly as yet possible. The alienation between the sections was not yet sufficient; and the power of the secessionist class over the state conventions was not yet great enough. Four years made a great difference in both respects. In December, 1860, Senator Iverson, of Georgia, pictured the situation in the senate thus: "There are the republican northern senators on that side. Here are the southern senators on this side. How much social intercourse is there between us? You sit on that side, sullen and gloomy; we sit on ours with portentous scowls. Yesterday I observed there was not a solitary man on that side of the chamber came over here, even to extend the civilities and courtesies of life; nor did any of us go over there. Here are two hostile bodies on this floor, and it is but a type of the feeling that exists in the two sections. We are enemies as much as if we were hostile states. I believe the northern people hate the south worse than ever the English people hated France; and I can tell my brethren over there that there is no love lost on the part of the south." From this picture, the fact is carefully eliminated that the southern senators represented, not the southern people, but its slaveholding class; but, even barring this defect, the picture is well worthy of study. With such a tightly strained tension of international relations between the governments of the two sections, the real feeling of the people was a matter of but secondary importance, and there was but little need of open threats of secession in case of Lincoln's election. Such threats were undoubtedly made, but unofficially; and the question of secession played no formal part in the campaign of 1860. The whole congress of 1859-61 was inundated by threats of secession in the event of the election of Seward as president in 1860, the object seeming to be to commit the southern people to that policy beyond the possibility of an honorable withdrawal. It has been asserted that the disruption of the democratic party, in 1860, was contrived by the secessionist class for the purpose of insuring Lincoln's election, and thus obtaining an excuse for secession; but such a design is very doubtful. (See DEMOCRATIC PARTY, V.) The more natural explanation of their course is in their hope that the electoral vote would be so divided up as to give no candidate a majority; that the choice of the president would thus go to the house of representatives; and that they would there be able to obtain the election of either Breckinridge or Bell. That their hopes had some foundation, may be seen from the facts that the opposition to Lincoln, after his election, still controlled both houses of congress; and that the republicans, throughout the whole rebellion, were indebted for their majority in congress to the voluntary absence of the southern delegations.

III.175.16

—As it resulted, however, Lincoln obtained the electoral votes of all the northern and western states, with the exception of a part of New Jersey's vote, and was elected beyond cavil. What was to be the next step in the political game? Were the southern states to go on debating about co-operation, without taking any practical steps toward secession, until the popular impression caused by Lincoln's election had worn off, and his administration was found to be nothing out of the ordinary? In that case, the idea of secession might as well be laid permanently on the shelf, with other worn-out political stage thunder. The southern politician class felt, that, rather than give up what they had grown accustomed to consider the only life-preserver of their section, or rather of slavery, they would prefer to go over the cataract with it.

III.175.17

—Nevertheless, there remained that dread of the practical attempt to secede by a single state, which was always the surest internal condemnation of the whole theory of secession. Gov. Gist, of South Carolina, had already sent a circular letter to the other southern governors, Oct. 5, 1860, asking their advice and plans. His state, he said, would secede with any other state, if Lincoln should be elected; or she would secede alone, if she should receive assurances that any other state would follow her; "otherwise, it is doubtful." Not one governor answered that his state would secede alone. Florida, Alabama and Mississippi would secede with any other state; North Carolina and Louisiana would probably not secede at all; Georgia would wait for some overt act. At first sight, these answers seem discouraging; but there was hope in them. If three states were only waiting for a leader, South Carolina would take the plunge, though the gallantry of the act is considerably diminished by this preliminary probing for assurances of support. A movement begun even by four states, would probably swing the other gulf states; any attempt at "coercion" by the federal government would bring the border states; and the confederacy of the slave states would then be complete.

III.175.18

—The South Carolina legislature, which chose presidential electors until 1868, was in session to choose them, Nov. 6, 1860, and remained in session until Lincoln's election was assured. It then called a state convention, made appropriations for the purchase of arms, and adjourned. The convention met at Columbia, Dec. 17, adjourned to Charleston, on account of an epidemic in Columbia, and there unanimously passed the following ordinance, Dec. 20: "We, the people of the state of South Carolina, in convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the ordinance adopted by us in convention, on the 23d day of May, in the year of our Lord 1788, whereby the constitution of the United States was ratified, and also all acts and parts of acts of the general assembly of this state ratifying amendments of the said constitution, are hereby repealed; and that the Union now subsisting between South Carolina and other states, under the name of the United States of America, is hereby dissolved." On the 24th a declaration of causes for secession was adopted. It recapitulated the arguments in favor of state sovereignty and the right of secession, and assigned as a cause for immediate secession the general hostility of the northern states to the south, as shown in their union under a sectional party organization, and in their refusal to execute the fugitive slave laws (see PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS); and it concluded with an imitation of the closing paragraph of the declaration of independence. On the same day the governor by proclamation announced the fact of secession. Having adopted ordinances to enforce the existing laws of the United States for the present under state authority, to transfer to the legislature the powers hitherto exercised by the federal government, to make the state ready for war, and to appoint commissioners to form, if possible, a permanent government for all the states which should secede, the convention adjourned, Jan. 5, 1861. The action of the state then ceases to relate to secession, and falls under other heads. (See CONFEDERATE STATES, REBELLION.)

III.175.19

—The action of Georgia comes second in importance politically, if not chronologically; for the rank, wealth and position of the state would have made its persistent refusal to secede a most annoying brake on the secession programme. The legislature called a state convention, Nov. 18, 1860, and the whole struggle took place on the election of delegates. There was hardly any denial of the right of secession; but a strong state party, under the lead of Alexander H. Stephens, warmly denied the advisability of secession. The convention met at Milledgeville, Jan. 17, 1861, and on the following day, by a vote of 165 to 130, declared it to be the right and the duty of the state to secede. This really settled the question. Jan. 19, the formal ordinance of secession was adopted by a vote of 208 to 89. In order to maintain the position of the state, every delegate but six signed the ordinance; and these six yielded so far as to pledge themselves to the defense of the state. After passing the other necessary ordinances for a transfer of powers from the federal government to the legislature, the convention adjourned, but re-assembled in Savannah, March 7, and on the 16th ratified the confederate constitution.

III.175.20

—In Mississippi the convention was called for Jan. 7, at Jackson, and passed an ordinance of secession on the 9th by a vote of 84 to 15. March 30, the confederate constitution was ratified by a vote of 78 to 7.

III.175.21

—In Florida the legislature passed the bill calling a convention, Dec. 1, 1860, and the convention met at Tallahassee, Jan. 3, 1861. Jan 10, an ordinance of secession was passed by a vote of 62 to 7.

III.175.22

—In Alabama the election for delegates was ordered by the governor (see ALABAMA), and the convention met at Montgomery, Jan. 7, 1861. Jan. 11, an ordinance of secession was adopted by a vote of 61 to 39. March 13, the confederate constitution was ratified.

III.175.23

—In Louisiana the legislature, Dec. 11, 1860, passed the bill calling a convention, and it met at Baton Rouge, Jan. 23, 1861. Jan. 26, an ordinance of secession was adopted by a vote of 113 to 17, and on March 21 the confederate constitution was ratified. Louisiana was the only original seceding state in which the popular vote for delegates was a close one. It is stated at 20,448 for, and 17,296 against, immediate secession.

III.175.24

—In Texas, secession was forced through with great difficulty, and altogether as a revolution. The governor refused to call an extra session of the legislature until, early in January, 1861, he found that steps were being taken to call it together without his authority. He then summoned it for Jan. 22. But this gave very little time for the passage of a convention bill, the election of delegates, and the meeting of the convention. An entirely unofficial call was therefore issued, delegates were elected, and the convention met at Austin, Jan. 28. Feb. 1, an ordinance of secession was passed by a vote of 166 to 7; but, as the convention itself was entirely without any basis of law, the ordinance was to be submitted to popular vote, Feb. 23. The legislature, Feb. 4, validated the convention, apparently with a view to overriding a possibly adverse popular majority. The popular vote was reported to the convention as 34,794 for the ordinance, and 11,235 against it. But even before the popular ratification, the convention had appointed delegates to the confederate congress, Feb. 11, and the federal troops in the state had been captured and paroled. The confederate constitution was ratified March 23. One week before that day the convention had declared vacant the office of Gov. Sam Houston, who had shown no inclination to favor the convention or its purposes.

III.175.25

—These seven states, South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas, were the original seceding states; and the details of their action seem to show that the first three named were the only ones in which convention action represented the majority of the white voters. In Georgia and Louisiana the result was due to the lack of any abiding principle in the unionist representatives for resistance to the earnest body of secessionists; in Alabama, to the control of the convention by the southern portion, or "black belt"; and in Texas, to the revolutionary action of the secessionist politicians. These considerations, however, are not of much practical importance, for in all the states unionists and secessionists alike acknowledged the abstract right of secession, the citizen's paramount allegiance to his state, and the unconstitutionality of "coercion" by the federal government. The secession of even a single state, and an attempt to coerce it, would therefore have brought about the secession of the other states named, as it afterward did in the cases of Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina and Virginia.

III.175.26

—COERCION. It is noteworthy that originally the most extreme particularists had the least objection to the coercion of a state by the federal government. In writing to Monroe, Aug. 11, 1786, Jefferson says: "There never will be money in the treasury till the confederacy shows its teeth. The states must see the rod: perhaps it must be felt by some one of them. * * Every rational citizen must wish to see an effective instrument of coercion, and should fear to see it on any other element than the water." And still more fully, Aug. 4, 1787: "It has been so often said as to be generally believed, that congress have no power by the confederation to enforce anything, for example, contributions of money. It was not necessary to give them that power expressly; they have it by the law of nature. When two parties make a compact, there results to each a power of compelling the other to execute it." This was the general ground on which the democratic members of congress, in 1861-5, while still holding the constitution to be a "compact," voted for the prosecution of the war. It may also explain the reason why both the Virginia and New Jersey plans in 1787 (see CONVENTION OF 1787) included a power to coerce disobedient states; and why Madison and others in the convention wished to give the federal government an absolute veto on the legislation of state governments, to remove the necessity for any forcible "coercion."

III.175.27

—Either of these plans would have been hazardous. Madison himself said that "the use of force against a state would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound." This expression, justified as it is by common sense, has often been quoted as a condemnation of "coercion." But it must be noted that no such "use of force against a state" was ever authorized by the constitution. That instrument gave an indirect and far safer power of coercion, 1, in the case of states, by extending the power of the federal judiciary to state laws involving the construction of the constitution (see JUDICIARY, I.); and 2, by giving the power to compel individuals to obey the federal government in any conflict with the state.

III.175.28

—Nevertheless the opinion was strangely prevalent in 1860-61, that, because congress had no power to "coerce" a state, secession could not be interfered with. The simplest argument for this view can be found in President Buchanan's message of Dec. 3, 1860. It was the main encouragement to secession by a single state; it was announced again and again by the border states during the winter of 1860-61; and the consciousness of its general existence threw the Lincoln administration at first altogether upon the defensive. (See BORDER STATES, and the names of their states in detail.) It was not until the popular uprising in the north had taught the administration what states it could rely upon, that the federal government was encouraged to begin the work of coercion by exercising its power to execute the laws and suppress insurrection by means of the armed militia. From that time coercion took the form of repression of individual resistance, the federal government ignoring the action of the state as entirely ultra vires. This is the form which coercion took in its first operation in our history, the "force bill" of 1833 (see NULLIFICATION), and which it must always take. If a state should see fit to form a treaty with a foreign power, the federal government would ignore such action, and would compel individuals to ignore it also, by the use of the courts in cases of mild resistance, and of the army and navy in case of resistance by force. This process of "coercion" could hardly be better stated than in a pamphlet cited below, by Gov. H. A. Wise, of Virginia, published in 1859, though aimed at a very different object. He supposes the state of Vermont gradually coming to forcible resistance against the execution of the fugitive slave laws, her state convention making the arrest of a slave felony, and her magistrates and officers resisting the federal writs of habeas corpus by force. "The president must then command a sufficient force of the army or navy or militia of the United States to overcome the rebellion and treason; and that would not be all. The jailor and judges and governor of Vermont, and all persons guilty with them of rebellion against the faithful execution of the laws of the United States, would have to be arrested and tried according to law, or, if their resistance was serious enough to require it, to be slain in battle of rebellion against the laws of the Union. And I am sure, that, if civil war should thus be brought on to battle and carnage, every patriot and lover of the laws would march to the order of coercing a state, to compel her authorities and her people to obey the supreme laws, to lay down their weapons, and to renounce the state laws and ordinances commanding their rebellion."

III.175.29

—Voluntary secession had really spent its force in carrying Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana and Texas with it; but it relied on carrying the other slave states with it on the plea of resistance to coercion, when President Lincoln should call for troops to enforce the laws. In two of them it succeeded fairly: Arkansas passed an ordinance of secession May 6, and North Carolina May 20. (See those states.) In Virginia and Tennessee, another plan had to be adopted. The convention, while nominally submitting the ordinance of secession to popular vote, first formed "military leagues" with the confederate states; confederate troops at once swarmed over their territory; and under their auspices the popular vote became a farce. In this way Virginia's ordinance was ratified May 23, and Tennessee's June 18. Here the current stopped: in Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri much the same plan was tried as in Texas, but it was a failure. (See those states.) In Delaware alone of the slave states, secession seems to have had no advocates.

III.175.30

—The United States supreme court has finally decided that the ordinances of secession were entirely void, and that a state government steps out of its sphere when it undertakes to organize armed resistance to the federal government. Reconstruction by congress does not seem to have been founded on the notion that the ordinances of secession had so far taken the states out of the Union as to require their readmission, but on the theory that the state governments had either been vacated by the fault of the individual citizens of the state, or had been seized upon by usurpers; that in either case the reconstruction must be under the authority of the federal government; and that individuals who had been guilty of treason were estopped from objecting to the methods which congress might see fit to employ. (See RECONSTRUCTION, I.)

III.175.31

—Finally, the suppression of the doctrine of secession by force has established the political existence of the nation, as distinguished even from all the states. It has done so, not by the facts that all the seceding states, in their new constitutions, expressly disavowed any right of secession, and declared the primary allegiance of the individual citizen to be due to the United States; but by the higher fact that the nation has plainly expressed and successfully enforced its will in the matter. For the future, all men are bound to take notice that it is the nation that wills that there should be state governments, and not states which will that there should be a national government. The ultimate results of secession in this way no man can foresee. (See NATION, III.)

III.175.32

—The theory of the right of secession will be found in Centz's Republic of Republics; Fowler's Sectional Controversy; 1 Calhoun's Works, 300; 1 Tucker's Blackstone, Appendix, 187; 1 Stephens' War Between the States, 495; Rawle's Commentaries on the Constitution, 302; Appleton's Annual Cyclopœdia. 1861, 614 (Davis' Message of April 29). The study of Mr. Fisher's theory of "constitutional secession," by amicable agreement between the federal government and a seceding state, will also be found interesting and profitable: see Fisher's Trial of the Constitution, 160, 167. (See STATE SOVEREIGNTY, III.) See also (I.) authorities under NEW ENGLAND UNION, and ALBANY PLAN OF UNION; 5 Elliot's Debates. 276, 278; 1 Benton's Debates of Congress, 172; 4 Jefferson's Works, edit. 1853, 111; 1 von Holst's United States, 196; authorities under KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS; 3 Jefferson's Works, edit. 1830, 394; 2 Schouler's United States, 192; Quincy's Life of Quincy, 206, 210; Adams' Documents Relating to New England Federalism (see, under index, "Northern Confederacy"); 4 Upham's Life of Pickering, 53; 3 Sparks' Writings of Gouverneur Morris, 319; 1 Story's Life of Story, 182; 8 Niles' Weekly Register, 262; Carey's Olive Branch, 7th edit., 416, 449; Hunt's Life of Livingston, 346; authorities under CONVENTION, HARTFORD, and NULLIFICATION; (II.) 1 Greeley's American Conflict, 359; May's Anti-Slavery Conflict, 320; 2 Benton's Thirty Years' View, 613, 698, 733; Cox's Eight Years in Congress, 188; 16 Benton's Debates of Congress, 403, 415 (Calhoun's and Webster's speeches, March 4 and 7, 1850); 2 Olmsted's Cotton Kingdom, 158; (III.) Nicolay's Outbreak of Rebellion; 1 Draper's Civil War, 438, and 2 ibid.; Buchanan's Administration, 108; Greeley's Political Text Book of 1860, 170; McPherson's Political History of the Rebellion, 2; 2 Stephens' War Between The States, 312; ibid., 671 (South Carolina declaration of 1861); 2' Jefferson's Works, edit. 1830, 43, 203; H. A. Wise's Territorial Government, 103; Botts' Great Rebellion, 205, 209; Brownson's American Republic, 277; Story's Commentaries on the Constitution, edit. 1833, § 359; Mulford's The Nation, 334; Goodwin's Natural History of Secession; Hurd's Theory of Our National Existence.

ALEXANDER JOHNSTON.

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