This past July, Bloomberg had an interesting story on the Bank of the Ozarks, soon to be rebranded “OZK Bank.” The bank has been very aggressive in making loans to property developers all over the country:
If there’s a marquee project in America—the tallest residential building in Nashville, condominiums in Miami’s Brickell financial district, a 450-unit apartment tower in the midst of Seattle’s booming Amazon campus—chances are “the Little Rock bank that could,” as the Kushner publication called it, is involved. . . .
Ozarks didn’t have a New York office until 2013; this year, industry watcher the Real Deal named it the city’s third-biggest construction lender. It’s committed more than $6 billion there, including loans for the Kushners’ purchase of a parking lot in the Dumbo area of Brooklyn, a $700 million Long Island City office tower anchored by Bloomingdale’s and WeWork Cos., and a 73-story residential tower that will be the tallest ever in Brooklyn. Gleason’s bank is the largest construction lender in Los Angeles, the largest in Miami, and one of the largest in Chicago, Denver, and Seattle. . . .
Eighty percent of Ozarks’ portfolio is in real estate, and half of that is in construction and land development, which is historically the riskiest sector and has led to a disproportionate share of bank failures. The share of these loans at a typical midsize bank such as Ozarks is eight times smaller, on average. Also, unlike many of his rivals, Gleason doesn’t work with other banks to spread risk or sell off loans as securities; he’s so confident of his judgments that he loads them onto Ozarks’ own balance sheet. Since 2014 profit has jumped almost fourfold, and the return on assets is double the industry average.
(Yes, that Kushner.) So why is this a concern? Isn’t this just capitalism in action?
If only that were so. The bank relies on funds from depositors, which ultimately means taxpayers:
As rates rise, Vandervliet predicted, the spread between what Ozarks pays out to depositors and collects in interest will shrink.
But didn’t Dodd-Frank limit the ability of banks to make risky bets with taxpayer-insured funds?
Regulators will have less authority to put the brakes on that pattern after Trump signed the law easing some of the oversight measures enacted in the wake of the financial crisis—“the crippling Dodd-Frank regulations that are crushing small banks,” as he put it. Congress did away with mandatory stress-testing that forced banks with $10 billion to $100 billion in assets to evaluate how, for instance, a 40 percent drop in commercial real estate prices might affect their balance sheets.
But there’s no reason to worry, as the economy is doing great, isn’t it? Here’s the Financial Times, from 2 months after the Bloomberg article:
Even as developers have been reshaping Manhattan’s skyline with soaring residential towers, the local new-build market has been dropping like a stone.
The number of new homes sold in Manhattan in the year to September is down 39 per cent on the same period in 2017, according to new data from real estate firm Douglas Elliman. Median sale prices fell 9 per cent over the period.
“We’re in the middle of a US housing slowdown, with Manhattan’s prime market the first and most sensitive to react,” says Jonathan Miller of Miller Samuel, a local property appraiser.
The slowdown has been most pronounced among the priciest homes, many of which are to be found in the slew of new super-slim residential skyscrapers that have sprung up along Billionaires’ Row — the area to the south of Central Park, centred around West 57th Street — and in parts of Lower Manhattan. . . .
Things could yet become worse. In the past three years, nine new residential skyscrapers (many include commercial tenants, too) taller than 200m were built in Manhattan, according to the Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat. Between the beginning of this year and the end of 2020, 22 more are set to join them
This slowdown is partly driven by policy changes:
At precisely the time that buyers for these new homes are most needed, growing ownership costs of new homes will discourage buyers. The new Republican tax bill, in force since January, caps at $10,000 the state and local taxes that many Americans can offset against their federal tax bill (so-called “itemised” deductions). . . .
This is particularly galling to buyers in New York where state and local taxes are among the highest in the country, says Miller. He estimates the property tax on a new $3m Manhattan home is currently $44,000 per a year
But won’t foreign buyers come to the rescue? More policy changes . . .
Fewer international buyers are purchasing homes in the United States, a turnaround from a surge in 2017 that could affect home sellers, real estate agents, mortgage lenders and others who deal with the housing market.The drop is attributed to a number of economic factors and to noneconomic ones such as U.S. policy toward immigrants.
Remember the last time we cracked down on immigration, in 2006?
As long as lenders are aware of the slowdown, and don’t start new projects, the current loan portfolios should be manageable. But will they stop? Surely they won’t make additional bets in a Manhattan market that is already quite shaky. This is from last weekend’s New York Post:
Powerful developers just took control of properties they needed to build long-in-coming mega-projects on two different blocks between Fifth and Sixth avenues.
Gary Barnett’s Extell Development Company bought 4-story 32 W. 48th St., former home to the Plaza Arcade diamond mini-mall, for $40 million, and at the same time closed on title to several adjacent buildings an air rights to another. The deals popped up in city records Friday night.
“We now have everything we need to build,” Barnett said on Sunday. Tentative plans call for a hotel with a “few hundred keys” and stores, he said.
The purchases totaled $85 million. Extell also signed a $63.8 million mortgage spreader agreement with Bank of the Ozarks for the six adjacent properties — 30, 32, 36 and 38 W. 48th St. and 25 and 27 W. 47th St. The new project will connect West 48th Street with the 47th Street diamond block.
Once NYC developers put up their luxury condos, the property taxes are surprisingly low. Again the New York Post:
New York City’s method of assessing property values is so out of whack that the buyer of the most expensive apartment ever sold — a $100 million duplex overlooking Central Park — pays taxes as if the place were worth just $6.5 million.
With controversial tax breaks granted to the One57 condo tower, the total property tax bill for the spectacular penthouse is just $17,268, an effective rate of 0.017 percent of its sale price.
Here’s my theory of modern American capitalism. During the 20th century, the government began intervening in the economy in a major way, often with good intentions. At some point, the rich learned how to “hack” the system and loot the public. I once spoke to a business executive in the education area (I can’t be more specific) whose basic business model is to engage in what’s politely called “regulatory arbitrage”. The programs he was taking advantage of would sound very “progressive” to the average person. And indeed those property tax breaks for NYC billionaires are defended by the very left wing de Blasio administration:
“This is a serious problem that [Mayor Bill] de Blasio needs to figure out,” he added. . . .
In a prepared statement, de Blasio spokesman Wiley Norvell said: “These inequities have been built into the tax system over decades, and they won’t be solved easily or quickly.”
“Any solution would require tax-law changes in Albany, and the impact of those changes on the lives of New Yorkers would have to be taken into account,” Norvell added.
Translation: Fugetaboutit.
Then we have a medical industrial complex absorbing 17% of GDP, mostly government dollars (directly, or via tax deductions.) Many surgeons, drug companies, and medical equipment companies become quite rich off the system. Ditto for firms that supply equipment to the military. Or property developers who make vast fortunes with taxpayer money funneled through the banking system. Or Disney, with its ability to get politicians to endlessly renew copyright protections—long after they are no longer needed to spur creativity. Or sugar growers protected from imports.
I could go on and on, but you get the point. The left correctly senses that there is something seriously wrong with the modern American economy. But they misdiagnose the problem as “laissez faire capitalism.” Actually, laissez faire capitalism is the solution; the problem is state capitalism, or if you prefer, crony capitalism.
PS. Disclaimer: As before, let me emphasize that I don’t predict recessions, and have no idea how the current slowdown in NYC property will play out. Nor do I have any views on the soundness of Bank of the Ozarks, other than that it seems emblematic of a flawed policy regime. A seemingly endless supply of credit from a formerly obscure Arkansas bank to the biggest and most influential developers in New York and Miami? What could go wrong?
Commercial property booms always end at some point, and I worry that taxpayers will be left holding the bag, just as in the 1980s and 2008-12.
READER COMMENTS
Alan Goldhammer
Nov 14 2018 at 5:33pm
Wasn’t much of the 2008 problem a result of poor loan practices for residential housing? I’m not sure that there was a lot of commercial real estate that was foreclosed on. I don’t know about the derivatives market and whether some of the dumb insurance products that got AIG in trouble were linked to the commercial sector.
Benjamin Cole
Nov 14 2018 at 9:05pm
There are financial immigrants and physical immigrants that contribute to the demand for housing.
Many Manhattan real estate brokers mention Chinese capital controls for the decrease of financial immigrants to the Manhattan condo scene.
How does a physical immigrant express demand for housing? They buy or rent.
How does a financial immigrant express demand for housing? They buy a place usually a condo, but often a house in the Southern California market. The financial immigrant may buy the house only as an investment or second-home. But demand is demand.
No one knows how the number of financial immigrants compares to the number of physical immigrants. If 1/10 of 1% of Chinese buy a house in the US every year that would be 130,000 units. The US net produces about 1 million units a year. If one posits that physical immigrants play a role in the price of housing, then one must also allow that financial immigrants play a role in the price of housing.
Indeed, viewing the long-term prospects for US current account trade deficits, the outlook for financial immigration is rather large.
The IMF says large current account trade deficits result in asset bubbles in the US. I disagree with the word “bubble” but they may be onto something.
The Fed has published serious studies that nations with large current account trade deficits experience house price booms.
Obviously, underlining this whole conversation is the restriction of new supplies of housing largely due to property zoning.
Scott Sumner is probably right in his sentiment that government regulations and programs will be gamed. Property owners, developers and lenders have learned to game the property zoning system, to enhance profits and make loans less risky.
The solution is to get rid of property zoning and to go to free markets and property development.
Scott Sumner
Nov 15 2018 at 12:35am
Alan, No, most of the bank failures were due to commercial loans.
Alan Goldhammer
Nov 15 2018 at 8:05am
Scott, I don’t think one can only focus on bank failures as there were multiple failures. I know that Bill McBride at Calculated Risk tracked this type of information and I’ll need to go back and check. One would need to know what portion of CDOs and MBSs were residential and I’m not sure that type of data is readily available.
Clearly Washington Mutual and several others like them were principally home loan outfits as was Countrywide that Bank of America acquired. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae only dealt with home mortgages and had to be bailed out. Our old bank Wachovia was failing until Wells Fargo bought them but again I don’t know what portion of their loan portfolio was commercial vs residential.
With respect to Ozark, it would be interesting to know whether they have any insurance on their loan portfolio. If so, who is the counter party providing it?
Scott Sumner
Nov 15 2018 at 9:29am
I focus on banks because that’s where taxpayers are exposed. I’m less concerned with losses to private investors.
Alan Goldhammer
Nov 15 2018 at 10:14am
Yes, I understand that your focus is on banks but things are more unsettled than that. I think Adam Tooze’s new book on the financial crisis covers all of this in great deal (it’s on my Kindle but I haven’t started reading it). You also have the case where Countrywide established its own bank IndyMac which was one of the early casualties. Also begging the question is whether it was correct to turn Goldman and Morgan Stanley into “commercial” banks back in 2008.
Matthew Waters
Nov 15 2018 at 1:41pm
Alan,
I would recommend “How Big Banks Fail” by Duffie. The title is misleading because it’s really about how big broker-dealers failed.
The popular books focus on the poorly underwritten non-Agency MBS. But they gloss over how the banks actually failed and why the failures caused 10% unemployment. 10% unemployment followed from the natural rate going below zero and lack of effective Fed policy at zero.
The natural rates went below zero because of:
1. Run on Money Market funds and Commercial Paper (the “shadow banking system”)
2. Prime broker rehypothecation of pledged assets. Hedge fund assets pledged to a margin account at, say, Lehman could be repledged. Lehman, Morgan and Goldman moved the assets to London subsidiaries to get around Fed limits on repledging assets.
The poor underwriting of non-Agency MBS may have “caused” the bank run, but it was somewhat tangential. Lehman creditors now expect to receive over 100 cents on the dollar, but it will take over 10 years.
The issue was really liquidity rather than solvency. Investment banks earned large returns on their leverage by borrowing short and lending long. That’s just not sustainable though without the backstops for regulated banks.
Alan Goldhammer
Nov 15 2018 at 7:57am
Sebastian Mallaby has an interesting column in the Washington Post today. Though it ostensibly is about the funny business Sears is doing about shuffling debt around, Mallaby uses this example to show how banks could be vulnerable in the Credit Default Swap arena.
Off topic but important is the impact of the Northern California fire on PG&E, who if at fault could easily be bankrupt. Insurance will not cover all the claims against the company and a bail out is going to be costly with consumers potentially on the hook.
Thaomas
Nov 15 2018 at 11:47am
So long as the Fed is committed to keeping NGDG growing at 6% pa 🙂 and the shareholders of OZK are cleaned out when and if it goes bust, we do not need to worry much about FDIC losses on their current account deposits.
I agree it is a shame that the “Tax Cuts for the Rich and Deficits Act of 2107” did not substitute partial tax credits for a capped home interest deduction in its single-minded effort to make the tax system more progressive.
Benjamin Cole
Nov 15 2018 at 11:10pm
“Alan, No, most of the bank failures were due to commercial loans.” –Scott Sumner
Does this mean loans on commercial property? Or straight-ahead business loans, such as on receivables, or new plant and equipment, or to finance a merger? Commercial paper?
In fact, there was a parallel “bust’ in commercial property values alongside the better-known (and endlessly debated) residential real estate bust.
BTW, about 50% of US commercial bank loans are on real estate. I think it may be higher, but I think some bank loans are counted as “business loans” but the collateral is real estate. SBA loans, for example, require collateral. What is collateral? Usually real estate.