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Trump’s Power as Seen by Mancur Olson

People often assume that the main constraints on Trump’s actions come from the American political system (such as institutional checks and balances, Congress, or the media). However, Trump’s real strength actually lies in the inability of the countries he targets to unite and act in a coordinated manner. Rather than relying solely on internal U.S. dynamics to limit his influence, these countries could play a more active role by mobilizing collectively.

The logic of collective action, theorized by Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective Action (1965), provides a relevant analytical framework to understand why countries opposing Donald Trump struggle to come together and coordinate their actions.

The “free rider” problem. In collective action, each actor (in this case, a country) has an incentive to let others take action to reap the common benefits without bearing the costs. For example, if several countries want to oppose Trump, each might prefer that others take the risks (economic sanctions, diplomatic tensions) while still benefiting from collective resistance (weakening Trump’s influence, rebalancing international relations). This leads to under-mobilization, as each country waits for others to act.
Individual costs vs. collective benefits. The costs of opposing Trump (economic retaliation, loss of access to the U.S. market, diplomatic isolation) are often immediate and certain for a country, while the benefits of collective opposition (global power rebalancing, strengthening multilateralism) are uncertain and shared among all. According to Olson, rational actors tend to prioritize their short-term individual interests over long-term collective gains.
Lack of strong leadership or coordination mechanisms. Successful collective action often requires a leader or a strong institutional mechanism to organize and motivate participants. In the case of countries opposing Trump, there has been no clear leader (such as the European Union or a group of major powers) capable of overcoming divergent interests and coordinating a unified response. Each country has its own priorities, making coordination difficult.
Asymmetry of interests and risks. Not all countries are affected in the same way by Trump’s policies. For instance, a country heavily dependent on exports to the U.S. (such as Mexico or Canada) has more to lose by opposing Trump than a country with less economic dependence. This asymmetry in interests and risks makes it even harder to form a solid coalition.
The prisoner’s dilemma on an international scale. The situation resembles a prisoner’s dilemma: each country has an incentive not to oppose Trump (to avoid individual costs), even though collective cooperation would be beneficial for all. Without mutual trust and mechanisms to ensure that other countries will do their part, cooperation often fails.

In short, Mancur Olson’s theory explains why countries opposing Trump struggle to unite: the individual costs of opposition are high, the collective benefits are uncertain, and there is a lack of leadership or institutional mechanisms to overcome these obstacles. As a result, despite shared discontent, few countries are willing to take risks to confront Trump directly,

It is possible that too much emphasis is placed on the role of laws in restraining the Leviathan.
In reality, there is no practical reason why the executive branch must pay attention to what Congress or the judiciary says. Neither Congress nor the courts control any armed force, whereas the executive branch directly commands many: the FBI, CIA, DEA, U.S. Marshals Service, ICE, and CBP—a total of approximately 100,000 armed agents, according to ChatGPT.
One could even argue that the armed forces themselves are, to some extent, under the influence of the executive, particularly through the careful appointment of a favorable Chief of Staff of the Army.
Why, then, should a leader controlling 100,000 armed agents—and potentially the military—obey the courts?
What truly prevents the executive from exploiting the immense real power at his disposal is not the Constitution, which is merely “words on paper.” What constrains him are American customs and traditions.
But these can be successfully defied—not all at once, but gradually, one small step at a time. With the right justification, the process becomes even easier. Expect to hear repeated “exceptional circumstances,” claims of “invasions at our southern border,” or arguments about “foreign disrespect and abuse.”
The real barrier that must be torn down is not the law itself but rather customs, traditions—the ‘culture of liberty,’ if you will. Congress and the courts, including the Supreme Court, are powerless. They have no real enforcement mechanism. Their only power is cultural—soft and fragile.
I would pay close attention to cultural shifts that might normalize the open defiance of Congress and the courts. And you have mentioned many of those. Once that barrier is breached, there are no defenses left.

He disrespected the United States of America in its cherished Oval Office.

L’État, c’est moi.  There really isn’t much difference among authoritarians.  Sure, their ideologies may differ, but that’s a distinction without a difference.

Today’s judiciary is nothing like its Common Law predecessors but is more of a part of the administrative state and its chief enabler.  Read Mark Steyn (he of a free speech case) and Conrad Black about evils of American judiciary. Conviction rate is 97% and 90% of  cases decided on plea bargaining?

There is no doubt that judiciary needs to be tamed if the government is to be downsized and economy deregulated.