A Wall Street Journal story illustrates the economics of violence, what UCLA economist Jack Hirshleifer called “the dark side of the force.” Reporting on a rabble-rousing speech given by Vladimir Putin, the WSJ mentions a war-mongering supporter, one of the Instagram “military bloggers,” who made some rousing statements of his own (“With Risks Rising at Home, Putin Takes Anti-Western Rhetoric to New Heights,” October 2, 2022):
Another military blogger, Vladlen Tatarsky, recorded his own video from the Kremlin with a different message.
“We’ll conquer everyone, we’ll kill everyone, we’ll loot whoever we need to, and everything will be as we like it,” he said.
This project has been a frequent feature of the history of mankind. Civilization—which can only be classical-liberal civilization, or else it’s regimentation—has tried to replace violence with the ideal of an abstract social order based on voluntary exchange. But would-be conquerors, killers, and looters will always exist. If they can be bribed in the sense that they choose the prosperity of a free society instead of following their tribal instincts, the problem is solved. (This is easier to attain within a single society where institutions for obtaining consent are available.) When that doesn’t work, fighting them or being ready to fight is the only solution, although the defense of liberal civilization does impose some severe constraints on the means used. Of course, a particular prudence is also required in the nuclear age.
READER COMMENTS
David Seltzer
Oct 4 2022 at 6:18pm
“If they can be bribed in the sense that they choose the prosperity of a free society instead of following their tribal instincts, the problem is solved.” If they are to be bribed, as a safer alternative to violence, it will only work when the bribe exceeds the cost of war. If the price of the bribe keeps rising, as the conquerors are monopolists, wealth will be acquired by force. As we are possessed of primal tribal instincts, the oppressed will surely fight back. Ukraine and, in my experience, Vietnam are recent examples. I suspect when it becomes too costly to the to kill and loot, the Putin’s of the world will capitulate.
Pierre Lemieux
Oct 4 2022 at 8:29pm
David: You raise interesting issues, but you must mean that, for the bribee, the bribe must exceed the net benefit of war (including other benefits of war for the victor), not simply the cost of war. I admit that between two states (or two alliances of states), “bribe” is somewhat metaphorical (at least as I wanted to use it): it simply consists in the would-be looters being otherwise able to gain larger net benefits from voluntary exchanges. As citizens of the potentially looting state also benefit from voluntary exchanges, it’s a bribe that cost nothing to citizens of the state potentially victimized by war. (Bribing the Russians or Chinese by trading with them cost us nothing.) Of course, there is also a problem of aggregation there: the state–Putin and his minions in Russa–may get a net benefit from war, but most of his subjects, including many conscripts, are likely not to. The metaphor is based of the fact that within a given society, individuals may accept to pay other individuals, the strongest looters and killers in the a state of nature, to be peaceful. I interpret the social contract à la Buchanan as incorporating this possibility if you discount the fact that an individual is not sure, or totally sure, how he would fare in anarchy. At least, this is the case, if consent of each and every individual is taken as only moral value. That’s (part of) what I, perhaps clumsily, wanted to include in my two sentences
David Seltzer
Oct 5 2022 at 6:59am
Pierre: There is nothing clumsy in your brilliant comments or reasoning. In fact, your nuanced work makes your defense of individual freedom much more profound.
Mactoul
Oct 6 2022 at 12:38am
If I am not mistaken, the initial acquisition of existing private property was held by Mises to be unjust, generally speaking but he wasn’t bothered greatly.
I suspect Mises only meant that existing private properties are based upon conquest, at one time Or another. And if we regard that has illegitimate, then all existing private property is illegitimate.
This conundrum is swept under carpet in libertarian theory but is resolvable in the theory that takes political divisions of man into account.
nobody.really
Oct 6 2022 at 12:08pm
Cracking the Safe
For security against robbers who snatch purses, rifle luggage, and crack safes,
One must fasten all property with ropes, lock it up with locks, bolt it with bolts.
This (for property owners) is elementary good sense.
But when a strong thief comes along he picks up the whole lot
Puts it on his back, and goes on his way with only one fear:
That the ropes, locks, and bolts may give way.
Thus what the world calls good business is only a way to gather up the loot, make it secure
In one convenient package for the more enterprising thieves.
Who is there, among those called smart,
Who does not spend his time amassing loot
For a bigger robber than himself?
In the land of Khi….
Every canton, county, and district
Was run according to the laws and statutes —
Until one morning the general, Tien Khang Tzu,
Did away with the King and took over the whole state.
Was he content to steal the land? No,
He also took over the laws and statutes at the same time,
And all the lawyers with them, not to mention the police.
They all formed part of the same package….
Teaching love and duty
Provides a fitting language
With which to prove that robbery
Is really for the general good.
A poor man must hang
For stealing a belt buckle
But if a rich man steals a whole state
He is acclaimed
Statesman of the year.
Hence if you want to hear the very best speeches
On love, duty, justice, etc.,
Listen to statesmen….
Moral: The more you pile up ethical principles
And duties and obligations
To bring everyone in line
The more you gather loot for a thief like Khang.
By ethical argument
And moral principle
The greatest crimes are eventually shown
to have been necessary, and, in fact,
A signal benefit
To mankind.
Chuang Tzu (circa 550 – 250 BCE)
Michael Clarke
Oct 7 2022 at 2:32am
Lane 1958. Classic analysis of the economics of organised violence.
https://econpapers.repec.org/article/cupjechis/v_3a18_3ay_3a1958_3ai_3a04_3ap_3a401-417_5f10.htm
Comments are closed.