The Strangest Macro Model Ever

Krugman is using the old threshold argument that I see many monetarists use. They believe that money operates like a nerve cell with a threshold for firing. If the stimulus to the nerve is below the threshold, the nerve won’t fire. Krugman believes that there is a threshold to money so that any amount of monetary pumping below the threshold had no effect at all, but monetary pumping above that threshold is totally effective. It’s the same old excuse that Keynesians have used for the repeated failure of fiscal stimuli.

But there is no empirical or logical evidence for a threshold in the economy. The economy has nonlinear effects, but that is nothing like the threshold effect. Monetarists hold to the threshold effect because they have seen hyperinflation, so they know that monetary policy can cause high levels of inflation. They just don’t have a clue as to why it doesn’t work all of the time. Why, for example, is monetary policy sometimes like pushing on a string and other times like throwing gas on a fire?

The answer lies in the fact that monetarists take the quantity theory of money too mechanically. Yes, an increase in the money stock does tend to cause price increases, with a lag and with all other things being equal. But all other things are rarely equal. Depressions can overwhelm the quantity theory for a long time.

For the monetary theory to work, people must be willing to borrow and they aren’t in a depression. And for an increase in money to create price inflation there must be a shortage of goods, which there isn’t in a depression. So during a depression monetary pumping is as useless as tits on a boar.

But once the economy turns around, idle resources are used up and people begin to borrow again, the quantity theory will kick in with a vengeance. That’s why bad economists think there is a threshold.

Wait a minute, wait a minute… Arnold “Inflation Regime” Kling is taking issue with discontinuities in Krugman’s model?! How does that make sense? Didn’t you identify your own discontinuity as being between 3.5 and 5.5 percent (8/29/2010)?

I don’t entirely understand Krugman’s post either, but I didn’t invest a whole lot of time in it. I figured the simple point was that unemployment and inflation are simultaneously determined and that when we’re not at full employment, economic slack prevents an inflationary policy from having an impact on price levels until it is substantially stronger. Maybe that’s a misinterpretation.

That, I have to say, is substantially more of an explanation for his discontinuity than I can find in this post about your prefered discontinuity: http://www.econlib.org/archives/2010/08/megan_mcardles.html

re RP Long: What’s strange is that the first graph depicts an entirely different relationship than the second graph, even though they graph the same things. How did this man graduate high school?

So? What is the concern here? Supply and demand graphs depict different relationships too… and you use them together to find stable equilibria. In fact it’s the ONLY way to find an equilibrium (stable or otherwise) in two-dimensional space – identify two different relationships and put them together.

You flippantly ask how Krugman graduate high school – I’m wondering how you graduated middle school. Don’t linear systems and basic algebra come in even before your freshman year of high school?

What’s strange about Krugman’s argument is that although he says that a modest inflation target can’t work, it does work elsewhere. For example, the UK has had an explicit inflation targeting regime since 1997. From 1997-2003 the target was 2.5%, and from 2003- present the target has been 2%. Precisely the figures that Krugman says are impossible.

Now arguably there are special structural factors in the US economy that make this impossible. But I’m sceptical. I’m particularly unconvinced by his claim:

But how do you get inflation? Only by having a full-employment economy.

fundamentalist –
Ironically enough, the 1970s were figured out at least as early as 1968, and that material has been covered several times on Krugman’s blog. I don’t think it makes that much sense to throw crude-Phillip’s-curve accusations at him when he’s working on the low-inflation end of the Phillip’s curve. The accusation simply doesn’t stick (and I would guess even Arnold would agree on that).

Daniel, the statement is still wrong, regardless of what you may think they “figured out” in 1968 or what you may determine from the Philips curve. We can have inflation without full employment.

The important thing to keep in mind about Krugman’s curves is that they’re hypothetical. He is trying to imagine why monetary policy works sometimes and why it doesn’t work other times. We might interpret the first chart as referring to anticipated inflation and the lower one as referring to actual inflation. Otherwise, as Kling has pointed out, the charts simply don’t make sense. If you take Krugman literally, then he is saying that inflation reduces unemployment except when it doesn’t. Regardless, there still is no empirical or logical evidence for a threshold effect. It’s all in Krugman’s imagination.

Daniel Kuehn –

Look, let’s not be daft. Krugman assumes a set of conditions that work out to 5% unemployment in the first picture and a set of conditions that work out to 6% unemployment in the second picture.

That’s fine, but given that both of these pictures depict a relationship between inflation and employment, then all Krugman has told us is that he’s changed his assumptions.

There is no meaningful economic story to be told by simply changing your core assumptions in the middle of an explanation and hoping no one notices.

RPLong:

There are two different processes here:

the first figure represents the mechanism “higher inflation > lower real interest rates > higher demand > lower unemployment”

the second figure represents the mechanism “lower unemployment > increasing inflation > higher inflation”

[it would help if Krugman had colored is lines in different colors]

“Look, let’s not be daft. Krugman assumes a set of conditions that work out to 5% unemployment in the first picture and a set of conditions that work out to 6% unemployment in the second picture.”

You are wrong about the second picture; in the second picture the unemployment is the exogenous variable, not the explained variable – then, in the second picture he is not presenting a set of conditions that work out to 6% unemployment: he is not saying that 1% of inflation will create an unemployment of 6%; he is saying the opposite: that 6% of unemployment will create an inflation of 1%

RP Long – think of a simply supply and demand model. Both the supply curve and the demand curve depict a relationship between quantity and price. But just because they’re not the same relationship, you don’t say that people “change their assumptions” when talking about quantity and prices.

The power of supply and demand is that we KNOW the supply relationship between p and q has to hold true and we KNOW the demand relationship between p and q has to hold true, and there’s only one point where they both hold true at the same time.

That’s all Krugman is doing here. Two distinct processes in two unknowns gets you at least one solution. It may not be a stable solution – there may be multiple solutions – but as I said above, this is pretty much middle school math so I wouldn’t go around being incredulous at how a Nobel laureate graduated high school.

The Phillips curve — or, rather, its drifting NE away from the origin — was a problem when we had strong industrial labor unions with automatic cost-of-living clauses written into their contracts.

You did catch the parenthetical, right?

And it is because is a “positive feedback” system that have a “no man’s-land”: systems with positive feedback can have two (or more) distant possible equilibrium points, but with an unstable intermediate area between these possible equilibrium

“Traffic light variation can cause higher traffic volumes, and higher traffic volumes can cause traffic light variation. But when you assume both relationships to explain a traffic jam, then you’ve effectively said nothing.

See what I’m saying yet?”

No, because if I say that, I am saying something: that traffic light variation and traffic volumes have a mutual reinforcement relation, with the eventual possibility of having two stable equilibrium – one with low traffic volume, and other with high traffic volume.

[the example of “higher traffic volumes can cause traffic light variation” seems a bit irrealistic, but we can easily imagine a more realistic example]

Either there is a determinable cause-effect relationship between employment and inflation, or something else is going on. By claiming that the causality can go either way at any time – and even worse, by changing which causality relationship you’re talking about in mid-explanation – you are essentially justifying any and every possible explanation that involves a relationship between those two.

There is a determinable cause-and-effect relationship (presented in a simplified way here, but that’s presumably not the major issue). Both are causes and both are effects – it’s an endogenous process. It’s not simply that the causality “can go either way at any time” – it’s that it goes BOTH ways ALL the time. And nobody is changing which causality relationship we’re talking about – we have been talking about both relationships throughout.

We have two things we’re trying to understand here – inflation and unemployment. The only way to grapple with it is to explain both as independent processes and put both of those explanations together to see what the total system will settle out to. That’s all he’s doing. What you advise – talking about one process at a time or even insisting there can only be one relationship between two variables – is not only inaccurate, it’s completely unhelpful in thinking about the relationship between inflation and unemployment. Krugman may ultimately be wrong – that’s something of an empirical question – but he is approaching the question in the right way.

Daniel, I appreciate your taking the time to discuss this with me. Unfortunatley, we seem to be at different stages of the debate. You seem to think that if you just explain Krugman’s faulty model better, I’ll “understand.” In reality I understand full well.

Unfortunately, there is very little difference between what you and I are saying. You say the cause and effect relationship goes both ways all the time; I say that proclaiming this to be true is bad science.

The problem with Keynesianism is that it is quasi-religion. It’s like the holy trinity: If god can be a man and a god and a feeling, depending on how god feels, then you can theoretically explain anything by changing god’s form to fit the situation. Krugman is doing this, too: when it becomes inconvenient to suggest that inflation causes employment, then he reverses the causality. (After all, the relationship goes both ways! God is both a man and a god!)

Those who buy into this explanation of the macroeconomy are those who are good at using the language. The true cause-effect relationships will continue to elude them because when one falls short, they replace it with its reverse. It is a handy intellectual escape for a bad macro model.

At least in religion we aren’t trying to explain anything about the physical universe, only our ethical and metaphysical systems. Economics has no such luxury – every theory must be consistent, coherent, and enlightening or else we must discard it. Failing to do so is simply bad science.

The Phillips Curve is old and silly by modern standards. The objections I have outlined above are not the least of its problems, they are merely the initial a priori problems. I have focused on these problems here because that’s where my interest lies. The other problems are well documented elsewhere.

RPLong, I have some doubts in understanding what is exactly the nature of your objection to Krugman’s model. More exacttly, you are saying that the model is

a) logical inconsistent;

or

b) impossible to empirically test?

These are two different criticism – a model can be logical coherent (in the sense of being consistent with the premises) but being impossible to test; and can be logically incoeherent but possible to test.

In your first comments, I had the impression that you were making the criticism a), but perhaps I misunderstud and you are really making the criticism b) (it is the impression that I have from your last comments).