The upcoming legislative election in France (on June 30 and, for the second round, July 7) tells us much about politics. It also suggests some comparisons between American and French politics.
The parties of the left vying for a majority in the National Assembly have built a populist coalition, the New Popular Front (Nouveau Front Populaire) or NPF, which temporarily unites in the pursuit of power both left and extreme-left parties, including the Communist Party. In each circumscription, NPF is running a single candidate of the left. The extreme-right National Rally (Rassemblement National) or NR, and the more center-right Republicans (Les Républicains or LR) have agreed on a similar electoral coalition. Renaissance, the center-right party of the current president, Emmanuel Macron, is running candidates in a loose alliance with a few small parties.
“Extreme” is a matter of degrees. Many Americans do not realize that the typical Democrat in America would be called center-right in France. A detached analyst would be hard-pressed to find differences between, say, Barack Obama and Emmanuel Macron. The political extremes are less extreme in America than in France, but that may have started to change a few years ago.
In the current French election campaign, it has been observed that the only program elements on which all the parties in the NPF really agree is to increase taxes and transfers–that is, to redistribute more money and benefits in kind to favored political clientèles. The redistribution goes basically to the poor and the modest middle-class, at the cost of “the rich” or, in fact, the less rich. It is a general political phenomenon that, whether on the left or on the right, those who want to re-engineer society have problems agreeing among themselves about what sort of utopia they want.
Interestingly, the program of the far right is as populist as the far left and targets the same clientele with similar goodies such as more “social” expenditures, also financed by the “rich,” and some price controls. The far right does add its dada of less immigration and more protectionism. The left adds “ecological planning” and a higher minimum wage. As Anthony de Jasay would say, in line with public choice theory, a political party that wants to get elected pursues the votes of the poorest 50%+1 of the voters with the promise to loot on their behalf the richest 49%. More generally, and whatever the reasons why the rationally ignorant voters support one party or another, the essence of politics or how politics works consists in harming some individuals in order to benefit others. At least, this is politics as we know it.
Mr. Macron’s “center-right” is just more prudent than the extremes, if only because it has already boosted the annual budget deficit to 5% of GDP.
Besides the general workings of politics, a major political similarity between France and America—after the Enlightenment, since America had a quite short history before—is that most citizens in each place think that freedom (“liberté”) has been born and dwells in their own country. In reality, liberty has been battered in both places, often in the very name of its defense, by their respective glorified political authorities, only earlier and more decisively in France than in America. In America, the worst is yet to come; over the long French history, it has come many times.
Marianne is a fictitious and attractive woman who has historically symbolized the French Republic. Her image or bust has taken different aspects over time–recently, those of French actresses such as Brigitte Bardot. The featured image of this post reproduces the current Marianne logo of the French state. Some may think that Marianne is a sexist symbol, but it certainly illustrates how efficient the French government has been in government propaganda and imagery for fueling national pride and obedience. Classical liberals and libertarians are rightly suspicious of state glorification.
The imminent French legislative election (like the forthcoming American presidential one) illustrates how escaping the plague of politics is as difficult as it is required. How to stop politicians from competing to discriminate against some citizens in order to favor others? Nobel laureate economist James Buchanan and the school of constitutional political economy he inspired have proposed subjecting politics to unanimously chosen rules at a superior “stage,” the constitutional stage. At that abstract stage, politics is tantamount to mutually beneficial exchange, while day-to-day politics under Leviathan is about discrimination and exploitation. (See my Econlib review of James Buchanan and Geoffrey Brennan’s book The Reason of Rules.) Anthony de Jasay, another economist and political philosopher worth consulting on these matters, proposed a more radical solution: abolish politics; that is, completely substitute individual choices for collective choices. (De Jasay’s book The State and his Against Politics are good entry doors to this radical theory; the links are to my Econlib reviews.)
The pessimists will opine that either ideal is a long shot. I would counter that considering something along those lines is required for the future of individual liberty and prosperity.

READER COMMENTS
Mactoul
Jun 21 2024 at 12:29am
This is just restatement of Carl Schmitt’s theory that politics is about friend-enemy dichotomy.
This might invalidate (some) social contract models of state but does nothing to delegitimate the notion of state.
Also, as I have previously noted, the social contract theories have no notion of political boundaries.
Thus, in a fundamental way, they are bound to have the problem noted by Jasay.
Thomas L Hutcheson
Jun 22 2024 at 11:48am
In an imperfect world it is probably impossible to do anything that does no harm to anyone, so that applies to politics, too. That does not preclude trying to search for Pareto improvements. The very imperfection implies that there is a lot of opportunity.
Pierre Lemieux
Jun 23 2024 at 5:34pm
Thomas: Please ignore my moral indignation, but think of the following. Everything one does in society affects many other individuals in a way some of the latter like it and a way others don’t like. You may call the latter “harm,” but then we need another world to label the harm that the state does coercively by forbidding the victims to avoid it. There is a distinction between coercive harm and inconvenience. Think about people paying discriminatory taxes, being taxes because they purchase goods from people the state does not like, having to compete with individuals privileged and supported by the state, being jailed because they consumed something the state does not like, having their life opportunities strictly limited if not (in certain cases) condemned to homelessness because the state has affixed a felony record on them (1 in 13 American adults has a felony record), being expropriated, being jailed for violating paper crimes, being forbidden to live with their foreign spouse, having to get a license to work. Being forbidden to defend themselves while their rulers have bodyguards and motorcades? Being denied a job because they are not members of an identity group favored by the state, and so on, and so forth. (It’s often worse in other countries, sometimes better.) Do you understand populism, now, which is perversely also a matter of harming some to benefit others?
Pierre Lemieux
Jun 21 2024 at 4:19pm
Mactoul: You raise two interesting objections. The first is easy to answer (at least to the extent that it is not the same as the second). What I say (and what de Jasay says) is very different from what Carl Schmitt says. Schmitt’s very state, which is supposed to represent one’s friends against external enemies, takes sides, discriminates against against some supposed friends. The non-Nazi Germans, including the non-Aryan ones, were harmed by the Third Reich government.
Your second objection is a bit more complicated. On the one hand, the “political” boundaries of a social contract are theoretically clear: they include all those who unanimously agree with it (with its rules) and, thus, who all benefit from the political exchange that incorporated in the contract. On the other hand, what this implies for the territorial boundaries of the contract is not clear, at least in my mind. If I may quote my review of Brennan and Buchanan’s The Reason of Rules:
Thus, de Jasay’s objection (which apparently Buchanan took seriously) is a very serious one.
Thomas L Hutcheson
Jun 22 2024 at 11:37am
“The redistribution goes basically to the poor and the modest middle-class, at the cost of “the rich” or, in fact, the less rich.”
If done efficiently with progressive consumption taxes, what’s wrong with that? 🙂
Pierre Lemieux
Jun 22 2024 at 12:07pm
Thomas: For at least three reasons. First, you would need to have very good reasons to believe that there is some chance a nirvana government would do this. Perhaps one ruled by an economist-king? Second, you have to consider not only the incentives of the forced givers but also those of the recipients: in 1967, in the bottom quintile of household income, 2/3 of the able-bodied working-age adults who were not students worked; in 2017, only 1/3 work. Third, once you accept that 51% redistribute to themselves as they wish, why not redistribute by reinstating slavery to the benefit of non-slaves (after all, the blacks are only 13% of the population), or exploiting any other minority on the basis of any criterion 51% determine? That is the constitutional problem Buchanan tried to solve. Disregarding problems of collective action, why don’t the 49% rich bribe part (say, the middle middle-class) of the 51% “poor” and expropriate the rest of the non-rich?
Pierre Lemieux
Jun 22 2024 at 1:19pm
Thomas: I am curious as to how a progressive consumption tax could be conceived. A higher VAT on wine than on beer? On Perrier than on milk? On beef than on baloney? On classical music concerts and streamings than on Western music shows? On electric cars than on gasoline ones? On house purchases than on apartment leases? On large houses and apartments than on smaller ones? On babysitting services than on daycare services? On education services than on entertainment services? On economic books than on chick lit novels?
Thomas L Hutcheson
Jun 22 2024 at 10:02pm
Raise rates (and not just on “the rich”) and allow non-consumption as a deduction.
But I would also use a VAT for “horizontal transfers of consumption (well to ill, employed to unemployed, non-“old” to old, without children to with children) instead of the wage tax.
Pierre Lemieux
Jun 23 2024 at 11:47am
Thomas: As a deduction from what? Or is it that the state will have a complete database of what every individual earns and consumes? What about a China-like social credit program (setup after a thorough cost-benefit analysis)?
Thomas L Hutcheson
Jun 22 2024 at 11:44am
But protectionism, anti-immigration and ecological planning are not particularly redistributionist, The de Jasay is not a good explanation for those positions; they just reduce real income for no good effect.
Self-interested choice is not a good model of voter behavior.
Pierre Lemieux
Jun 22 2024 at 12:24pm
Thomas: That’s an astute and interesting objection. I often think about it. Just a few remarks: Note that protectionism and anti-immigration are very redistributionist; and that ecological planning redistributes to the ecological priesthood (and their supporting special interests). In fact, all these policies redistribute towards minorities, which leads to your critique of de Jasay’s model and your objection that “self-interested choice is not a good model of voter behavior.” (It is possible that, after The State, de Jasay abandoned that model.) So what we are left with are rationally ignorant voters who, once the redistributionist principle proposed in your first comment is accepted, will follow any redistributionist ideology proposed by well-organized interest groups or by demagogues (probably supported by such groups). Isn’t it exactly where we are now in America, France, and many other countries?
Thomas L Hutcheson
Jun 22 2024 at 10:16pm
But even protection, subsidies for substitutes of net CO2 emitting technologies, and anti immigration are not obviously obviously driven by the direct beneficiaries. Tesla subsidies did come out an organized group of upper income people who wanted cheep Teslas. The people most harmed by immigration are those with the most similar skills, not my impression of who is most anti immigration. Unions and protection do sort of fit the “interest” model.
I think mistaken idea are much more important than self interest even for these “redistributions.”
Monte
Jun 23 2024 at 2:56am
Pragmatists, maybe? The ideals propounded by Buchanan and De Jasay are what Rothbard would call “ideological camouflage to be thrown over the naked exploitative reality of political life.” Unanimous consent, according to Buchanan/Tullock, is the gold standard by which Pareto optimality is assured. But collective agreements are more commonly arrived at by qualified majorities, not unanimous consent. And in what world could we realistically hope to abolish politics in favor of individual choices?
Aren’t Buchanan and De Jasay’s ideals mere “postulates of theoretical reasoning” (Kant) that we can only aspire to, but never achieve?
Pierre Lemieux
Jun 26 2024 at 12:05pm
Monte: You ask:
That’s the fundamental question indeed. We can get the sense that at least the question is not only “theoretical” when we realize that there are many domains of choice where, during nearly all the history of mankind, individual choices were deemed impossible or evil: religion, speech, sex, trade… Trade can be considered as the generic term for all interindividual relations. “Who is in charge of the supply of bread to the population of London?“
Monte
Jun 26 2024 at 2:51pm
Hope springs eternal that someday all the king’s men will join the ranks of the ignorant who plead for more liberty.
Roger McKinney
Jun 24 2024 at 8:48pm
Hayek wrote that conflict can be avoided only if the state is limited to enforcing only unanimously agreed on rules, such as Thou shalt not steal and Thou shalt not murder. The US had such a government its first century. People even refused progressive taxation on the grounds that it’s immoral for the state to treat citizens differently. The US had a government that didn’t treat rich and poor differently, although it abused tribes and allowed abuse of blacks.
Then, as Higgs points out, everything changed in the late 19th century. People rapidly embraced socialism without any attempt to discredit capitalism; they merely ignored it. Why?
Helmet Schoeck shows in his classic Envy: A Theory of Social Behavior that Envy powers socialism and only Christianity has suppressed it enough to allow for economic growth. The rise of socialism is closely correlated with the decline of Christianity.
Comments are closed.