It is never a bad idea to remind students of economics that, long before Smith’s Wealth of Nations gave birth to modern economics, complex and vivid discussion of economics were already happening. They have been happening, I am certain, for as long as humans have trucked, bartered, and exchanged. Two excellent reminders of the length and complexity of the human interest in economic matters are the summary of Stoic ethics by Aurius Didymus, from the first century BCE, and Cicero’s De Officiis (44 BCE).
Most striking in the Didymus text is that his continued interest in the Stoic definition of the virtuous man gives particular attention to the economic aspects of the virtuous man. At the end of an extended litany of the qualities of the virtuous man, Didymus writes, “[the virtuous man] is happy most of all, and fortunate and blessed and prosperous and pious and god-loving and worthy, like a king and a general, a politician and a household economist and a money-maker.” The crowning function of the virtuous man, in other words, is to be a money-maker. It is, quite literally, the end all.
Didymus explores this more thoroughly at another point in the text when he tries to understand how the Stoics can say that “all good things belong in common to the virtuous.” He argues, first, that all virtuous men are in concord about how things ought to be done, and therefore the choices they make are the same. Then he argues:
Although it is doubtful how well this clarifies the question of how things are or are not held in common, it does clarify one thing of enormous interest to readers of Smith. Money-making is not a bar to virtue. In fact, it is only possible for the virtuous, because the wisdom necessary to make the decisions that are necessary in order to make money is only available to the virtuous.
In much the same way that Didymus cordons off illegal activity from the praiseworthy activity of “money-making,” Cicero, in De Officiis notes that exploitation of others is unacceptable:
Money-making and profit are fine, but they must be pursued in ways that do not violate other virtues. Cicero then works through two hypothetical “case studies” of moments where a virtuous man would need to think carefully through a decision about profit and money-making. The first of these is a discussion about corn trading:
Cicero then follows this hypothetical case with examples of ways in which various philosophers would respond to the situation––which serves to show that even wise and virtuous people may find reasons for debate here, and which suggests that economic decision-making can be sophisticated and difficult. To emphasize this, Cicero suggests a second hypothetical case study, as follows:
Again, a series of possible responses to the question are mapped out, inviting the reader to consider the complexities of the question. Equally, I think, the two case studies here invite the reader to compare them, asking if they are alike or different, and if they are different, where does the difference lie?
Our view of economic thinking in the ancient world tends, understandably, to be largely dominated by Aristotle and his very negative attitude towards money and interest.[i] While he is a towering figure, the Stoics and Cicero may offer another view of market transactions that will allow us to deepen and enrich our vision of ways in which the classical world thought about money. Certainly, seeing money-making listed as a virtuous activity and seeing complex theoretical debates over the ethics of asymmetric information are aspects of classical thinking about economics that may come as a surprise to many.
READER COMMENTS
robc
Feb 10 2020 at 3:19pm
One thing I noticed is in the first example of Cicero, there doesnt seem to be any problem with selling the grain at a high price IF it is the only supplier. The question is about informing the buyers of the other later supply. The “gouging” itself is clearly acceptable to Cicero.
Jeremy
Feb 11 2020 at 9:50am
“The crowning function of the virtuous man, in other words, is to be a money-maker. It is, quite literally, the end all.”
That’s rather a misrepresentation of the text, don’t you think? There’s no indication that the list is in any particular order – it could just as easily be the order Didymus thought of his words, or the order he thought sounded most pleasing to the ear. It’s clear from other Stoic texts that money-making is what they call a “preferred indifferent” – that is, something you can pursue, so long as you don’t become obsessed with it, and with no moral relevancy in and of itself. Money-making in particular is called out by Seneca as something reliant on fortune: one may become wealthy by accident and lose it all in an instant. “Virtue,” as he pointed out, “stands above all such things. It is appraised in coin of its own minting; and it deems none of these random windfalls to be good.” (Moral Epistles, Gummere translation, Epistle LXXXVII) If there is one crowning function of the virtuous man, it is to be a sage and a philosopher, as the Stoics derive all other virtues from wisdom, and deem philosophy the proper business of all.
The “only a virtuous man is —” construction is something that’s fairly common in ancient Stoic texts; and from other writings of the Stoics it is clear that this construction doesn’t necessarily mean that only the virtuous man can do something – indeed, the Stoics admit that the virtuous “sage” is an impossible ideal, to be sought after and never reached. Rather, the construction is a deliberate exaggeration, meant to emphasis the importance of virtue in doing things correctly. In the selection you quoted, Diodorus is saying that the virtuous man not only knows where to get money, but “when and how and up to what point one should continue doing so” – in other words, the virtuous man knows that there are limits to making money which ought not to be transgressed, because to retain one’s virtue is more important than money, or citizenship, or esteem, or anything else which may be gained or lost by chance.
Thaomas
Feb 11 2020 at 11:03am
One thing I have noticed in pre-Christian philosophy is that there is no place for love in the equation. Shouldn’t good man, having made a normal profit on his grain purchase have, if possible, distributed the excess to the most needy Rhodians?
R R Schoettker
Feb 12 2020 at 12:00pm
I believe Jeremy’s comments to be very useful qualifications and clarifications of Stoic philosophy. I especially concur with the final sentence.
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