An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
By Jeremy Bentham
The First Edition of this work was printed in the year 1780; and first published in 1789. The present Edition is a careful reprint of ‘A New Edition, corrected by the Author,’ which was published in 1823.
First Pub. Date
1789
Publisher
Oxford: Clarendon Press
Pub. Date
1907
Comments
1907 reprint of 1823 edition. (First printed 1780.)
Copyright
The text of this edition is in the public domain. Picture of Jeremy Bentham courtesy of The Warren J. Samuels Portrait Collection at Duke University.
- Preface
- Chapter I, Of the Principle of Utility
- Chapter II, Of Principles Adverse to That of Utility
- Chapter III, Of the Four Sanctions or Sources of Pain and Pleasure
- Chapter IV, Value of a Lot of Pleasure or Pain, How to be Measured
- Chapter V, Pleasures and Pains, Their Kinds
- Chapter VI, Of Circumstances Influencing Sensibility
- Chapter VII, Of Human Actions in General
- Chapter VIII, Of Intentionality
- Chapter IX, Of Consciousness
- Chapter X, Of Motives
- Chapter XI, Of Human Dispositions in General
- Chapter XII, Of the Consequences of a Mischievous Act
- Chapter XIII, Cases Unmeet for Punishment
- Chapter XIV, Of the Proportion between Punishments and Offences
- Chapter XV, Of the Properties to be Given to a Lot of Punishment
- Chapter XVI, Sections 1-2, Division of Offences
- Chapter XVI, Sections 3-4, Division of Offences
- Chapter XVII, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence
VALUE OF A LOT OF PLEASURE OR PAIN, HOW TO BE MEASURED
Chapter IV
I. Pleasures then, and the avoidance of pains, are the
ends that the legislator has in view; it behoves him therefore to understand their
value. Pleasures and pains are the
instruments he has to work with: it behoves him therefore to understand their force, which is again, in other words, their value.
II. To a person considered by
himself, the value of a pleasure or pain considered
by itself, will be greater or less, according to the four following
circumstances:*20
1. Its
intensity.
2. Its
duration.
3. Its
certainty or
uncertainty.
4. Its
propinquity or
remoteness.
III. These are the circumstances which are to be considered in estimating a pleasure or a pain considered each of them by itself. But when the value of any pleasure or pain is considered for the purpose of estimating the tendency of any
act by which it is produced, there are two other circumstances to be taken into the account; these are,
5. Its
fecundity, or the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the
same kind: that is, pleasures, if it be a pleasure: pains, if it be a pain.
6. Its
purity, or the chance it has of not being followed by sensations of the
opposite kind: that is, pains, if it be a pleasure: pleasures, if it be a pain.
These two last, however, are in strictness scarcely to be deemed properties of the pleasure or the pain itself; they are not, therefore, in strictness to be taken into the account of the value of that pleasure or that pain. They are in strictness to be deemed properties only of the act, or other event, by which such pleasure or pain has been produced; and accordingly are only to be taken into the account of the tendency of such act or such event.
IV. To a
number of persons, with reference to each of whom to the value of a pleasure or a pain is considered, it will be greater or less, according to seven circumstances: to wit, the six preceding ones; viz.
1. Its
intensity.
2. Its
duration.
3. Its
certainty or
uncertainty.
4. Its
propinquity or
remoteness.
5. Its
fecundity.
6. Its
purity.
And one other; to wit:
7. Its
extent; that is, the number of persons to whom it
extends; or (in other words) who are affected by it.
V. To take an exact account then of the general tendency of any act, by which the interests of a community are affected, proceed as follows. Begin with any one person of those whose interests seem most immediately to be affected by it: and take an account,
1. Of the value of each distinguishable
pleasure which appears to be produced by it in the
first instance.
2. Of the value of each
pain which appears to be produced by it in the
first instance.
3. Of the value of each pleasure which appears to be produced by it
after the first. This constitutes the
fecundity of the first
pleasure and the
impurity of the first
pain.
4. Of the value of each
pain which appears to be produced by it after the first. This constitutes the
fecundity of the first
pain, and the
impurity of the first pleasure.
5. Sum up all the values of all the
pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on the other. The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure, will give the
good tendency of the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of that
individual person; if on the side of pain, the
bad tendency of it upon the whole.
6. Take an account of the
number of persons whose interests appear to be concerned; and repeat the above process with respect to each.
Sum up the numbers expressive of the degrees of
good tendency, which the act has, with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is
good upon the whole: do this again with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is
good upon the whole: do this again with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is
bad upon the whole. Take the
balance which if on the side of
pleasure, will give the general
good tendency of the act, with respect to the total number or community of individuals concerned; if on the side of pain,the general
evil tendency, with respect to the same community.
VI. It is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment, or to every legislative or judicial operation. It may, however, be always kept in view: and as near as the process actually pursued on these occasions approaches to it, so near will such process approach to the character of an exact one.
VII. The same process is alike applicable to pleasure and pain, in whatever shape they appear: and by whatever denomination they are distinguished: to pleasure, whether it be called
good (which is properly the cause or instrument of pleasure) or
profit (which is distant pleasure, or the cause or instrument of distant pleasure,) or
convenience, or
advantage, benefit, emolument, happiness, and so forth: to pain, whether it be called
evil, (which corresponds to
good) or
mischief, or
inconvenience, or
disadvantage, or
loss, or
unhappiness, and so forth.
VIII. Nor is this a novel and unwarranted, any more than it is a useless theory. In all this there is nothing but what the practice of mankind, wheresoever they have a clear view of their own interest, is perfectly conformable to. An article of property, an estate in land, for instance, is valuable, on what account? On account of the pleasures of all kinds which it enables a man to produce, and what comes to the same thing the pains of all kinds which it enables him to avert. But the value of such an article of property is universally understood to rise or fall according to the length or shortness of the time which a man has in it: the certainty or uncertainty of its coming into possession: and the nearness or remoteness of the time at which, if at all, it is to come into possession. As to the
intensity of the pleasures which a man may derive from it, this is never thought of, because it depends upon the use which each particular person may come to make of it; which cannot be estimated till the particular pleasures he may come to derive from it, or the particular pains he may come to exclude by means of it, are brought to view. For the same reason, neither does he think of the
fecundity or
purity of those pleasures.
Thus much for pleasure and pain, happiness and unhappiness, in
general. We come now to consider the several particular kinds of pain and pleasure.
elements or
dimensions of
value in a pleasure or a pain.
Not long after the publication of the first edition, the following memoriter verses were framed, in the view of lodging more effectually, in the memory, these points, on which the whole fabric of morals and legislation may be seen to rest.
Such marks in
pleasures and in
pains endure.
Such pleasures seek if
private be thy end:
If it be
public, wide let them
extend.
Such
pains avoid, whichever be thy view:
If pains
must come, let them
extend to few.
.