Whenever a legal challenge to a given policy is decided, a discussion tends to arise as if the court is making a statement on the desirability of the policy itself. For example, after the US Court of International Trade struck down Trump’s tariffs enacted under the International Economic Policy Act (IEEPA) of 1977 (VOS Selections, Inc. v. Trump), supporters of the tariffs took to social media to decry the court’s ruling as a “judicial coup” against a vital policy. The Trump Administration said:
It is not for unelected judges to decide how to properly address a national emergency. President Trump pledged to put America First, and the Administration is committed to using every lever of executive power to address this crisis and restore American Greatness.
On the Left, after the US Supreme Court overruled Roe v Wade in Dobbs, many decried the ruling as supporting bad policy (abortion restrictions). The argument they were making was that Dobbs wasn’t wrongly decided because the law was wrong, but because legal abortion is a desirable policy.
But here’s the thing: courts do not exist to judge policy. Courts interpret the law and ensure that actions conform to the law. If courts were to uphold an action just because it is desirable (or, consequently, strike down an action because it is undesirable), that would be a judicial coup. That would be the courts making policy, ironically, the very thing the dissenters object to.
Take VOS Selections. The question before the court was not “Are tariffs a good tool to affect trade deficits?” Nor was it “Should tariffs be used in trade negotiations?” The question before the court was, “whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (“IEEPA”) delegates these powers to the President in the form of authority to impose unlimited tariffs on goods from nearly every country in the world.” Whether tariffs are a good or bad policy is irrelevant to whether the President has the authority under the statute he invoked to impose them.
Courts are not in a position to judge good from bad policy. That is a question limited exclusively to Congress (not the President). Congress must “speak clearly” when delegating authority to the executive branch for big questions; for the Court to endorse (or strike down) policy just because it is good or bad would be to seize power from the proper branch (see Biden v Nebraska, pgs. 25–26). Congress is the place to decide what policies should be enacted.
In the United States, all government authority derives from the Constitution. It does not come from winning an election or some other supposed manifestation of the “public will.” The Constitution is “the supreme Law of the Land.” All government actions must conform to it (see Article VI). The courts’ job is to ensure that all parties conform to the law, no matter how desirable their actions may be.
I applaud the International Trade Court’s decision in VOS Selections on both economic and legal grounds. But, if the situation were reversed, and Trump were to use the IEEPA to unilaterally revoke all tariffs (a policy outcome I would support), I would still want the courts to strike down such a proclamation. It is in Congress’s hands, and Congress’s only to set tax policy. Congress decides what policies are good or bad. Courts should not. By striking down tariffs in VOS Selections (or student loan forgiveness in Biden v Nebraska), it is not a statement on the social or political merits of those policies, but rather the legal merits. To argue tariffs are vital negotiating tools (for example) is wholly irrelevant. Those are arguments for Congress and the courts have said (as in VOS Selections and Biden v Nebraska) that it is in Congress where those arguments must be made.
READER COMMENTS
David Seltzer
Jun 25 2025 at 10:38am
Jon: Well explained. Thanks.
Monte
Jun 25 2025 at 12:17pm
Buchanan’s public choice theory applies with equal force to judges, who are self-interested individuals that frequently render politically motivated decisions and whose rulings often align with the politics of the appointing president, especially at the district court level. Several legal scholars have suggested that nationwide injunctions do constitute a “judicial coup.” And whether you agree with them or not, district courts are exerting outsized influence over national policy in ways that undermine executive authority, but that’s for the SCOTUS to decide.
Jon Murphy
Jun 25 2025 at 12:36pm
The research points in the other direction. The incentive structure is for judges to downplay policy preferences. And even if one (or even many) go rogue, that’s what appeals courts are for.
And several others have not. Regardless, it’s irrelevant to my point.
Monte
Jun 25 2025 at 3:02pm
Disagree. Studies (Sunstein et al – 2006, Epstein & Landes – 2013) show federal judges decisions cluster ideologically. Also, the nation-wide injunction (used disproportionately against Trump-era policies) was rarely applied prior to 2017 and largely by Democratic appointees during his term.
Public officials – including judges – are not immune to self-interest or ideological influence. PCT explains why judicial decisions are so predictable.
Jon Murphy
Jun 25 2025 at 3:50pm
And many more show otherwise.
Again, but that point has been addressed already and is irrelevant to my post here. Please do not bring it up again.
Yes, particularly along legal, not ideological, lines.
Again, irrelevant to my point. Please do not bring it up again.
Monte
Jun 25 2025 at 5:38pm
I’m sorry Jon, but my point about judges being influenced by self-interest and ideology is directly relevant to this discussion because it challenges the assumption behind your argument that judicial decisions are objectively rendered based strictly on the law and are not politically or personally motivated.
Jon Murphy
Jun 25 2025 at 5:50pm
No. This post has nothing to do with judges decision making. You’re about two weeks late for that conversation. This post is about the public reaction to court rulings. Different topic.
Monte
Jun 25 2025 at 6:40pm
If you insist. Thanks for the discussion.
Jose Pablo
Jun 25 2025 at 6:50pm
Even if judges do “benefit” from following their ideological biases (which is itself open to lengthy debate), that’s precisely the point.
The ideal is for every individual to hold a veto over political decisions. That ideal is better served when 870 federal judges each hold a veto than when the state is compelled to blindly follow the will of a single deranged individual — no matter what kind of “socialist of any party” that person happens to be.
Craig
Jun 25 2025 at 7:20pm
Ideal remains judicial impartiality of course.
Monte
Jun 25 2025 at 7:23pm
I don’t recall you vigorously defending this when other “deranged individuals” were in office, but I could be mistaken.
Jose Pablo
Jun 25 2025 at 8:15pm
You’re quite mistaken. The Republicans are actually my favorite socialist party — not that this fact has any bearing on the argument at hand.
Monte
Jun 25 2025 at 8:39pm
Well strap me to a hog and roll me in the mud!
Jon Murphy
Jun 25 2025 at 12:47pm
Another reminder, as this is a misconception I am seeing more and more:
Buchanan’s theory (aka public choice theory) is not that politicians (judges, etc) are mindlessly self-interested. Public Choice Theory is that people respond to incentives in non-market situations just as they do in market situations. Thus, it is about structuring incentives to get desirable results.
In other words, one cannot just mindlessly invoke Public Choice and assume people are malicious. That’d be about as anti-Public Choice as it is possible to be.
Craig
Jun 25 2025 at 7:19pm
While I would suggest that the US government should strongly consider reinvigorating the ‘nondelegation principle’ — the concept that Congress simply is not constitutionally permitted to delegate certain powers to the Executive Branch, including the ability to impose tariffs under various statutory pretenses — well, the ship sailed on that a while ago.
Now one might say, well, ok, let’s assume that the nondelegation principle remains weak, well, Trump invoked a specific statute, in this case the IEEPA and the statute does not expressly note tariffs. Ok, not a bad argument, it could prevail, but make no mistake about it, prevailing on this question borders on pointless because right around the corner is the Trade Act of 1974 Sec 301, the ‘301’ tariffs. For instance: https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/biden-administration-expands-section-301-tariffs-imports-china-targeting-green-energy
But yes, Conrgess has delegated authority to the Executive Branch to respond to perceived unfair trade practices. In the case of 301 tariffs that route goes through the USTR. Ultimately the statutory hook he’s relying on may fail, but its not as if there aren’t other statutory hooks he can potentially rely upon.