On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation
By David Ricardo
On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, was first published in 1817 (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street), with second and third editions in quick succession.We present Ricardo’s final revision, the third edition, published in 1821, here.The three different editions encompassed several substantive changes in the development of Ricardo’s ideas. A comprehensive, readable comparison of the three editions can be found
Works of David Ricardo, Vol. 1, ed. by Pierro Sraffa with the collaboration of M. H. Dobb, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951. We are indebted to this fine work and have relied on it to correct occasional typographical misprints in the 1821 edition.Minor editorial modifications in this edition are: removing periods after the roman numerals designating kings and “per cent.” We have also substituted modern £ symbol for the historical
l. and added commas in numbers greater than 1,000.Editor
Library of Economics and Liberty
First Pub. Date
London: John Murray
The text of this edition is in the public domain. Picture of David Ricardo courtesy of The Warren J. Samuels Portrait Collection at Duke University.
- Ch.1, On Value
- Ch.2, On Rent
- Ch.3, On the Rent of Mines
- Ch.4, On Natural and Market Price
- Ch.5, Of Wages
- Ch.6, On Profits
- Ch.7, On Foreign Trade
- Ch.8, On Taxes
- Ch.9, Taxes on Raw Produce
- Ch.10, Taxes on Rent
- Ch.11, Tithes
- Ch.12, Land-Tax
- Ch.13, Taxes on Gold
- Ch.14, Taxes on Houses
- Ch.15, Taxes on Profits
- Ch.16, Taxes on Wages
- Ch.17, Taxes on Other Commodities
- Ch.18, Poor Rates
- Ch.19, Changes in the Channels of Trade
- Ch.20, Value and Riches
- Ch.21, Profits and Interest
- Ch.22, Bounties on Exportation, Importation
- Ch.23, On Bounties on Production
- Ch.24, Adam Smith concerning the Rent of Land
- Ch.25, On Colonial Trade
- Ch.26, On Gross and Net Revenue
- Ch.27, On Currency and Banks
- Ch.28, Comparative Value of Gold, Corn, and Labour
- Ch.29, Taxes Paid by the Producer
- Ch.30, Influence of Demand and Supply on Prices
- Ch.31, On Machinery
- Ch.32, Mr Malthus's Opinion on Rent
Taxes are a portion of the produce of the land and labour of a country, placed at the disposal of the government; and are always ultimately paid, either from the capital, or from the revenue of the country.
We have already shewn how the capital of a country is either fixed or circulating, according as it is of a more or of a less durable nature. It is difficult to define strictly, where the distinction between circulating and fixed capital begins; for there are almost infinite degrees in the durability of capital. The food of a country is consumed and reproduced at least once in every year; the clothing of the labourer is probably not consumed and reproduced in less than two years; whilst his house and furniture are calculated to endure for a period of ten or twenty years.
When the annual productions of a country more than replace its annual consumption, it is said to increase its capital; when its annual consumption is not at least replaced by its annual production, it is said to diminish its capital. Capital may therefore be increased by an increased production, or by a diminished unproductive consumption.
If the consumption of the government, when increased by the levy of additional taxes, be met either by an increased production, or by a diminished consumption on the part of the people, the taxes will fall upon revenue, and the national capital will remain unimpaired; but if there be no increased production or diminished unproductive consumption on the part of the people, the taxes will necessarily fall on capital, that is to say, they will impair the fund allotted to productive consumption.
In proportion as the capital of a country is diminished, its productions will be necessarily diminished; and, therefore, if the same unproductive expenditure on the part of the people and of the government continue, with a constantly diminishing annual reproduction, the resources of the people and the state will fall away with increasing rapidity, and distress and ruin will follow.
Notwithstanding the immense expenditure of the English government during the last twenty years, there can be little doubt but that the increased production on the part of the people has more than compensated for it. The national capital has not merely been unimpaired, it has been greatly increased, and the annual revenue of the people, even after the payment of their taxes, is probably greater at the present time than at any former period of our history.
For the proof of this we might refer to the increase of population—to the extension of agriculture—to the increase of shipping and manufactures—to the building of docks—to the opening of numerous canals, as well as to many other expensive undertakings; all denoting an increase both of capital and of annual production.
Still, however, it is certain that but for taxation this increase of capital would have been much greater. There are no taxes which have not a tendency to lessen the power to accumulate. All taxes must either fall on capital or revenue. If they encroach on capital, they must proportionably diminish that fund by whose extent the extent of the productive industry of the country must always be regulated; and if they fall on revenue, they must either lessen accumulation, or force the contributors to save the amount of the tax, by making a corresponding diminution of their former unproductive consumption of the necessaries and luxuries of life. Some taxes will produce these effects in a much greater degree than others; but the great evil of taxation is to be found, not so much in any selection of its objects, as in the general amount of its effects taken collectively.
Taxes are not necessarily taxes on capital, because they are laid on capital; nor on income, because they are laid on income. If from my income of £1,000 per annum, I am required to pay £100, it will really be a tax on my income, should I be content with the expenditure of the remaining £900, but it will be a tax on capital, if I continue to spend £1,000.
The capital from which my income of £1,000 is derived, may be of the value of £10,000; a tax of one per cent on such capital would be £100; but my capital would be unaffected, if after paying this tax, I in like manner contented myself with the expenditure of £900.
The desire which every man has to keep his station in life, and to maintain his wealth at the height which it has once attained, occasions most taxes, whether laid on capital or on income, to be paid from income; and therefore as taxation proceeds, or as government increases its expenditure, the annual enjoyments of the people must be diminished, unless they are enabled proportionally to increase their capitals and income. It should be the policy of governments to encourage a disposition to do this in the people, and never to lay such taxes as will inevitably fall on capital; since by so doing, they impair the funds for the maintenance of labour, and thereby diminish the future production of the country.
In England this policy has been neglected, in taxing the probates of wills, in the legacy duty, and in all taxes affecting the transference of property from the dead to the living. If a legacy of £1,000 be subject to a tax of £100, the legatee considers his legacy as only £900 and feels no particular motive to save the £100 duty from his expenditure, and thus the capital of the country is diminished; but if he had really received £1,000, and had been required to pay £100 as a tax on income, on wine, on horses, or on servants, he would probably have diminished, or rather not increased his expenditure by that sum, and the capital of the country would have been unimpaired.
“Taxes upon the transference of property from the dead to the living,” says Adam Smith, “fall finally, as well as immediately, upon the persons to whom the property is transferred. Taxes on the sale of land fall altogether upon the seller. The seller is almost always under the necessity of selling, and must, therefore, take such a price as he can get. The buyer is scarce ever under the necessity of buying, and will, therefore, only give such a price as he likes. He considers what the land will cost him in tax and price together. The more he is obliged to pay in the way of tax, the less he will be disposed to give in the way of price. Such taxes, therefore, fall almost always upon a necessitous person, and must, therefore, be very cruel and oppressive.” “Stamp duties, and duties upon the registration of bonds and contracts for borrowed money, fall altogether upon the borrower, and in fact are always paid by him. Duties of the same kind upon law proceedings fall upon the suitors. They reduce to both the capital value of the subject in dispute. The more it costs to acquire any property, the less must be the neat value of it when acquired. All taxes upon the transference of property of every kind, so far as they diminish the capital value of that property, tend to diminish the funds destined for the maintenance of labour. They are all more or less unthrifty taxes, that increase the revenue of the sovereign, which seldom maintains any but unproductive labourers, at the expense of the capital of the people, which maintains none but productive.”
But this is not the only objection to taxes on the transference of property; they prevent the national capital from being distributed in the way most beneficial to the community. For the general prosperity, there cannot be too much facility given to the conveyance and exchange of all kinds of property, as it is by such means that capital of every species is likely to find its way into the hands of those, who will best employ it in increasing the productions of the country. “Why,” asks M. Say, “does an individual wish to sell his land? It is because he has another employment in view in which his funds will be more productive. Why does another wish to purchase this same land? It is to employ a capital which brings him in too little, which was unemployed, or the use of which he thinks susceptible of improvement. This exchange will increase the general income, since it increases the income of these parties. But if the charges are so exorbitant as to prevent the exchange, they are an obstacle to this increase of the general income.” Those taxes, however, are easily collected; and this by many may be thought to afford some compensation for their injurious effects.
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