Book II, Chapter XXIII
THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND
THE INSTRUMENTS OF CIRCULATION.
IF the experience of the last twenty-five years has confirmed,
as being partly correct, the principles which have been set up by the prevailing
theory in contradiction to the ideas of the so-called 'mercantile' system on
the circulation of the precious metals and on the balance of trade, it has,
on the other hand, brought to light important weak points in that theory respecting
those subjects.
Experience has proved repeatedly (and especially in Russia and North America)
that in agricultural nations, whose manufacturing market is exposed to the free
competition of a nation which has attained manufacturing supremacy, the value
of the importation of manufactured goods exceeds frequently to an enormous extent
the value of the agricultural products which are exported, and that thereby
at times suddenly an extraordinary exportation of precious metals is occasioned,
whereby the economy of the agricultural nation, especially if its internal interchange
is chiefly based on paper circulation, falls into confusion, and national calamities
are the result.
The popular theory maintains that if we provide ourselves with the precious
metals in the same manner as every other article, it is in the main indifferent
whether large or small quantities of precious metals are in circulation, as
it merely depends on the relation of the price of any article in exchange whether
that article shall be cheap or dear; a derangement in the rate of exchange acts
simply like a premium on a larger exportation of goods from that country, in
favour of which it oscillates from time to time: consequently the stock of metallic
money and the balance between the imports and exports, as well as all the other
economical circumstances of the nation, would regulate themselves in the safest
and best manner by the operation of the natural course of things.
This argument is perfectly correct as respects the internal interchange
of a nation; it is demonstrated in the commercial intercourse between town and
town, between town and country districts, between province and province, as
in the union between State and State. Any political
economist would be deserving of pity who believed that the balance of the mutual
imports and exports between the various states of the American Union or the
German Zollverein, or between England, Scotland, and Ireland, can be regulated
better through State regulations and laws than through free interchange. On
the hypothesis that a similar union existed between the various states and nations
of the earth, the argument of the theory of trusting to the natural course of
things would be quite consistent. Nothing, however, is more contrary to experience
than to suppose under the existing conditions of the world that in international
exchange things act with similar effect.
The imports and exports of independent nations are regulated and controlled
at present not by what the popular theory calls the natural course of things,
but mostly by the commercial policy and the power of the nation, by the influence
of these on the conditions of the world and on foreign countries and peoples,
by colonial possessions and internal credit establishments, or by war and peace.
Here, accordingly, all conditions shape themselves in an entirely different
manner than between societies which are united by political, legal, and administrative
bonds in a state of unbroken peace and of perfect unity of interests.
Let us take into consideration as an example the conditions between England
and North America. If England from time to time throws large masses of manufactured
goods on to the North American market; if the Bank of England stimulates or
restricts, in an extraordinary degree, the exports to North America and the
credit granted to her by its raising or lowering its discount rates; if, in
addition to and as a consequence of this extraordinary glut of the American
market for manufactured goods, it happens that the English manufactured goods
can be obtained cheaper in North America than in England, nay, sometimes much
below the cost price of production; if thus North America gets into a state
of perpetual indebtedness and of an unfavourable condition of exchange towards
England, yet would this disorganised state of things readily rectify itself
under a state of perfectly unrestricted exchange between the two countries.
North America produces tobacco, timber, corn, and all sorts of means of subsistence
very much cheaper than England does. The more English manufactured goods go
to North America, the greater are the means and inducements to the American
planter to produce commodities of value sufficient to exchange for them; the
more credit is given to him the greater is the impulse to procure for himself
the means of discharging his liabilities; the more the rate of exchange on England
is to the disadvantage of North America, the greater is the inducement to export
American agricultural products, and hence the
more successful will be the competition of the American agriculturist in the
English produce market.
In consequence of these exportations the adverse rate of exchange would speedily
rectify itself; indeed, it could not even reach any very unfavourable point,
because the certain anticipation in North America that the indebtedness which
had been contracted through the large importation of manufactured goods in the
course of the present year, would equalise itself through the surplus production
and increased exports of the coming year, would be followed by easier accommodation
in the money market and in credit.
Such would be the state of things if the interchange between the English manufacturer
and the American agriculturist were as little restricted as the interchange
between the English manufacturer and the Irish agriculturist is. But they are
and must be different: if England imposes a duty on American tobacco of from
five hundred to one thousand per cent.; if she renders the importation of American
timber impossible by her tariffs, and admits the American means of subsistence
only in the event of famine, for at present the American agricultural production
cannot balance itself with the American consumption of English manufactured
goods, nor can the debt incurred for those goods be liquidated by agricultural
products; at present the American exports to England are limited by narrow bounds,
while the English exports to North America are practically unlimited; the rate
of exchange between both countries under such circumstances cannot equalise
itself, and the indebtedness of America towards England must be discharged by
exports of bullion to the latter country.
These exports of bullion, however, as they undermine the American system of
paper circulation, necessarily lead to the ruin of the credit of the American
banks, and therewith to general revolutions in the prices of landed property
and of the goods in circulation, and especially to those general confusions
of prices and credit which derange and overturn the economy of the nation, and
with which, we may observe, that the North American free States are visited
whenever they have found themselves unable to restore a balance between their
imports and their exports by State tariff regulations.
It cannot afford any great consolation to the North American that in consequence
of bankruptcies and diminished consumption, the imports and exports between
both countries are at a later period restored to a tolerable proportion to one
another. For the destruction and convulsions of commerce and in credit, as well
as the reduction in consumption, are attended with disadvantages to the welfare
and happiness of individuals and to public order, from which
one cannot very quickly recover and the frequent repetition of which must necessarily
leave permanently ruinous consequences.
Still less can it afford any consolation to the North Americans, if the popular
theory maintains that it is an indifferent matter whether large or small quantities
of precious metals are in circulation; that we exchange products merely for
products; whether this exchange is made by means of large or small quantities
of metallic circulation is of no importance to individuals. To the producer
or proprietor it certainly may be of no consequence whether the object of his
production or of his possession is worth 100 centimes or 100 francs, provided
always that he can procure with the 100 centimes as large a quantity of objects
of necessity and of enjoyment as he can with the 100 francs. But low or high
prices are thus a matter of indifference only in case they remain on the same
footing uninterruptedly for a long period of time.
If, however, they fluctuate frequently and violently, disarrangements arise
which throw the economy of every individual, as well as that of society, into
confusion. Whoever has purchased raw materials at high prices, cannot under
low prices, by the sale of his manufactured article, realise again that sum
in precious metals which his raw materials have cost him. Whoever has bought
at high prices landed property and has left a portion of the purchase money
as a mortgage debt upon it, loses his ability of payment and his property; because,
under diminished prices, probably the value of the entire property will scarcely
equal the amount of the mortgage. Whoever has taken leases of property under
a state of high prices, finds himself ruined by the decrease in prices, or at
least unable to fulfil the covenants of his leases. The greater the rising and
falling of prices, and the more frequently that fluctuations occur, the more
ruinous is their effect on the economical conditions of the nation and especially
on credit. But nowhere are these disadvantageous effects of the unusual influx
or efflux of precious metals seen in a more glaring light than in those countries
which are entirely dependent on foreign nations in respect of their manufacturing
requirements and the sale of their own products, and whose commercial transactions
are chiefly based on paper circulation.
It is acknowledged that the quantity of bank notes which a country is able
to put into and to maintain in circulation, is dependent on the largeness of
the amount of metallic money which it possesses. Every bank will endeavour to
extend or limit its paper circulation and its business in proportion to the
amount of precious metals lying in its vaults. If the increase in its own money
capital or in deposits is large, it will give more credit; and through this
credit, increase the credit given by its debtors, and by so doing raise the
amount of consumption and prices; especially those of landed property. If, on
the contrary, an efflux of precious metals is perceptible, such a bank will
limit its credit, and thereby occasion restriction of credit and consumption
by its debtors, and by the debtors of its debtors, and so on to those who by
credit are engaged in bringing into consumption the imported manufactured goods.
In such countries, therefore, the whole system of credit, the market for goods
and products, and especially the money value of all landed property, is thrown
into confusion by any unusual drain of metallic money.
The cause of the latest as well as of former American commercial crises, has
been alleged to exist in the American banking and paper system. The truth is
that the banks have helped to bring about these crises in the manner above named,
but the main cause of their occurrence is that since the introduction of the
'compromise' bill the value of the English manufactured goods has far surpassed
the value of the exported American products, and that thereby the United States
have become indebted to the English to the amount of several hundreds of millions
for which they could not pay in products. The proof that these crises are occasioned
by disproportionate importation is, that they have always taken place whenever
(in consequence of peace having set in or of a reduction being made in the American
customs duties) importation of manufactured goods into the United States has
been unusually large, and that they have never occurred as long as the imports
of goods have been prevented by customs duties on imports from exceeding the
value of the exports of produce.
The blame for these crises has further been laid on the large capital which
has been expended in the United States in the construction of canals and railways,
and which has mostly been procured from England by means of loans. The truth
is that these loans have merely assisted in delaying the crises for several
years, and in increasing it when it arose; but these very loans themselves have
evidently been incurred through the inequality which had arisen between the
imports and exports, and but for that inequality would not have been made and
could not have been made.
While North America became indebted to the English for large sums through the
large importation of manufactured goods which could not be paid for in produce,
but only in the precious metals, the English were enabled, and in consequence
of the unequal rates of exchange and interest found it to their advantage, to
have this balance paid for in American railway, canal, and bank stocks, or in
American State paper.
The more the import of manufactured goods into America surpassed her exports
in produce, and the greater that the demand for
such paper in England became, the more were the North Americans incited to embark
in public enterprises; and the more that capital was invested in such enterprises
in North America, the greater was the demand for English manufactured goods,
and at the same time the disproportion between the American imports and exports.
If on the one hand the importation of English manufactured goods into North
America was promoted by the credit given by the American banks, the Bank of
England on the other side through the credit facilities which it gave and by
its low rates of discount operated in the same direction. It has been proved
by an official account of the English Committee on Trade and Manufactures, that
the Bank of England lessened (in consequence of these discounts) the cash in
its possession from eight million pounds to two millions. It thereby on the
one hand weakened the effect of the American protective system to the advantage
of the English competition with the American manufactories; on the other hand
it thus offered facilities for, and stimulated, the placing of American stocks
and State paper in England. For as long as money could be got in England at
three per cent. the American contractors and loan procurers who offered six
per cent. interest had no lack of buyers of their paper in England.
These conditions of exchange afforded the appearance of much prosperity, although
under them the American manufactories were being gradually crushed. For the
American agriculturists sold a great part of that surplus produce which under
free trade they would have sold to England, or which under a moderate system
of protection of their own manufactories they would have sold to the working
men employed therein, to those workmen who were employed in public works and
who were paid with English capital. Such an unnatural state of things could
not, however, last long in the face of opposing and divided national interests,
and the break up of it was the more disadvantageous to North America the longer
it was repressed. As a creditor can keep the debtor on his legs for a long time
by renewals of credit, but the bankruptcy of the debtor must become so much
the greater the longer he is enabled to prolong a course of ruinous trading
by means of continually augmented credit from the creditor, so was it also in
this case.
The cause of the bankruptcy in America was the unusual export of bullion which
took place from England to foreign countries in consequence of insufficient
crops and in consequence of the Continental protective systems. We say in consequence
of the Continental protective systems, because the English—if the European
Continental markets had remained open to them—would have
covered their extraordinary importations of corn from the Continent chiefly
by means of extraordinary export of English manufactured goods to the Continent,
and because the English bullion—even had it flown over for a time to the
continent—would again have found its way back to England in a short time
in consequence of the augmented export of manufactured goods. In such a case
the Continental manufactories would undoubtedly have fallen a sacrifice to the
English-American commercial operations.
As matters stood, however, the Bank of England could only help itself by limiting
its credit and increasing its rate of discount. In consequence of this measure
not only the demand for more American stocks and State paper fell off in England,
but also such paper as was already in circulation now forced itself more on
the market. The United States were thereby not merely deprived of the means
of covering their current deficit by the further sale of paper, but payment
of the whole debt they had contracted in the course of many years with England
by means of their sales of stocks and State paper became liable to be demanded
in money. It now appeared that the cash circulation in America really belonged
to the English. It appeared yet further that the English could dispose of that
ready money on whose possession the whole bank and paper system of the United
States was based, according to their own inclination. If, however, they disposed
of it, the American bank and paper system would tumble down like a house built
of cards, and with it the foundation would fall whereon rested the prices of
landed property, consequently the economical means of existence of a great number
of private persons.
The American banks tried to avoid their fall by suspending specie payments,
and indeed this was the only means of at least modifying it; on the one hand
they tried by this means to gain time so as to decrease the debt of the United
States through the yield of the new cotton crops and to pay it off by degrees
in this manner; on the other hand they hoped by means of the reduction of credit
occasioned by the suspension to lessen the imports of English manufactured goods
and to equalise them in future with their own country's exports.
How far the exportation of cotton can afford the means of balancing the importation
of manufactured goods is, however, very doubtful. For more than twenty years
the production of this article has constantly outstripped the consumption, so
that with the increased production the prices have fallen more and more. Hence
it happens that, on the one hand, the cotton manufacturers are exposed to severe
competition with linen manufactures, perfected as these are by greatly improved
machinery; while the cotton planters, on the
other hand, are exposed to it from the planters of Texas, Egypt, Brazil, and
the East Indies.
It must, in any case, be borne in mind that the exports of cotton of North
America benefit those States to the least extent which consume most of the English
manufactured goods.
In these States, namely, those which derive from the cultivation of corn and
from cattle-breeding the chief means of procuring manufactured goods, a crisis
of another kind now manifests itself. In consequence of the large importation
of English manufactured goods the American manufactures were depressed. All
increase in population and capital was thereby forced to the new settlements
in the west. Every new settlement increases at the commencement the demand for
agricultural products, but yields after the lapse of a few years considerable
surplus of them. This has already taken place in those settlements. The Western
States will therefore pour, in the course of the next few years, into the Eastern
States considerable surplus produce, by the newly constructed canals and railways;
while in the Eastern States, in consequence of their manufactories being depressed
by foreign competition, the number of consumers has decreased and must continually
decrease. From this, depreciation in the value of produce and of land must necessarily
result, and if the Union does not soon prepare to stop up the sources from which
the above-described money crises emanate, a general bankruptcy of the agriculturists
in the corn-producing States is unavoidable.
The commercial conditions between England and North America which we have above
explained, therefore teach:
(1) That a nation which is far behind the English in capital and manufacturing
power cannot permit the English to obtain a predominating competition on its
manufacturing market without becoming permanently indebted to them; without
being rendered dependent on their money institutions, and drawn into the whirlpool
of their agricultural, industrial, and commercial crises.
(2) That the English national bank is able by its operations to depress the
prices of English manufactured goods in the American markets which are placed
under its influence—to the advantage of the English and to the disadvantage
of the American manufactories.
(3) That the English national bank could effect by its operations the consumption
by the North Americans, for a series of years, of a much larger value of imported
goods than they would be able to repay by their exportation of products, and
that the Americans had to cover their deficit during several years by the exportation
of stocks and State paper.
(4) That under such circumstances the Americans carried on their
internal interchange and their bank and paper-money system with ready money,
which the English bank was able to draw to itself for the most part by its own
operations whenever it felt inclined so to do.
(5) That the fluctuations in the money market under all circumstances act on
the economy of the nations in a highly disadvantageous manner, especially in
countries where an extensive bank and paper-money system is based on the possession
of certain quantities of the precious metals.
(6) That the fluctuations in the money market and the crises which result therefrom
can only be prevented, and that a solid banking system can only be founded and
maintained, if the imports of the country are placed on a footing of equality
to the exports.
(7) That this equality can less easily be maintained in proportion as foreign
manufactured goods can successfully compete in the home manufacturing markets,
and in proportion as the exportation of native agricultural products is limited
by foreign commercial restrictions; finally, that this equality can less easily
be disturbed in proportion as the nation is independent of foreign nations for
its supply of manufactured goods, and for the disposal of its own produce.
These doctrines are also confirmed by the experience of Russia. We may remember
to what convulsions public credit in the Russian Empire was subjected as long
as the market there was open to the overwhelming consignments of English manufactured
goods, and that since the introduction of the tariff of 1821 no similar convulsion
has occurred in Russia.
The popular theory has evidently fallen into the opposite extreme to the errors
of the so-called mercantile system. It would be of course false if we maintained
that the wealth of nations consisted merely in precious metals; that a nation
can only become wealthy if it exports more goods than it imports, and if hence
the balance is discharged by the importation of precious metals. But it is also
erroneous if the popular theory maintains, under the existing conditions of
the world, that it does not signify how much or how little precious metals circulate
in a nation; that the fear of possessing too little of the precious metals is
a frivolous one, that we ought rather to further their exportation than favour
their importation, &c. &c. This manner of reasoning would only be correct
in case we could consider all nations and countries as united under one and
the same system of law; if no commercial restrictions of any kind against the
exportation of our products existed in those nations for whose manufactured
goods we can only repay with the productions of our agriculture; if the changes
wrought by war and peace caused no fluctuations
in production and consumption, in prices, and on the money market; if the great
credit institutions do not seek to extend their influence over other nations
for the special interest of the nation to which they belong. But as long as
separate national interests exist, a wise State policy will advise every great
nation to guard itself by its commercial system against extraordinary money
fluctuations and revolutions in prices which overturn its whole internal economy,
and it will attain this purpose only by placing its internal manufacturing production
in a position of proper equality with its internal agricultural production and
its imports with its exports.
The prevailing theory has evidently not sufficiently discriminated between
the mere possession of the precious metals and the power of disposition
of the precious metals in international interchange. Even in private exchange,
the necessity of this distinction is clearly evident. No one wishes to keep
money by him, everyone tries to remove it from the house as soon as possible;
but everybody at the same time seeks to be able to dispose at any time of the
sums which he requires. The indifference in regard to the actual possession
of ready money is manifested everywhere in proportion to wealth. The richer
the individual is, the less he cares about the actual possession of ready money
if only he is able at any hour to dispose of the ready cash lying in the safes
of other individuals; the poorer, however, the individual is, and the smaller
his power of disposing of the ready money lying in other people's hands, the
more anxiously must he take care to have in readiness what is required. The
same is the case with nations which are rich in industry or poor in industry.
If England cares but little as a rule about how great or how small a quantity
of gold or silver bars are exported out of the country, she is perfectly well
aware that an extraordinary export of precious metals occasions on the one hand
a rise in the value of money and in discount rates, on the other hand a fall
in the prices of fabrics, and that she can regain through larger exportation
of fabrics or through realisation of foreign stocks and State paper speedy possession
of the ready money required for her trade. England resembles the rich banker
who, without having a thaler in his pocket, can draw for any sum he pleases
on neighbouring or more distant business connections. If, however, in the case
of merely agricultural nations extraordinary exports of coin take place, they
are not in the same favourable position, because their means of procuring the
ready money they require are very limited, not merely on account of the small
value in exchange of their products and agricultural values, but also
on account of the hindrances which foreign laws put in the way of their exportation.
They resemble the poor man who can draw no bills
on his business friends, but who is drawn upon if the rich man gets into any
difficulty; but who is drawn upon if the rich man gets into any difficulty;
who can, therefore, not even call what is actually in his hands, his own.
A nation obtains the power of disposition of the amount of ready money
which is always required for its internal trade, mainly through the possession
or the production of those goods and values whose facility of exchange approaches
most nearly to that of the precious metals.
The diversity of this property of the facility of exchange in respect to the
various articles of commerce and of property, has been as little taken into
consideration by the popular school of economists in judging of international
commerce, as the power of disposition of the precious metals. If we consider
in this respect the various articles of value existing in private interchange,
we perceive that many of them are fixed in such a way that their value is exchangeable
only on the spot where they are, and that even there their exchange is attended
with great costs and difficulties. To that class belong more than three-fourths
of all national property—namely, immovable properties and fixed plant
and instruments. However large the landed property of an individual may be,
he cannot send his fields and meadows to town in order to obtain money or goods
for them. He can, indeed, raise mortgages on such property, but he must first
find a lender on them; and the further from his estate that such an individual
resides, the smaller will be the probability of the borrower's requirements
being satisfied.
Next after property thus fixed to the locality, the greatest part of agricultural
products (excepting colonial produce and a few less valuable articles) have
in regard to international intercourse the least facility for exchange. The
greatest part of these values, as e.g. building materials and wood for fuel,
bread stuffs, &c., fruit, and cattle, can only be sold within a reasonable
distance of the place where they are produced, and if a great surplus of them
exists they have to be warehoused in order to become realisable. So far as such
products can be exported to foreign countries their sale again is limited to
certain manufacturing and commercial nations, and in these also their sale is
generally limited by duties on importation and is affected by the larger or
smaller produce of the purchasing nation's own harvests. The inland territories
of North America might be completely overstocked with cattle and products, but
it would not be possible for them to produce through exportation of this excess
considerable amounts of the precious metals from South America, from England,
or from the European continent. The valuable manufactured goods of common use,
on the other hand, possess incomparably greater
facilities for exchange. They find at ordinary times a sale in all open markets
of the world; and at extraordinary crises they also find a sale (at lower prices)
in those markets whose protective tariffs are calculated to operate adversely
merely in ordinary times. The power of exchange of these articles clearly approaches
most nearly to that of the precious metals, and the experience of England shows
that if in consequence of deficient harvests money crises occur, the increased
exportation of fabrics, and of foreign stocks and State paper, quickly rectifies
the balance. The latter, the foreign stocks and State paper, which are evidently
the results of former favourable balances of exchange caused by exportations
of fabrics, constitute in the hands of the nation which is rich in manufacturing
industry so many bills which can be drawn on the agricultural nation, which
at the time of an extraordinary demand for the precious metals are indeed drawn
with loss to the individual owner of them (like the manufactured goods at the
time of money crises), but, nevertheless, with immense advantage to the maintenance
of the economical conditions of that nation which is rich in manufacturing industry.
However much the doctrine of the balance of trade may have been scorned by
the popular school, observations like those above described encourage us nevertheless
to express the opinion that between large and independent nations something
of the nature of a balance of trade must exist; that it is dangerous for great
nations to remain for a long period at very considerable disadvantage in respect
of this balance, and that a considerable and lasting efflux of the precious
metals must always be followed as a consequence by important revolutions in
the system of credit and in the condition of prices in the interior of the nation.
We are far from wishing in these remarks to revive the doctrine of the balance
of trade as it existed under the so-called 'mercantile system,' and to maintain
that the nation ought to impose obstacles in the way of the exportation of precious
metals, or that we must keep a specially exact account with each individual
nation, or that in the commerce between great nations a few millions difference
between the imports and exports is of great moment. What we deny is merely this:
that a great and independent nation, as Adam Smith maintains at the conclusion
of his chapter devoted to this subject,
'may continually import every year considerably larger values in products and
fabrics than it exports; that the quantities of precious metals existing in
such a nation may decrease considerably from year to year and be replaced by
paper circulation in the interior; moreover,
that such a nation may allow its indebtedness towards another nation continually
to increase and expand, and at the same time nevertheless make progress from
year to year in prosperity.'
This opinion, expressed by Adam Smith and maintained since that time by his
school, is alone that which we here characterise as one that has been contradicted
a hundred times by experience, as one that is contrary in the very nature of
things to common sense, in one word (to retort upon Adam Smith his own energetic
expression) as 'an absurdity.'
It must be well understood that we are not speaking here of countries which
carry on the production of the precious metals themselves at a profit, from
which therefore the export of these articles has quite the character of an export
of manufactured goods. We are also not speaking of that difference in the balance
of trade which must necessarily arise if the nation rates its exports and imports
at those prices which they have in their own seaport towns. That in such a case
the amount of imports of every nation must exceed its exports by the total amount
of the nation's own commercial profits (a circumstance which speaks to its advantage
rather than to its disadvantage), is clear and indisputable. Still less do we
mean to deny the extraordinary cases where the greater exportation rather denotes
loss of value than gain, as e.g. if property is lost by shipwreck. The popular
school has made clever use of all those delusions arising from a shopkeeper-like
calculation and comparison of the value of the exchanges arising from the exports
and imports, in order to make us disbelieve in the disadvantages which result
from a real and enormous disproportion between the exports and imports of any
great and independent nation, even though such disproportion be not permanent,
which shows itself in such immense sums as for instance in the case of France
in 1786 and 1789, in that of Russia in 1820 and 1821, and in that of the United
States of North America after the 'Compromise Bill.'
Finally, we desire to speak (and this must be specially noted) not of colonies,
not of dependent countries, not of small states or of single independent towns,
but of entire, great, independent nations, which possess a commercial system
of their own, a national system of agriculture and industry, a national system
of money and credit.
It evidently consists with the character of colonies that their exports
can surpass their imports considerably and continuously, without thereby involving
any conclusion as to the decrease or increase
of their prosperity. The colony always prospers in the proportion in which the
total amountof its exports and imports increases year by year. If its
export of colonial produce exceeds its imports of manufactured goods considerably
and lastingly, the main cause of this may be that the landed proprietors of
the colony live in the mother country, and that they receive their income in
the shape of colonial goods, in produce, or in the money which has been obtained
for them. If, however, the exports of fabrics to the colony exceed the imports
of colonial goods considerably, this may be chiefly due to the fact that by
emigrations or loans from year to year large masses of capital go to the colony.
This latter circumstance is, of course, of the utmost advantage to the prosperity
of the colony. It can continue for centuries and yet commercial crises under
such circumstances may be infrequent or impossible, because the colony is endangered
neither by wars nor by hostile commercial measures, nor by operations of the
national bank of the mother country, because it possesses no independent system
of commerce, credit, and industry peculiar to itself, but is, on the contrary,
supported and constantly upheld by the institutions of credit and political
measures of the mother country.
Such a condition existed for more than a century with advantage between North
America and England, exists still between England and Canada, and will probably
exist for centuries between England and Australia.
This condition becomes fundamentally changed, however, from the moment in which
the colony appears as an independent nation with every claim to the attributes
of a great and independent nationality—in order that it may develop a
power and policy of its own and its own special system of commerce and credit.
The former colony then enacts laws for the special benefit of its own navigation
and naval power—it establishes in favour of its own internal industry
a customs tariff of its own; it establishes a national bank of its own, &c.,
provided namely that the new nation thus passing from the position of a colony
to independence feels itself capable, by reason of the mental, physical, and
economical endowments which it possesses, of becoming an industrial and commercial
nation. The mother country, in consequence, places restrictions, on its side,
on the navigation, commerce, and agricultural production of the former colony,
and acts, by its institutions of credit, exclusively for the maintenance of
its own national economical conditions.
But it is precisely the instance of the North American colonies as they existed
before the American War of Independence by which Adam Smith seeks to prove the
above-mentioned highly paradoxical opinion: that a country can continually increase
its exportation of gold and silver, decrease
its circulation of the precious metals, extend its paper circulation, and increase
its debts contracted with other nations while enjoying simultaneously steadily
increasing prosperity; Adam Smith has been very careful not to cite the example
of two nations which have been independent of one another for some time, and
whose interests of navigation, commerce, industry, and agriculture are in competition
with those of other rival nations, in proof of his opinion—he merely shows
us the relation of a colony to its mother country. If he had lived to the present
time and only written his book now, he would have been very careful not to cite
the example of North America, as this example proves in our days just the opposite
of what he attempts by it to demonstrate.
Under such circumstances, however, it may be urged against us that it would
be incomparably more to the advantage of the United States if they returned
again to the position of an English colony. To this we answer, yes, provided
always that the United States do not know how to utilise their national independence
so as to cultivate and develop a national industry of their own, and a self-supporting
system of commerce and credit which is independent of the world outside. But
(it may be urged) is it not evident that if the United States had continued
to exist as a British colony, no English corn law would ever have been passed;
that England would never have imposed such high duties on American tobacco;
that continual quantities of timber would have been exported from the United
States to England; that England, far from ever entertaining the idea of promoting
the production of cotton in other countries, would have endeavoured to give
the citizens of the United States a monopoly in this article, and to maintain
it; that consequently commercial crises such as have occurred within the last
decades in North America, would have been impossible? Yes; if the United States
do not manufacture, if they do not found a durable system of credit of their
own; if they do not desire or are not able to develop a naval power. But then,
in that case, the citizens of Boston have thrown the tea into the sea in vain;
then all their declamation as to independence and future national greatness
is in vain: then indeed would they do better if they re-enter as soon as possible
into dependence on England as her colony. In that event England will favour
them instead of imposing restrictions on them; she will rather impose restrictions
on them; she will rather impose restrictions on those who compete with the North
Americans in cotton culture and corn production, &c. than raise up with
all possible energy competitors against them. The Bank of England will then
establish branch banks in the United States, the English Government will promote
emigration and the export of capital to America, and through
the entire destruction of the American manufactories, as well as by favouring
the export of American raw materials and agricultural produce to England, take
maternal care to prevent commercial crises in North America, and to keep the
imports and exports of the colony always at a proper balance with one another.
In one word, the American slaveholders and cotton planters will then realise
the fulfilment of their finest dreams. In fact, such a position has already
for some time past appeared to the patriotism, the interests, and requirements
of these planters more desirable than the national independence and greatness
of the United States. Only in the first emotions of liberty and independence
did they dream of industrial independence. They soon, however, grew cooler,
and for the last quarter of a century the industrial prosperity of the middle
and eastern states is to them an abomination; they try to persuade the Congress
that the prosperity of America depends on the industrial sovereignty of England
over North America. What else can be meant by the assertion that the United
States would be richer and more prosperous if they again went over to England
as a colony?
In general it appears to us that the defenders of free trade would argue more
consistently in regard to money crises and the balance of trade, as well as
to manufacturing industry, if they openly advised all nations to prefer to subject
themselves to the English as dependencies of England, and to demand in exchange
the benefits of becoming English colonies, which condition of dependence would
be, in economical respects, clearly more favourable to them than the condition
of half independence in which those nations live who, without maintaining an
independent system of industry, commerce, and credit of their own, nevertheless
always want to assume towards England the attitude of independence. Do not we
see what Portugal would have gained if she had been governed since the Methuen
Treaty by an English viceroy—if England had transplanted her laws and
her national spirit to Portugal, and taken that country (like the East Indian
Empire) altogether under her wings? Do not we perceive how advantageous such
a condition would be to Germany—to the whole European continent?
India, it is true, has lost her manufacturing power to England, but has she
not gained considerably in her internal agricultural production and in the exportation
of her agricultural products? Have not the former wars under her Nabobs ceased?
Are not the native Indian princes and kings extremely well off? Have they not
preserved their large private revenues? Do not they find themselves thereby
completely relieved of the weighty cares of government?
Moreover, it is worthy of notice (though it is so after the manner of those
who, like Adam Smith, make their strong points in maintaining paradoxical opinions)
that this renowned author, in spite of all his arguments against the existence
of a balance of trade, maintains, nevertheless, the existence of a thing which
he calls the balance between the consumption and production of a nation, which,
however, when brought to light, means nothing else but our actual balance of
trade. A nation whose exports and imports tolerably well balance each other,
may rest assured that, in respect of its national interchange, it does not consume
much more in value than it produces, while a nation which for a series of years
(as the United States of America have done in recent years) imports larger quantities
in value of foreign manufactured goods than it exports in value of products
of its own, may rest assured that, in respect to international interchange,
it consumes considerably larger quantities in value of foreign goods than it
produces at home. For what else did the crises of France (1786-1789),
of Russia (1820-1821), and of the United States since 1833, prove?
In concluding this chapter we must be permitted to put a few questions to those
who consider the whole doctrine of the balance of trade as a mere exploded fallacy.
How is it that a decidedly and continuously disadvantageous balance of trade
has always and without exception been accompanied in those countries to whose
detriment it existed (with the exception of colonies) by internal commercial
crises, revolutions in prices, financial difficulties, and general bankruptcies,
both in the public institutions of credit, and among the individual merchants,
manufacturers, and agriculturists?
How is it that in those nations which possessed a balance of trade decidedly
in their favour, the opposite appearances have always been observed, and that
commercial crises in the countries with which such nations were connected commercially,
have only affected such nations detrimentally for periods which passed away
very quickly?
How is it that since Russia has produced for herself the greatest part of the
manufactured goods which she requires, the balance of trade has been decidedly
and lastingly in her favour, that since that time nothing has been heard of
economical convulsions in Russia, and that since that time the internal prosperity
of that empire has increased year by year?
How is it that in the United States of North America the same effects have
always resulted from similar causes?
How is it that in the United States of North America, under the large importation
of manufactured goods which followed the 'Compromise
Bill,' the balance of trade was for a series of years so decidedly adverse to
them, and that this appearance was accompanied by such great and continuous
convulsions in the internal economy of that nation?
How is it that we, at the present moment, see the United States so glutted
with primitive products of all kinds (cotton, tobacco, cattle, corn, &c.)
that the prices of them have fallen everywhere one-half, and that at the same
time these states are unable to balance their exports with their imports, to
satisfy their debt contracted with England, and to put their credit again on
sound footing?
How is it, if no balance of trade exists, or if it does not signify whether
it is in our favour or not, if it is a matter of indifference whether much or
little of the precious metals flows to foreign countries, that England in the
case of failures of harvests (the only case where the balance is adverse to
her) strives, with fear and trembling, to equalise her exports with her imports,
that she then carefully estimates every ounce of gold or silver which is imported
or exported, that her national bank endeavours most anxiously to stop the exportation
of precious metals and to promote their importation—how is it, we ask,
if the balance of trade is an 'exploded fallacy,' that at such a time no English
newspaper can be read wherein this 'exploded fallacy' is not treated as a matter
of the most important concern to the nation?
How is it that, in the United States of North America, the same people who
before the Compromise Bill spoke of the balance of trade as an exploded fallacy,
since the Compromise Bill cannot cease speaking of this exploded fallacy as
a matter of the utmost importance to their country?
How is it, if the nature of things itself always suffices to provide every
country with exactly the quantity of precious metals which it requires, that
the Bank of England tries to turn this socalled nature of things in her own
favour by limiting her credits and increasing her rates of discount, and that
the American banks are obliged from time to time to suspend their cash payments
till the imports of the United States are reduced to a tolerably even balance
with the exports?