Counterfactuals are a necessary part of any scientific analysis: If X didn’t happen, then Y would have. But counterfactuals, by definition, can never be known. They never occurred, so we can never truly know if the counterfactual would have happened. For example, there was much debate in the Truman Administration and the US military during World War 2 over whether or not to drop atomic bomb(s) on Japan. Some argued that the bombings were necessary to end the war: conventional warfare would cost significantly more American and Japanese lives and continue to drag on the war. Others argued the Japanese were close to surrender and that the bombings were going to cost more innocent lives.[1] The debate continues to this day. But the American military did drop the bombs, with estimates upward of 200,000 lives lost. What we can never know for certain is what would have happened if the US military had never dropped those bombs.
Of course, just because a counterfactual can never be known does not mean that every counterfactual is reasonable. Counterfactuals have to be justified. A good theory and model help us justify our counterfactuals. If I were to say, “without dropping the atomic bomb, the Japanese military would have unleashed Godzilla upon our soldiers, devastating our military, and then invaded San Francisco,” I’d rightfully be laughed out of the room. That’s a goofy B-movie plot, but not a reasonable counterfactual for historical discussion. There’s simply no evidence that Godzilla was a tool of the Japanese military.
In international trade discussions these days, the focus is often on the counterfactuals…at least, after protectionists make empirical claims that are easily debunked by the data. A famous counterfactual revolves around the (oft-cited-never-read) China Shock paper. If not for China joining the WTO, protectionists claim, the US would be a thriving place, rather than the devastated hellhole it is now.
University of Central Arkansas economist Jeremy Horpedahl recently explored the metro areas hit heaviest by the China Shock (as identified in the original China Shock paper), and he found something surprising to everyone except economists:
[A]ll of the MSAs hit hard by the China Shock still managed to have significant and positive real wage growth across the distribution since 2001…Wage gains in several of these places, in fact, are better than the national trends.
And, except for the Hickory, North Carolina MSA[2], all MSAs have more jobs now than before the China Shock. Austin, Texas has doubled the number of jobs. The overall economic changes in these areas are rising real wages for all income levels, more jobs, and a growing economy. These changes suggest that trade has been good for the region: newer, higher-paying jobs have entered to compensate for the lower-paying jobs that were lost (as trade theory predicts). If trade were restricted, these better, higher-paying jobs would likely be lost.
But what of the individuals laid off? Do they lose their well-paying factory jobs and have to take low-paying service sector jobs? The evidence indicates “no.” In his 2025 book Crushing Capitalism, Cato Institute economist Norbert Michel provides evidence that displaced workers were not necessarily made worse off. Using data from the BLS, Michel found that about 43% of workers displaced between 2001 and 2003 earned as much or more than their previous job. Between 2015 and 2017, that figure was 51% (pg. 70 of the Kindle Edition). During the China Shock, displaced workers found it easier to find new jobs that paid the same or better. Looking even further back, in 1991–1992, only about 1/3rd of reemployed workers had pay at or higher than their previous job (ibid). Furthermore, over two-thirds of people displaced were finding jobs quickly (within a year), and again, those jobs were paying at or better than previous wages. Since NAFTA and WTO, it has become easier for displaced workers to find employment at or better than their previous jobs.
So, the relevant counterfactual to compare against increased trade is not that, the US with a thriving economy and protectionism in place. Instead, the data indicate that higher-paying jobs would be lost in favor of lower-paying, less productive jobs.
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[1] There are other arguments, such as retribution for the heinous war crimes the Japanese committed during the war, but this post is about counterfactuals, not retribution, so I won’t be dealing with those arguments.
[2] Hickory could have fewer jobs because the town is becoming a retirement hotspot. Retired people don’t work.
READER COMMENTS
David Seltzer
Aug 20 2025 at 10:29am
Jon, Good stuff. Reminds me of Frost’s poem, “The Road Not Taken.” The story of making the choice of which road to take. Frost’s character chose the road that was less traveled, and the consequences of that decision have made all the difference their life. What if the speaker chose the alternate road, as counterfactual? We can only speculate as there is no evidence of the speaker traveling that road.
Kevin Corcoran
Aug 20 2025 at 12:28pm
As you should be, because we all know that it was the use of atomic weapons that woke up Godzilla in the first place! And besides, if the majority of Godzilla movies are to be trusted (and I see no good reason for doubting them), Japan seems to be Godzilla’s favorite punching bag anyway.
Jon Murphy
Aug 20 2025 at 12:29pm
Exactly. The better counterfactual is that Godzilla was a tool of the US military to prevent Japan from rising again
Monte
Aug 20 2025 at 5:10pm
Wouldn’t the more relevant counterfactual be that the U.S. would have experienced a slower decline in manufacturing job losses and a less populist backlash against increased trade if China had not joined the WTO? Of course, consumers would also have had to continue to pay higher prices for things like apparel and consumer electronics.
The China Shock paper you link to was followed up with another in 2021 by the same authors (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson), in which their original conclusions were reinforced, arguing that “the negative effects of the China Shock lasted longer than expected and were not fully offset even a decade later.”
Jon Murphy
Aug 20 2025 at 6:52pm
Yes, that’d be a more reasonable counterfactual, but I am unaware of any Trumpian making that argument.
Jose Pablo
Aug 20 2025 at 9:20pm
Maybe what Truman feared most in August 1945 wasn’t the last desperate gasp of Japan’s war machine, but the steady march of Soviet troops across Asia. And above all, the nightmare of Russian boots on the northern shores of Japan.
That outcome was not some wild fantasy. Had the war dragged on into late ’45 or early ’46, Stalin’s armies, already crushing the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, already in Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kurils, might well have forced their way into Hokkaidō.
In that scenario, the map of the Cold War could have looked very different: a North Japan and South Japan, carved up just like Korea, split by ideology and barbed wire.
So maybe the real calculation wasn’t about “saving lives.” Maybe Truman was willing to incinerate well over 200,000 innocent Japanese civilians just to ensure that Asia didn’t fall further into Soviet hands. To ensure he didn’t have to face another Berlin in Tokyo.
Mactoul
Aug 21 2025 at 3:22am
Far from fearing Soviet boots against Japan, US and Britain requested the Soviets to move against Japan with which the Soviets had been at peace. Stalin graciously consented and granted this favor in Potsdam.
Jose Pablo
Aug 21 2025 at 7:49pm
Stalin graciously consented and granted this favor in Potsdam.
Yes, extraordinarily kind and generous of him as always. What a man!
No wonder he is still revered in Russia, not least by Putin himself.
Craig
Aug 21 2025 at 10:47am
Hiroshima was before Manchuria. Soviet invasion of Manchuria and Nagasaki are same day. The Red Army does chew up the Kwangtung Army in Manchuria and that fact major factor in Japanese decision to accept unconditional surrender. Not particularly familiar with military actions in the Kurils but with respect to Sakhalin the Red Army already had half that island already. Hokkaido? Red army tough, but the Red Army was a Wehrmacht killer and not sure about its ability to mount such an operation.
Jose Pablo
Aug 22 2025 at 1:21pm
Stalin proposed to Truman that Soviet forces participate directly in the occupation of Japan.
Specifically, Stalin asked for a zone of occupation in Hokkaidō, plus a role in the surrender process.
Truman flatly rejected the idea. Not easy to understand why if the objective was “to save American lives“.
Hiroshima was before Manchuria
But Truman knew perfectly well when the Soviet invasion of Manchuria would take place: Stalin’s commitment at Yalta had been to open a new front against Japan exactly three months after Germany’s surrender (May 8th 1945).
During this period, Churchill and Truman had grown increasingly wary of Stalin’s behavior as an ‘ally’ in the reconstruction of Europe (suspicions that would culminate seven months later in Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech)
In this light, the timing of the bomb looks far from accidental. Hiroshima was not aimed at Japan (or at least, not only), but at limiting Soviet ambitions to replay the European scenario in Asia. Ambitions, Stalin most certainly had
Warren Platts
Aug 23 2025 at 9:04am
The Japanese cabinet finally realized they were going to be occupied one way or another. But they had a choice: be occupied by the Americans or be occupied by the Russians. Hence they surrendered to the Americans while they still had a chance.
Jose Pablo
Aug 23 2025 at 2:15pm
If you prefer that narrative, then under this hypothesis, the Americans incinerated well over 200,000 innocent Japanese civilians, mostly to ensure that surrender to the Soviets was never an option available to Japan.
One could even argue that the Americans did the Japanese a favor, since it is not entirely unreasonable to think that under Soviet occupation, the death toll might well have surpassed this figure. Relatively modest by Stalin’s standards.
This plausible argument is, in any case, far too coldly utilitarian for my taste.
Monte
Aug 24 2025 at 12:19am
I’m not certain, but your response seems to imply that Imperial Japan would have treated Americans so much more humanely than the U.S. if they had prevailed. If so, this doesn’t align with the historical record of their conduct during the war. Imperial Japan’s treatment of POWs and civilians was notoriously brutal.
Jose Pablo
Aug 24 2025 at 8:27am
seems to imply
Neither “seems” nor “imply” mean what you think they mean
Warren Platts
Aug 23 2025 at 1:19pm
The other implicit counterfactual is that if China had not joined the WTO & there was no PNTR, free traders claim that the U.S. would worse off than it is now. This implies that the China Shock actually was a boost to the U.S. economy. But the sine qua non of a boost to an economy is an increase in the GDP growth rate. However, if anything, the GDP growth rate declined post-WTO/PNTR; the only debate is whether the apparent decline is statistically significant. Let’s say, for the sake of the argument, that the apparent decline is not statistically significant and can be safely ignored. That still leaves untouched the fact that there was no gain at all — and that result is highly statistically significant!
So what actually happened and why did we do it? I’m old enough to remember the debates at the time. We were told by the Bushes and the Clintons (who were advised by famous economists such as Milton Friedman) that “A rising tide raises all boats.” But that never happened. We are still growing, to be sure, but the promised turbocharging never occurred. Thus as far as I can see, all that happened was a transfer of wealth and income from the working class to what is now known as the laptop class. Indeed, Professor Murphy apparently agrees:
This is a bit unprecise. What would have happened is that the increase in real wages for higher paying jobs at the cost in real wages for lower-paying jobs would not have happened. That such a counterfactual outcome ought to be considered a bad thing is debatable.
As for the Horpedahl article, no generalizations should be drawn from it. Whether Professor Horpedahl intended to or not, by limiting his analysis to the 10 out of 38 commuter zones identified by Autor et al. (2021, Table A-4, p. A6) as especially hard-hit by the China Shock that happen to be Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), that effectively results in cherry picking. The other 28 commuter zones happen to be so-called Micropolitan Statistical Areas (μSAs). The latter definition is arbitrarily defined as having a core urban center population between 10,000 and 50,000 but the overall population can be much higher than some MSAs. For example as of 2024, the smallest MSA was Carson City, NV (pop. 58,148) whereas the largest μSA was Seaford, DE (pop. 271,134).
With places like the Austin and San Jose MSAs that have large, educated populations and a diverse economy, one would naturally expect a rather quick rebound from a China Shock. In contrast, I examined the nine μSAs with populations over 100,000 in Autor et al.’s Table A-4 and compared them to the 10 MSAs analyzed by Professor Horpedahl. The average population, manufacturing share of employment, and B.A. share of the population for the 10 MSAs (in 2000) were 677.8K, 29.9%, and 21.6%, respectively. For the 9 largest μSAs, the respective averages were 132.3K, 36.4%, and 14.4%. Based on those figures alone, we should expect the μSAs to have worse outcomes due to their higher specialization in manufacturing and lower educational levels.
Jon Murphy
Aug 24 2025 at 10:12am
This is a common misconception, an example of the reification fallacy. GDP growth is a useful measure of economic growth, but it is not a “sine qua non.” Just about any intro textbook or reading on GDP warns against exactly your statement.
GDP is only a measurement of gross domestic production in a given time period. There are lots of things that contribute to economic growth but do not show up in GDP and vice versa: lots of things that detract from economic growth that do appear in GDP.
Examples of the former include (but not limited to): domestic work, stay-at-home parenting, leisure time, imports, exchange of used goods, DYI work, informal exchanges, etc.
Examples of the latter include (but not limited to): natural disaster repairs, war, wartime buildup, government spending on pork barrel projects, etc.
Treating GDP growth as a “sina qua non” has led to many bad policies and misconceptions (eg that World War 2 ended the Great Depression or that the USSR proved central planning was desirable).
Warren Platts
Aug 26 2025 at 9:31am
Mankiw’s Macroeconomics (13th edition):
Also, we should remind ourselves that imports and the exchange of used goods do not count towards the GDP.
Anyways, “sine qua non” means the same as “without which, none.” Therefore, if the removal of trade barriers does not cause an increase over the prevailing GDP growth rate, then there are no gains from trade. After all, how are the “gains from trade” supposed to be cashed out if not in terms of increased GDP?
The reason I ask is because in Ricardo’s original model, the gains from trade were cashed out in increases in GDP. To be sure, Portugal gained more than England, but England gained some as well. On the other hand, Samuelson proved mathematically that it’s not the case that the “gains from trade” are *necessarily* positive: they can be zero or even negative.
Thus, given the huge, chronic trade deficit that the USA has been running for over 50 years now, it should not be surprising if there are no gains from free trade because the trade deficit represents a huge net export of aggregate demand. It is like Keynes’s theory of recessions. When aggregate demand goes down, the quantity supplied will tend to go down. Thus we should expect the trade deficit to be a headwind to economic growth.
(Caveat: As I’ve pointed out several times before, trade deficits are not inherently bad. It depends on the circumstances. During the first hundred years of U.S. history, we ran a chronic trade deficit. But then there was a genuine shortage of capital and thus the resultant capital inflows funded needed investments that paid for themselves. That is not the case now. There is no shortage of capital. Big companies like Apple are sitting on more piles of cash than they know what to do with; hence the epidemic of stock buybacks. Instead, the capital inflows have, in the main, resulted in mountains of debt mainly funding consumption, both private and public. Now the government spends more on interest payments than on the military; and according to Ferguson’s Law, when that happens, that’s a good sign that a great power is past it’s sell-by date.)
One other pattern that I’ve noticed is that “employment troughs” (defined as the number of months it takes for overall employment to recover from a recession) have increased during the free trade era. In fact, if we just look at post-China WTO/PNTR period (Jan 2001 thru Jul 2025), we’ve been in employment troughs 54% of the time, whereas from the period from January 1950 through December 2000, we were in employment troughs only 28.6% of the time.
Jon Murphy
Aug 26 2025 at 11:02am
The Mankiw quote is an excellent source. Note he is saying the same thing I am. GDP is a measurement, not an essential condition of economic growth.
I think part of the problem is you do not seem to know what “sine qua non” means. You correctly translate the Latin, but do not seem to know what those words mean. A “sine qua non” is an essential condition, without which X could not occur. For example, life could not exist on Earth without water. Water is a sine qua non of life. But life could exist without “gallons.” “Gallons” are a measurement of water. An accounting identity, nothing more. Do not confuse the map for the terrain.
Again, to the rest of your comment, you rely on the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, rather blatant contradictions, and some statistical reasoning that is usually drilled out of students in their first class.
Warren Platts
Aug 26 2025 at 3:34pm
This is what I wrote: “the sine qua non of a boost to an economy is an increase in the GDP growth rate.” That is not an abuse of the language. We were discussing counterfactuals:
To answer this question, then, we need to measure the gains from increased trade post-China WTO/PNTR because the counterfactual you propose entails that those gains would be erased.
And the sine qua non of any measurement is some sort of a yardstick. If you want to measure water and you don’t like gallons, you still need something like cubic meters or kilograms.
When it comes to measuring how well an economy is doing, as Mankiw says, “GDP is often considered the best measure of how well the economy is performing.”
Now (and you can correct me if I’m wrong) the free trade theory is that trade restrictions everywhere and always cause a headwind to economic growth. Thus, as Irwin proved in detail, all that economic growth in the 19th century was not because of all those trade restrictions; the growth happened despite the trade restrictions. More than that, while it’s the case that free trade will disrupt some jobs, the gains from trade will be big enough to more than compensate for the losses suffered by the losers because “a rising tide lifts all boats.” Thus the prediction was that by granting PNTR to the most populous nation on Earth, then the gains from the resultant increased trade would turbocharge economic growth rates.
But in order to measure economic growth rates, we need to use real GDP growth rates. Right? It does no good to say that unilateral free trade will increase labor productivity because that would in turn show up in terms of increased real GDP growth rates. Thus we are stuck with using GDP, unless you can think of a better measure. I cannot. Therefore, if there is no measured boost to GDP, there is no boost to real economic growth, and thus no “gains from trade.”
Unfortunately, with 20-20 hindsight, we can now see that there was in fact no boost to prevailing GDP growth rates. Arguably, they went down. Thus your proposed counterfactual to increased trade — that the gains from increased trade would be erased because “higher-paying jobs would be lost in favor of lower-paying, less productive jobs” — is implausible because there are no gains from trade to lose. Thus it turns out that Samuelson apparently was correct: gains from trade are not guaranteed.
Your point, however, that there are several unimputed items that are left out the GDP measurement (such as “domestic work, stay-at-home parenting, leisure time … DYI work, informal exchanges, etc.”) is well-taken. Thus I guess it’s within the realm of possibility that China-WTO/PNTR actually boosted economic growth — it just didn’t show up in the GDP measurement. Is that what you’re saying? If so, how? Honest question.
I’m skeptical because the only unmeasured item I can think of that would be remotely big enough to make a difference would be an increase in illicit drug trafficking. Certainly there has been an unprecedented ramp up in drug overdoses post-China WTO/PNTR, but it’s hard to believe that an increase in drug abuse would be a boost to the economy rather than a drag on the economy.
Jon Murphy
Aug 24 2025 at 10:15am
The rest of your post is a combination of post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning and misunderstanding rudimentary statistical analysis. These are important mistakes you make, but I haven’t the time to go into it.
Warren Platts
Aug 26 2025 at 3:48pm
Also there is no post hoc ergo propter hoc in suggesting that a doubling of the average length of time of “employment troughs” post-China WTO/PNTR is mainly due to the China Shock. The theory is that offshoring of production and aggregate demand should reduce the domestic demand for labor and exports have not been able to make up the difference. Thus the theory predicts that the time taken for employment to recover after a recession should increase. Furthermore, Bernanke himself said that the global savings glut was responsible for the GFC and Pettis says that the global savings glut is the root cause of the U.S. trade deficit.
Besides, what else could there be? Well, there was 9-11 and 25 years of forever wars. However, manufacturing employment was already falling drastically by the time 9-11 happened.
Could it be that the problem was that we didn’t do enough fiscal and monetary stimulus in order to recover from the 21st century recessions? The drastic increases in the money supply, inflation rates, massive federal debt suggest, if anything, we did too much.
Maybe there is some other explanation. I am open to suggestions.
As for contradictions, it is no contradiction to assert that the trade deficit for the first hundred years of U.S. economic history was a good thing, while maintaining that the trade deficit for the last fifty years has been a bad thing, for reasons I have explained multiple times now.
Warren Platts
Aug 23 2025 at 3:14pm
The book The Decision to Drop the Bomb: A Political History made it pretty clear that to the people actually running the war (Roosevelt, Stimson, Marshall), the atomic bomb was just another weapon of war and that they were going to use it as soon as it was available. Truman didn’t even know about the Manhattan Project until he was sworn in as President. There wasn’t much debate at all; guys like Oppenheimer had little influence over the decision. There was, however, imho, an element of damnable curiosity in that half a dozen cities were spared from Lemay’s firebombing campaign (Lemay himself was never told why he wasn’t supposed to bomb those cities). That is, dropping the bomb was a sort of scientific experiment to see what an atom bomb would do to an actual city. If a city was already half-firebombed, there would be no way to disentangle the effects of the firebombing from the atomic bombing!
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