
President Trump has been pressuring Fed Chair Powell to cut interest rates. Back in January, I made the following comment:
The markets are now scaling back their estimates for future rate increases, due to slower expected NGDP growth. Is that a victory for Trump’s pressure tactics, pushing the Fed toward lower rates? Or a failure–pushing the Fed toward tighter money?
Karl Smith has a fascinating article that discusses some research on this question:
The researchers, from Duke University and the London Business School, focused only on Trump’s tweets since June 2015. They ignored tweets that also contain information about the economy more broadly. They reasoned that there are at least two ways the president could influence the Fed’s choices. First, he could pressure the Fed directly, urging it to alter its response to the macroeconomic environment — by, say, cutting interest rates. Second, he could alter the macroeconomic environment itself — by, say, launching a trade war.
The researchers wanted to isolate the first effect. So they focused only on tweets that were critiques of the Fed, and to measure the response they looked not at the Fed’s actual moves but used high-frequency market data. (Investors and large banks trade futures contracts that are essentially bets on the whether the Fed will raise or lower interest rates.)
What did they find? Within five minutes of a critical tweet by the president, according to the paper, the Fed futures market lowered its expectation of future rates. Each tweet had only a miniscule effect, but the researchers estimate that the cumulative effect has been about one-tenth of a percentage point over the last year. And that effect is growing over time.
The real question is why did interest rate expectations fall. Was it the liquidity effect, or the income and Fisher effects? Do Trump tweets lead to expectations of easier money, or expectations of tighter money that will slow growth and inflation and lead to lower interest rates in the future?
Smith discusses some additional evidence in the paper that is not decisive, but certainly suggestive:
They show that Trump’s tweets have little to no effect on expected interest rate changes at the next four Fed meetings. But the tweets have significant and persistent effects on interest rate changes expected nine or more Fed meetings into the future.
That is, the real impact of the tweets is on what investors think the Fed will do a year or more from now.
I don’t want to make too much of this, as the evidence is not strong enough to pin down the mechanism. And the size of the change (10 basis points in total) is rather small. But I’d lean slightly toward the contractionary interpretation. If I were Trump, the fall in fed funds rates far out in the future would make me nervous. That’s usually not good.
Future research should look at how stock prices react to these tweets. That would help to pin down whether the effect is expansionary or contractionary. And yet I don’t want to be too negative, as this sort of event study is exactly what macroeconomists should be doing. It’s a good start.
I know that readers get bored with my tiresome crusade against using interest rates as the indicator of monetary policy. But this study is a perfect example of why we need to look at other indicators too.
PS. The paper makes the following claim:
The estimated revision in expectations might appear small, but it is important to keep in mind that the typical change in the FFR target is 25 bps. A back-of-the-envelope calculation based on two scenarios shows that a decline of 0.5 bps corresponds to a 2% increase in the probability of a 25 bps FFR target cut, which is a relevant change in the probability assigned to an expansionary monetary policy change. Furthermore, the reported coefficient is the average effect of each tweet. The cumulative effect is quite large when taking into account the total number of tweets. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the typical size of a monetary policy shock is also small, especially in a period of near zero interest rates.
I’m not an econometrician, but that doesn’t seem right to me. The total effect of the tweets should occur as soon as the market recognizes that there will be a series of tweets criticizing Powell. In that case, the cumulative effect might have been little more than a basis point. Here’s another way of making my point. Markets quickly figure out that there will be periodic Trump tweets bashing Powell. The expected change in yields on those days is slightly negative. That means the expected change in yields on tweet-free days is slightly positive. The cumulative effect requires adding up both the tweet days and the tweet-free days.
READER COMMENTS
bill
Sep 26 2019 at 7:43am
I like your conclusion – income and Fisher effects. I remind myself though that the effects they found are small and I know my personal bias is to see things like these tweets backfire on Trump, so I’m still processing this. I need to look at the paper because the other point (per tweet average vs cumulative) seems important. ie, did the authors overstate things or understate them? Should the analysis look for the results on a “per burst of tweets” basis? That may be harder to do methodoligically.
Brian Donohue
Sep 26 2019 at 9:09am
Trump is by no means the first President to jawbone the Fed, but he is predictably ham-fisted about it, in keeping with his general style. Since this is predictable, I can’t imagine his Twitter outbursts about Powell provide any “information” to markets here.
It’s funny that, directionally, I (and you?) agree that Trump happens to be right about Fed policy right now. Saying this out loud of course risks being tainted as a Trumpist, so best to concede the floor to Wall Street geniuses to hold forth on the inanity of Fed cuts right now..
Scott Sumner
Sep 26 2019 at 3:15pm
Bill and Brian, I don’t know if I explained it well enough, but I’m pretty confident that their “cumulative” approach is simply wrong, and greatly exaggerates the effect. They seem to be assuming that the amount of tweets matter. That may be so, but only to the extent that the amount is greater or less than expected. In that case non-tweet days count too, as the market certainly anticipates these tweets to some extent.
As an analogy, imagine if someone simply added up the effects of all the Trump trade tweets.
Scott Sumner
Sep 26 2019 at 3:18pm
Brian, I think it’s misleading to say I agree with Trump on monetary policy “directionally”, although I understand what you mean. Interest rates aren’t a useful measure of the stance of policy. I’d say that I prefer current Fed policy over Trump’s preference for negative rates.
More importantly, we have radically different views on the appropriate policy regime, as he favored tighter money in 2015 and 2016.
bill
Sep 29 2019 at 1:15pm
I think Trump’s view of a monetary policy regime is about as far from yours as possible. Lol.
I see your point now about their mistake in measuring market responses to tweets, I think. The binary isn’t the reaction to each tweet or tweet burst. It might be more the reaction to having a President that tweets like that on interest rates at all
Michael Rulle
Sep 26 2019 at 2:59pm
A 10 basis point effect over 1 year? Is that even perceptible? Was it statistically significant? (that is a joke—per Deirdre McCloskey). I doubt it even was. It is perfectly fine to dislike Trump, but this one is really a stretch. What I keep waiting for is your view on what is happening in the Fed Funds market—-that would add some value.
Scott Sumner
Sep 27 2019 at 1:15pm
Just to be clear, I don’t agree with the paper. Can’t tell if you are criticizing me or the authors.
As far as the fed funds market, rates briefly increased. Why does anyone care?
Michael Rulle
Sep 30 2019 at 9:01am
The authors, sorry, thought that was clear. Re: Fed Funds market. I am glad you don’t care, as that is what I think—-except———the reason we should not care seems unclear to me.
The Fed, according to some articles, had not been in the over night repo market since 2007. I assumed that was true because it meant, to me at least, that all banks were in excess reserves positions. Apparently that is no longer the case. But there is still several trillion floating around to lend overnight——but banks have held back——why should rates hop to as high as 9%? Were those with excess reserves trying to “squeeze” those who had none? The Fed would fight this, I assume. I related it to IOR.
Just asking.
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