Often, when we observe that something does not work correctly (that is, according to consumer demand and the likely opportunity cost of production), we discover that a restraining regulation is the culprit. Consider hearing aids. Why are they so expensive, typically thousands of dollars? Until two years ago, a Food and Drug Administration regulation forbade their sale over the counter and required an audiologist’s prescription (Dominique Mosbergen and Julie Jargon, “FDA Clears Hearing Aids for Over-the-Counter Sale,” Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2022).

Whether we model the prescription obligation as a government restriction on supply or as an excise tax on consumers, the effect was higher prices, a reduction in the size of the market, and less incentive for innovation. Who knew what consumers were missing?

We got part of the answer when Apple announced that it will soon offer a software update for its $250 AirPods Pro 2 that will give them a hearing-aid function for low-to-medium hearing loss (FDA restriction will remain in place for more severe cases). The conspicuous shape of the AirPods has the drawback of advertising that one is hard of hearing, but some old people may think that wearing them looks cool (see Ben Cohen, “Apple Has a Hot New Product. It’s a Hearing Aid,” September 13, 2014). This new competition from outside the previously regulated market will likely cause a fall in the prices of more conventional hearing-aid devices.

How many months earlier would people with hearing problems have been able to use the new device if it had not been regulated out? It is true that a technological innovation or the adaptation of existing technology was necessary, but technology depends on research and research depends on the expectation that its products can be profitable.

We still have to wait to see how well the AirPods will work as hearing aids, but we know that this innovation and many others are less likely to happen if they are legally impeded. The story illustrates a more general argument for individual liberty, well formulated by Friedrich Hayek (see Volume 1 of his Law, Legislation, and Liberty, originally published in 1973):

Since the value of freedom rests on the opportunities it provides for unforeseen and unpredictable actions, we will rarely know what we lose through a particular restriction of freedom. … And so, when we decide each issue solely on what appear to be its individual merits, we always over-estimate the advantages of central direction.

On the market, you don’t have to “vote” with your single ballot to get what you want or to hope that entrepreneurs and innovators will offer you goods or services you would want if only you knew they existed. The only requirement is that enough consumers, but not necessarily a majority or some politically vocal minority, will be probabilistically willing to pay for it.

Contrast this with the ideal government of Rexford Guy Tugwell (1891-1979), a believer in government planning and close collaborator of Franklin D. Roosevelt. In a 1932 American Economic Review article, he wrote:

New industries will not just happen as the automobile industry did; they will have to be foreseen, to be argued for, to seem probably desirable features of the whole economy before they can be entered upon.

(See also my Regulation review of his 1933 book Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts; also available in pdf format, pp. 71 ff.)

On the political “market,” could you have effectively voted for iPhones or AirPods that can be used as hearing aids? Lobbying politicians or regulators is costly, especially for what only exists in entrepreneurs’ or innovators’ minds. How do we know what we are missing with the 188,346 pages of federal regulations, not counting state and local regulations? The question is relevant in all countries.

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