Civil Asset Forfeiture: The War on Drugs™ as a Law Enforcement Revenue Center

This is the third in my series on the social costs of drug prohibition. You can read part one here (prison-industrial complex) and part two (police militarization) here.

 

In the 1914 decision US v Regan, the Supreme Court held that the “rule of evidence requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt is generally applicable only in strictly criminal proceedings.” This decision is relevant because it has subsequently allowed for civil actions in rem (against a thing, such as property) to be taken against those who have not been criminally charged in persoram. (against a person). Specifically, Section 881 of Nixon’s Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 declared subject to forfeiture all controlled substances, as well as equipment used in the manufacture and distribution of such substances (Stahl, 1992). With §881, the practice of civil asset forfeiture, the extrajudicial seizing of property suspected of being used in (or being the benefit of) was born.

The addition of § 881(a)(6) in 1978 allowed for the seizure of both profits derived from the drug trade and anything purchased with those profits, while the 1984 addendum of § 881(a)(7) permits the forfeiture of any real property used to violate drug laws. Because the law enforcement agency responsible for the seizing of assets is allowed to keep the property – or any proceeds from the sale thereof – asset forfeiture has become an important source of revenue for these agencies. This has created a situation where a conflict between genuine enforcement of prohibition and revenue raising is all too often decided in favor of the latter (Boudreaux & Pritchard, 1996). This is made possible because of the differing standards between criminal and civil procedures; while criminal suspects must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, victims of asset forfeiture only need be “reasonably suspected” of having committed a crime.  

Of course, reasonable suspicion is a highly subjective standard of proof, and extant laws provide little objectivity. This is hardly surprising, as asset forfeiture sits at the nexus between criminal and civil law. Depending on the case in question, the Court has declared in rem forfeitures as criminal in some instances, and as civil in others. In truth, the hazy distinction serves a purpose, as it allows law enforcement to civilly punish individuals for suspected criminal activity without the heightened burden of proof required for criminal prosecution. It then becomes the duty of the individual who has had his property seized to prove his innocence after the fact, an often-costly procedure that is a clear violation of due process protections. Unfortunately for these individuals, judicial precedent has trended towards viewing this protection as a matter for criminal prosecution, not civil.

Police department budgets are subject to the same laws of scarcity as everything else, and every enforcement priority comes with opportunity costs. Money and manpower dedicated to, for instance, investigating auto thefts, cannot be used to investigate homicides. Indeed, research has shown that shifting resources towards drug enforcement has lowered the opportunity costs of property crime, leading to an increase thereof (Benson, Rasmussen, & Sollars, 1995).Asset forfeiture allows the drug enforcement apparatus of police departments to supplement their revenue at little cost to the taxpayer outside of the costs of seizure. Moreover, individuals who have their assets seized are often permanently bereft of their property even if they are never found guilty of any crime.

Incentives to maintain this system in place go far beyond local departments; while they keep the lion’s share of proceeds – especially cash seizures – the funds are often spread around. Williams (2002)observes that some departments share a small portion of proceeds with local schools, health departments, and favored nonprofits, while Blumenson and Nilsen (1998) note that courts also receive a share of these funds, providing little incentive for judicial independence in protecting the property rights of forfeiture victims. All of this contributes to a paradigm wherein seizures are used in place of criminal convictions in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule regarding evidence, and the focus of law enforcement in the area of drugs has shifted from fighting crime to chasing assets (Jensen & Gerber, 1996). Not only has this shift in focus not decreased crime, as we shall explore next, there is also evidence that it has helped increase crime.

 


Tarnell Brown is an Atlanta based economist and public policy analyst.

READER COMMENTS

steve
May 8 2024 at 9:37am

I believe it was Balko who did a series a few years ago on the abuses of civil forfeiture. Once the police have your asset it’s very difficult to get it back. For example, if your car is stolen by a drug gang and the police seize it you may need months of effort and lawyer’s fees to get it back.

Steve

Richard W Fulmer
May 8 2024 at 2:23pm

It then becomes the duty of the individual who has had his property seized to prove his innocence after the fact, an often-costly procedure that is a clear violation of due process protections.

Two thoughts:
1 – Civil asset forfeiture is, in effect, a regressive tax; poor people are unlikely to have the means to fight forfeiture in court.

2 – The injustices stemming from due process violations highlight the importance of the norms and procedures at which both the left and right increasingly sneer.

The consequences of jettisoning the rule of law in favor of getting results by any available means are on display right now in the Supreme Court. SCOTUS is actually deliberating on the question whether a sitting president should be criminally liable for sending Seal Team Six to kill a political opponent!

LEAVE A COMMENT

required
required
required, not displayed
required, not displayed
optional
optional

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

RECENT POST

Michael Crichton once highlighted an unusual quirk in human thinking – something he called Gell-Mann Amnesia, after his friend Murray Gell-Mann. Chrichton said: Briefly stated, the Gell-Mann Amnesia effect is as follows. You open the newspaper to an article on some subject you know well. In Murray's case, phys...

Read More

In a recent blog post, Vasant Dhar had some interesting remarks about the possible role of AI in Fed policy: Might AI help us better understand the data and design better economic policy interventions?Last week I had lunch with some central bankers who wanted to talk to me about AI. They were interested in discussin...

Read More

This is the third in my series on the social costs of drug prohibition. You can read part one here (prison-industrial complex) and part two (police militarization) here.   In the 1914 decision US v Regan, the Supreme Court held that the “rule of evidence requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt is general...

Read More