The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy

James M. Buchanan.
Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock
(1919- )
CEE
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Editor/Trans.
First Pub. Date
1958
Publisher/Edition
Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc.
Pub. Date
1999
Comments
Foreword by Robert D. Tollison.
Series Contents
The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (with Gordon Tullock)
Foreword Robert D. Tollison
Gordon Tullock
Preface
Part I. The Conceptual Framework
1. Introduction
2. The Individualistic Postulate
3. Politics and the Economic Nexus
4. Individual Rationality in Social Choice
Part II. The Realm of Social Choice
5. The Organization of Human Activity
6. A Generalized Economic Theory of Constitutions
7. The Rule of Unanimity
8. The Costs of Decision-Making
Part III. Analyses of Decision-Making Rules
9. The Structure of the Models
10. Simple Majority Voting
11. Simple Majority Voting and the Theory of Games
12. Majority Rule, Game Theory, and Pareto Optimality
13. Pareto Optimality, External Costs, and Income Redistribution
14. The Range and Extent of Collective Action
15. Qualified Majority Voting Rules, Representation, and the Interdependence of Constitutional Variables
16. The Bicameral Legislature
17. The Orthodox Model of Majority Rule
Part IV. The Economics and the Ethics of Democracy
18. Democratic Ethics and Economic Efficiency
19. Pressure Groups, Special Interests, and the Constitution
20. The Politics of the Good Society
Appendix 1 Marginal Notes on Reading Political Philosophy
Appendix 2 Theoretical Forerunners
Footnotes
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