This month marks 20 years since the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Kelo v. City of New London. This 5-4 ruling upheld the Court’s rational basis deference to legislatures in determining whether economic development (jobs, tax revenue, etc.) satisfies “public use”, even when the government conveys the seized property to other private parties.
Although Kelo was pretty controversial at the time, interest in it has naturally waned over the years. Under this diminishing spotlight, governments have gotten ever more creative in the ways they exercise eminent domain.
In Richmond, California, for example, the city tried to seize upside down mortgages to protect residents from foreclosure. In Atlantic City, eminent domain has been used without specific plans for how the seized properties would be used. In Minnesota, when an elderly woman fell behind on her property taxes, the county seized her condo, sold it, settled the tax bill, and kept the proceeds. And in my home state of North Carolina, dozens of homes and a local church were seized to make way for a new electric vehicle assembly plant, only for the company (Vinfast, headquartered in Vietnam) to back down by delaying construction for years.
These kinds of cases count as abuse of eminent domain power. Not only do these “Grasping Hand” abuses waste taxpayer dollars and valuable resources, but they needlessly violate fundamental, constitutionally protected rights to property.
Yet economists have shown that eminent domain does have its legitimate uses. Namely, economic development takings can promote the public interest (economic efficiency) when used against strategic holdouts standing opportunistically in the way of development.
Herein lies a classic question that Kelo raises. How can takings powers be regulated to avoid abuse, while still preserving eminent domain’s legitimate uses? Clearly leaving things up to legislative majorities is not the answer — it’s actually the reason for the abuses in the first place. Instead, better regulation of government regulators can help.
In a new paper* forthcoming at the Review of Law & Economics, co-authors Justin Pace and Jon Murphy and I dig into the long-term dynamics of how to regulate eminent domain authorities. The first thing is to recognize that government officials, even those with the best intentions, will devise ways around existing eminent domain restrictions. Following the financial regulation and campaign finance literatures, we call this loophole mining. It becomes especially powerful over time as the public spotlight on abuse wanes. Second, loophole mining necessitates ongoing adjustments to eminent domain restrictions. So, when looking at the long-term dynamics of the problem, the effectiveness of restrictions depends not only on their initial design but also on ongoing vigilance against regulators’ becoming overly creative in satisfying the rational basis test.
This makes for a complicated dynamic policy dilemma. Tighter restrictions may beget more creative forms of loophole-mining and necessitate ongoing regulatory adjustments, creating a cycle of regulation and circumvention. Much simpler, and arguably more efficient as well, would be for the Court to abandon its rational basis deference and instead close the door to takings for economic development.
Closing the Kelo loophole amounts to saying yes to holdout problems. Of course, central planners and development authorities would howl and double-down on claims that eminent domain is critical for economic development. But in fact, a large body of literature shows that developers are pretty effective at handling holdouts even without resorting to eminent domain.
Better for the law to let entrepreneurs deal with holdouts than to keep encouraging governments to hone their loophole mining skills. After 20 years, it’s past time to revisit Kelo.
* “The Long-Term Impact of Kelo v. City of New London: Comparing State Legislative and Judicial Responses” and is available for PDF download here.
Edward J. Lopez, is Professor of Economics at Western Carolina University, Executive Director of the Public Choice Society, and author of numerous articles and books including Madmen, Intellectuals, and Academic Scribblers.
READER COMMENTS
Jon Murphy
Jun 26 2025 at 12:32pm
This was a fun paper to work on, Ed
Mactoul
Jun 27 2025 at 5:11am
I wonder how necessity of eminent domain be squared with classical liberal principles? Sometimes the term individual sovereignty is used, carelessly in my opinion. But how can an individual be sovereign with the sword of eminent domain hanging over him?
How does, indeed, eminent domain differ from socialism, strictly speaking or even communism? For it implies the state as the ultimate owner, does it not?
The sentiments
how can a libertarian, an anarchist, a classical liberal utter?
Jon Murphy
Jun 27 2025 at 9:04am
These are excellent questions. Off the top of my head, I do not know of any sources that discuss foundations of eminent domain from a strictly classically liberal perspective, except in very technical legal terms. But I will do my best to answer these questions, at least broadly.
Some foundations before the discussion:
First: we’re going to just ignore anarchists. By definition, anarchists reject government, so they will necessarily reject eniment domain as well (can’t have government takings if there is no government).
Second: For simplicity, I am just going to use the phrase “classical liberals” to encompass both classical liberals and libertarians.
Third: Know that there are wide differences in opinions here.
That out of the way, let’s begin:
Individual sovereignty refers to one’s ownership over one’s body, not real property. It’s a seperate issue from eminent domain. Individual sovereignty is dealt with in the 13th Amendment, not the 5th.
It does not imply state ownership as the state must compensate fairly the individual whose property is taken. Furthermore, the state cannot just seize willy-nilly; there needs to be a legitimate reason for such seizure (what constitutes “legitimate” can be vague. I am working on a blog post on this very issue). So, the state (or county, or town, whoever is doing the seizing) must compensate for the harm done and must have a legitimate reason to do the seizure. If either of those conditions fail, the seizure is illegal.
If the state were the true owner of the property, it would not need either condition. It could do what it wishes. I own my house. If I want to paint the walls purple, I can. I am the owner here; I do not need anyone’s permission. However, if the state were to want to paint my walls purple, they must have a legitimate reason to do so and compensate me. Why? Because they are taking my property. If the state were the true owner, they wouldn’t need a reason or compensation (indeed, I’d need to seek their permission).
robc
Jun 27 2025 at 9:56am
Your answer has one problem: “compensate fairly”. As the value is whatever a willing buyer and willing seller would agree to, there can be no fair compensation without a willing seller.
robc
Jun 27 2025 at 10:12am
The philosopher Ian Anderson backing up my point:
They say they gave me compensation
That’s not what I’m chasing. I was a rich man before yesterday.
And what do I want with a million dollars and a pickup truck?
When I left my farm under the freeway.
https://youtu.be/LySTISqaH9o?si=ZKcCiZ7KWUWDCzFD
Jon Murphy
Jun 27 2025 at 10:26am
And that is always a problem (something we discuss in our paper). But, in this case, “fairly” means fair market value: a reasonable price that a seller and a buyer would exchange the property for.
robc
Jun 27 2025 at 11:17am
That is the exact problem…the domain of sellers is one. So the value is determined by that individual, you cannot average over similar nearby properties and get a fair value.
Someone who has lived on a property for 80 years is going to value differently than someone there for 2 years. See the song above.
Jon Murphy
Jun 27 2025 at 12:22pm
I agree 100%. We discuss that problem in the paper.
Mactoul
Jun 27 2025 at 11:28pm
As I understand it, individual sovereignty is altogether a stronger and a more expansive notion than self-ownership. It explicitly refers to the hypothetical pre-political stage where an individual was sovereign over his domain precisely as a state is sovereign now.
Hence it is pointed towards property in a way self-ownership isn’t.
Jon Murphy
Jun 28 2025 at 6:52am
I’ve never heard it used that way, but perhaps there are those who do.
Regardless, since we’re not in the pre-political stage, it’s not relevant.
Monte
Jun 28 2025 at 9:32am
Very timely post on a subject that should concern us all in light of recent developments in New Jersey (see City Gov to Seize 175 Year-old Farm by Eminent Domain). Hopefully, your paper (very well written, researched, and informative, btw) and others will help reinvigorate discussions and efficient reforms of this abuse of power.
In other words, sentimental value – a difficult thing to evaluate monetarily. I know economists attempt to assess Fair Market Value (FMV) based on things like revealed preference (reservation value) and Willingness to Accept (WTA) vs market price, but courts have consistently held that FMV is sufficient for constitutional purposes under the Takings Clause. This needs to change.
Monte
Jun 28 2025 at 9:41am
That is to say, economists attempt to equilibrate FMV to sentimental value as best they can by taking into consideration revealed preference and WTA.
Jon Murphy
Jun 28 2025 at 11:44am
What alternative do you propose?
Monte
Jun 28 2025 at 12:05pm
That’s a difficult question. Maybe start by setting FMV as a base level of compensation in addition to a subjective value adjustment of some kine. The difficulty, of course, would be establishing a legal precedent that the courts would be obliged to accept in eminent domain cases going forward.
Jon Murphy
Jun 28 2025 at 12:26pm
Yeah. And how does one value subjective things. It’s a tough question courts wrestle with every day
Jon Murphy
Jun 28 2025 at 2:13pm
Another issue is whether the owner genuinely doesn’t want to part with the property or if they are merely rent-seeking
Monte
Jun 28 2025 at 2:45pm
I suppose a rent-seeking individual or entity could be identified by their track record of financial or property transactions. And non-resident or speculative property owners could be excluded from subjective claims, couldn’t they?
Jon Murphy
Jun 28 2025 at 3:02pm
Sure, but a non-resident or speculative owner could still genuinely want to hold the property. Eg, a landlord who is renting out the old family home.
Monte
Jun 28 2025 at 4:24pm
Well, in the eternal words of Lincoln:
“Whether there shall be any legislation upon the subject, and if any, what, is submitted entirely to the better judgment of Congress.”, such as it is.