The increase in the relative price of housing (relative to the prices of other goods and services) is the consequence of supply increasing less than demand. Many economic factors are at play, such as a growing population, land prices, and construction costs. Many political mandates and prohibitions play a role in limiting the supply of new housing units. Zoning regulation is a major factor. Import tariffs on Canadian lumber impose a special tax on the construction of houses. Over the last two years, the Fed has pushed up interest rates–and thus, indirectly, mortgage rates–in order to control the inflation generated by the money it created to accommodate higher government expenditures.
Other interventions work the other way. The federal government’s role in the supply of mortgages probably reduces their prices. On the demand side, the deductibility of mortgage interest from income taxes (as any subsidization of house purchases) pushes up housing demand and prices. The net effect of the multitude of government interventions on specific markets is often obscure.
Contradictions in government policies are not unusual, but a more basic question goes unnoticed: Why should governments take sides in favor of or against some homeowners? Why should governments be concerned at all about the issue (except to question their extant interventions)? Consider the simple case of owner-occupied housing units (houses or condos) and their increasing prices.
When house prices are on the rise, a new buyer has to pay more while an existing owner sees the value of his asset increase and can obtain more from its sale. Heirs of a deceased homeowner or any homeowner who wants to downsize are advantaged. A homeowner who sells at a higher price obviously figures out that the extra money is worth more for him (or her, of course) than the advantage of staying put. If a homeowner is upsizing, the price difference between his old and his new house may go up, but this is not necessarily true in a diversified market where house prices don’t increase in the same proportion. To repeat the question: Why would governments—by favoring lower house prices—discriminate between one group of citizens and another, like between new and current homeowners?
Most if not all government policies consist in, and are only effective by, arbitrarily taking sides and discriminating among citizens. It is largely a political fairy tale that governments produce “public goods” that all citizens want, thereby benefiting everybody. When they do produce goods or services that can be called “public,” it is most often for a specific group of citizens. And nothing guarantees that most citizens will come out as net beneficiaries of the sum of government interventions. Governments are essentially, or at least mostly, redistributive machines. The underlying justification for redistribution is the utilitarian fiction that the favored citizens gain more than the ones discriminated against lose, that the former are more helped than the latter harmed.
It is this danger of exploitation of some citizens to help others that led James Buchanan and the school of constitutional political economy to emphasize a “generality” requirement for government intervention: no discriminatory taxes, no unequal subsidies, and no regulation meant to distribute benefits and costs among groups (indeed, like zoning). The same observations led Anthony de Jasay to dismiss all moral arguments in favor of the state. Both approaches—Buchanan’s and de Jasay’s—can be seriously defended. (Friedrich Hayek provides another approach, which is less neatly contoured and can be left aside here.)
The political function of government interventions that, in some cases, push up house prices and, in other cases, push them down is probably to appear to respond positively to the demands of different electoral clientèles and special interests.
Provided certain general conditions of formal equality obtain, the beauty of the market is that a voluntary exchange without fraud between two adults takes care of itself: each one benefits or thinks he will according to his own lights. Trying to find out who benefits most in a free exchange, who gains more “utility,” is a fool’s errand: it is impossible to calculate, even conceptually. Using coercive means including special taxes to bring an individual to make a choice different than he would otherwise have made is arbitrary authoritarianism.
We may repeat the injunction to governments that the Marquis d’Argenson, who was a friend of Voltaire and a former minister of Louis XV, immortalized in his memoirs: “Laissez faire, morbleu! Laissez faire!” (Laissez faire, for God’s sake! Laissez faire!).
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READER COMMENTS
David Seltzer
Sep 26 2024 at 5:01pm
Pierre: The confused and arbitrary central planner is inherently opposed to rule of law and individual freedom. The will of these deep thinkers, a small minority to be sure, is imposed on the majority of individuals. Their power is the taking of money or property and subjugates the individual to the state. Their moral turpitude issues from insisting on their (right?) to benefit the few at the cost of others by threats or violence, to which, libertarians are vehemently opposed. Of course I’m preaching to the choirmaster. But the larger question. How do we cashier those rascals give most individuals make the rational decision to comply.
Pierre Lemieux
Sep 26 2024 at 9:44pm
David: What do you mean with your last sentence?
David Seltzer
Sep 26 2024 at 11:16pm
Pierre: I meant to write given instead of give. To be more clear. How do we remove those interventionist policy-makers when it seems most individuals make the rational choice to comply with government policy? Apologies for the confusion.
Mactoul
Sep 27 2024 at 1:26am
Where or who or what is this central planner? In America?
What you really have is factions of the ruling class, the people who read (and more importantly) who write on public matters. The bureaucrats, the journalists, the activists, the professors and also the elected representatives. In short, the people that think on public matters. By their arguments and their negotiations, public policies emerge.
Jose Pablo
Sep 27 2024 at 4:59am
public policies emerge.
Public policies emerge because these particular “emerging” public policies, help the individuals in charge of making “public policies emerge” to achieve their individual objectives.
That is (should be) a pretty obvious insight.
David Seltzer
Sep 27 2024 at 10:54am
Following up on Jose Pablo’s comment; Central planning as public police. To wit. Twelve Fed members sitting around a table and setting interest rates. Biden supporting unions to stand strong against corporations. Biden-Harris threatening price controls. Trump demanding tariffs against Carrier if they moved their plants to Mexico. Anti-trust policies. Rent control in NYC. Personal note. I worked at US Steel in Gary. In order to work, I had to join the USW. Pay dues that went into some wasteful project. I could not negotiate terms with US Steel. Of course I made the rational trade-off to work there. If I wanted employment in any of the trades, union membership was required.
Kevin Erdmann
Sep 27 2024 at 12:31am
Are you saying that zoning meets the generality requirement or that it fails to?
Pierre Lemieux
Sep 27 2024 at 12:28pm
Kevin: Your question is interesting because it illustrates that the application of the generality requirement is not always obvious. It seems to me, however, that zoning cannot meet any generality requirement. The general rule of freedom of contract opposes it: if I want to sell part of my land and somebody else wants to buy it at a price we both agree on, generality requires that we may proceed, whatever the majority of whatever political group thinks. An exception would be a restrictive covenant whereby I have sold my right to dispose of a portion of this piece of land (or the preceding owner sold it to me with a previous restrictive covenant attached).
It is true, however, that in a contractarian approach Ă la Buchanan, property rights are defined by the social contract, and general restrictions to property rights could be established at that stage. The example I have in mind is, Who has the right to use maritime beaches? Or which pieces of land are and are not the commons?
robc
Sep 30 2024 at 3:59pm
A couple of questions since you brought up restrictive covenants:
One, since the original owner still owns part of the property (the part that doesn’t allow me to split it, or whatever), shouldn’t they be paying property tax on that? If my property is worth $500k without the covenant and $300k with it, then the original covenant creator still owns $200k worth of property. Not that I want property taxes to exist, but while they do, the generality rule requires them to be taxed too.
Two, isn’t a restrictive covenant a perpetuity? Shouldn’t they thus be limited by law? I think a 25 year limit is about right. IIRC, Florida used to have a 20 year limit, but the developers lobby got it removed.
Personally, I think it solves problem #1 too, as for the first generation of a neighborhood, most of the owners want the original character to stay fixed, as it maximizes value. It probably doesn’t truly solve it, but close enough for a short period of time is good enough. As neighborhoods get older, they need to change, so limited the covenant to one generation is enough.
Pierre Lemieux
Sep 30 2024 at 9:14pm
robc: Good question. The answer, fortunately, is not difficult. In a society based on contracts instead of collective/government commands, nobody is obliged to buy a property with a restrictive covenant. Many do so because the price is lower–just as many buy houses near airports, being reimbursed for the noise inconvenience by the lower price they pay. (See my article on externalities.) The original owner paid the price of his restrictive covenant by selling his property for $200k less. (Of course, depending on the market and individual preferences, collective covenants may also have a positive value. Markets are much, much better than governments in calculating values: have the look at the more complicated case of nectar and pollination in my article linked above.)
Robert EV
Oct 1 2024 at 2:17pm
Temporary restrictive covenants could be used as really convenient tax-avoidance schemes. Especially when passing property down generations.
robc
Oct 1 2024 at 5:51pm
So that is another benefit of temporary restrictive covenants.
Mactoul
Sep 27 2024 at 1:20am
Because the government is attempting something which is not allowed for, perhaps inconceivable within, in your framework. The matter is obvious, to those not of the Buchanan school, but to put it in abstract terms, the government seeks to realize the vision of the governing class.
Mosca would be more to the point as to the doings of the ruling class and why the academicians write idealistic tomes.
Jose Pablo
Sep 27 2024 at 5:24am
the vision of the governing class
The governing class has no vision. This idea that “different governing classes have different visions and voters vote for the competing visions that are presented to them” has no explanatory power of what actually happens in politics.
The wannabe governing classes will produce a “vision” that reflects their own interpretation of what the vision of 50%+1 of the voters is. They are not in the business of “producing visions for society”, they are in the business of winning elections
That’s the main reason why you see the “visions” of the different wannabe governing classes converging until resulting almost indiscernible.
Pierre Lemieux
Sep 27 2024 at 1:30pm
Mactoul: The normative goal of, I think, all liberal schools of thought is to prevent any governing “class” from favoring itself or its political clientèle by exploiting others. (It seems that Mosca claimed to be a liberal, but I haven’t read him, so I don’t know. It seems to me that Pareto’s theory of fluid elites is consistent with liberalism, but I could be wrong.) What I described as the normative goal of liberalism is clearly obvious in Buchanan and the school of constitutional political economy–as The Limits of Liberty or its precursor and more technical The Calculus of Consent should persuade you. All this is even more obvious in de Jasay who defined governing as harming some to favor others. Recall from The State (an unavoidable book) that what de Jasay calls the “capitalist state” is a state that does not govern but whose only function is to ward off any state (external or internal) that would be intent on governing.
Political “idealism,” with or often without tomes, is more to believe in noble savages and angelic government.
Jose Pablo
Sep 27 2024 at 5:15am
Why do political representatives take sides?
In politics, narratives are everything. Facts are just an inconvenience (“Never let the facts confuse you”)
And voters favor some narratives over others. This has been very well analyzed in Caplan’s “The Myth of the Rational Voter“. Narratives that are anti-market, anti-foreigners, pro “labor conservation” and that favor negative views of the future that require “action”, are voter’s favorites (to the economist and rational people’s dismay) and so, you should expect this kind of narrative oversupplied by politicians.
How does this apply to housing markets?
The narrative that you can not “trust” markets to provide such a relevant good as housing (enshrined in many constitutions as a citizen’s right) will certainly be there.
The narrative that housing prices will keep going up and push everybody out of the housing market leading to a wave of homeless roaming the streets, will also be there (despite the logical impossibility of houses being, at the same time, empty and very expensive).
Of course, you can also expect the narrative that foreign buyers (Canadians, Chinese, tourists…) are driving up housing market prices.
On the other hand, the narrative of “actual owners are doing great and will see the price of their assets forever increasing”, has no political value so, you will not see it in the political market.
Caplan’s framework has a significant explanatory power when it comes to housing policies.
Mactoul
Sep 27 2024 at 9:40pm
Seems your “narrative” is something like a “vision”.
But this explanation that elites peddle illiberal narratives in order to win elections is itself not very liberal
1) It presumes elite/non-elite distinction, which also may be called ruling class/ruled class distinction.
This distinction is missing in the liberal theories that start with political equality.
2) It assumes that the common man is more illiberal than the elite
Again this idea isn’t very favorable to the liberal theories.
Jose Pablo
Sep 28 2024 at 5:50am
Not sure I understand your comment.
Caplan’s analysis is not a narrative but a positive analysis of voter’s behavior. It manage to explain observations that the idea of a “rational voter trying to advance with his vote vote, his own individual interests” did not.
Not sure what you mean by “elites”. By my preferred definition of “elites” (not a very epistemologically useful distinction anyway), they don’t do anything to win elections. In fact, they profoundly despise politicians (the shameless rascals in the business of winning elections)
Nothing you mention follows from Caplan’s positive identification of voters’ biases and their political consequences.
Thomas L Hutcheson
Sep 30 2024 at 6:40pm
Better to reform a policy than to curse the distortions. 🙂
Pierre Lemieux
Sep 30 2024 at 9:21pm
Thomas: Lots of policies have been reformed, de-reformed, and reformed again for decades. It is not because a policy exists that it should continue to be reformed and that the policy sedimentation should continue to pile up. Could we call this the policy-maker or policy-advisor bias?
Grand Rapids Mike
Oct 3 2024 at 11:14am
A few comments. The articles uses the terms “government” to designate who establishes the policies impacting housing. I think a more accurate term would be “politicians and the administrative state”. Think this set of words points the finger more accurately. Also the lack of supply is due to an increasing percentage of old people, that are in bigger numbers than the past, who don’t want to move. Supporting this is reverse mortgages which allow old folks to stay in their home along with property tax deductions for seniors. Don’t know if this data point exist but it would be interesting to know what percentage of old folks, like me, still live, and live in their homes as compared to 1970, 1980 etc. With the aging of the population this would seem to have an real impact.