
In my previous post, I took on the common claim that America is losing manufacturing jobs.
Not only are jobs growing, but job growth has outpaced population growth—i.e. the increase in the number of people available to fill those jobs—and this has been the case for most of the last four decades.
Is the fact that more people are working good news for the economy? As is often the case in economics, it depends. If real wages are rising and people want to work more in order to improve their standard of living, then sure, let’s celebrate the growth in productivity, output, and earnings. If wages are stagnant and some people would rather pursue non-labor vocations, but feel the need to earn a paycheck in order to keep up with the cost of living, then job growth would be at best a mixed bag.
At any rate, broadly speaking there are plenty of jobs out there to go around. As I like to remind my students, the most important skill required to get and keep a good job is something I probably can’t teach them in the classroom: a strong work ethic and a willingness to learn. If you know how to show up, listen, learn, apply yourself, and contribute to a production process, you’re not only going to be okay, you’re going to climb a ladder of employment success and growing wages as you gain skills and experience.
Yet despite the ever upward-trending job numbers, demagogues will contend that we’ve replaced good, high-paying manufacturing jobs with lousy service sector jobs. The service sector, broadly defined, has seen basically all of US employment growth, accounting for 90% of new jobs created since our 1979 benchmark, as shown in Figure 4. But beware making hasty assumptions about a sector that employs nearly 110 million people. When we compare earnings across different sectors of the economy, we see that a majority of the new service sector jobs pay better than manufacturing jobs, and most service sector jobs are safer and more pleasant than the factory jobs they’ve replaced.
Table 1 presents Bureau of Labor Statistics data on the 15 largest sectors and sub-sectors of the US economy, which together capture essentially all of the total net increase in payroll employment for the post-peak manufacturing jobs era (1979 to 2025). This might come as a surprise to the anti-globalization crowd: while we lost 7 million manufacturing jobs, and some mining, logging and utilities jobs, we’ve seen a net increase of nearly 69 million total jobs. Of these net new jobs, more than half of them (53.5%) feature average hourly earnings greater than current average hourly manufacturing earnings. Another 20% of new jobs have average hourly earnings within 10% of current manufacturing jobs. In other words, most of the 69 million new jobs pay better or close to the same wages than those “good” manufacturing jobs. So, we lost 7 million good jobs, only to gain about 37 million better-paying jobs, about 14 million close-paying jobs, and about 18 million lower-paying jobs (about 26% of net new jobs pay substantially less than manufacturing).
We’ve established that, despite a major decrease in employment in the manufacturing sector, we’ve gained many more jobs than we’ve lost in the past 45 years, and that most of these new jobs pay better. Economic changes, while painful in the short run, have brought gains in output and employment not only for the US, but for the rest of the world as well. Overall, this is good news for the US and world economies.
But even if we can get the protectionists to acknowledge that high-paying service sector jobs have more than replaced lost factory jobs, they’re still likely to whine that, “we don’t make things here anymore.” This complaint goes along with laments about the “deindustrialization” of America, implying that industrialization is over simply because the number of one particular kind of industrial job type (factory workers) is declining. This oft-heard refrain is patently false. We don’t make certain things, such as garments, toys or electronics, because global free trade and technological advances tend to shift America’s output into those industries in which our comparative advantage is greatest. But Americans do indeed make things, quite valuable things. This is nowhere more simply and obviously demonstrated than in the Industrial Production Index—a measure of the total US manufacturing output. As Figure 5 shows, after the expected steep decline following the Great Recession of 2008-2009, US manufacturing gradually recovered before getting walloped again during and after the Covid shutdowns. Still, this index, which consists mainly of manufacturing, has now recovered pre-Covid highs, and overall it’s grown by almost exactly 100% since the 1979 peak in manufacturing employment.
From an economic perspective, nothing could be better news. US manufacturing creates 100% more value with 35% fewer workers. Creating more value with fewer workers means we’re more efficient than ever, more productive than ever. These awesome productivity gains have many sources, especially in the form of technological advances in areas like software, robotics, and now the emergence of AI as the next great source of creative destruction. Globalization and outsourcing have also played a role, as they allow American workers a greater degree of specialization in those sectors where our productivity edge is largest. Regardless of the relative importance of technology vs. outsourcing in driving these changes, the broader point still stands: the US economy is both more productive and has more job opportunities than ever before.
Economists know that it’s at best useless and at worst scurrilous to talk of other countries “beating us” at trade, or of other countries having “unfair” advantages. I love to play football, but let’s face it: Jaylen Hurts is a better player than I (and 99.999% of the population). It’s not “unfair,” it just is. But it’s okay—I’m better at economics and writing than probably 98% of the population. So we each find our niche—he’ll throw touchdown passes and entertain millions, I’ll give lectures and write articles and teach hundreds about specialization, comparative advantage, and the always-present gains from trade. The entire economic system will have more of everything if each of us focuses on his or her comparative advantage and stops whining about things being unfair. As I like to instruct my students, “fairness” is a word not found in the economics lexicon, but we do like to use words like “wealth,” “growth,” and “prosperity.” The first lesson of market economics is that trade, on the basis of specialization, is a massively positive sum game. This is true for individuals, and it remains true when we aggregate the gains at a national scale. The thing is, since nobody can know in advance or from above what everyone else’s most productive specialization might be, we need a decentralized market process that gives us information and incentives, through price signals, that help each of us find our best opportunities and fit into the broader system in a more productive, more wealth-enhancing way. One of the main tasks for economists, especially we who teach the subject, is to explain not only how this system works, but to impress upon our students that the free market—unfettered by arbitrary and restrictive policies like tariffs—is the only way we can hope to achieve sustained gains from the division of labor.
They didn’t take “our” jobs. As long as we have even a semi-functional market economy, there will always be jobs to do. The real issue today is not creating jobs, but creating workers—people who are ready, willing, and able to show up, commit, and learn. So let’s stop the whining about “unfair” trade practices and the hectoring of other countries—especially our friends and allies—for “stealing” our jobs or “taking advantage of us” through trade that is necessarily mutually beneficial. Let’s instead count our blessings and make the best of a good situation. Teach people to have a good work ethic, and the rest will take care of itself.
Tyler Watts is a professor of economics and management at Ferris State University.
READER COMMENTS
Jon Murphy
May 13 2025 at 1:57pm
Good stuff. One thing I’d add is the story is even better than you say here. The jobs being lost are low-productivity, low-paying jobs. According to the BLS, those manufacturing jobs pay about $17/hr, roughly equal to Walmart Cashier jobs.
Warren Platts
May 15 2025 at 1:54pm
The question is: What happened to 7 million displaced industrial workers? According to the theory of comparative advantage, they would shift to more productive sectors. Did they? Probably not. It’s doubtful that they moved into Finance or Information or Professional Services. (btw the payroll increase of 15 million in Table 1 has got to be a typo because according to the BLS there’s only 10 million employees in Professional services as of 2024; an increase of 5 million would be believable.)
Also, why report average hourly wages instead of median hourly wages? Average wages are distorted by long tails at the high side, hiding the fact that the majority of workers are making less than the average wage.
In any case, wages are not the proper comparison if we’re talking macroeconomics. We should be looking at labor productivity. Thus I took the liberty of calculating the labor productivity of the sectors listed by Professor Watts, defined as GDP/industry (source: BEA) divided by employment/industry (source: BLS) for 2023. Here is the data in comma separated (.csv) format that can be uploaded into a spreadsheet if the reader wants to:
Industry,Employment,GDP (MMM),Productivity
Manufacturing,”12,614,000″,”$2,915.7″,”$231,148″
Mining/Oil,”575,000″,$428.3,”$744,870″
Utilities,”569,000″,$430.2,”$756,063″
Info Services,”2,833,000″,”$1,516.9″,”$535,439″
Real Estate,”2,296,000″,”$3,889.5″,”$1,694,033″
Wholesale,”5,924,000″,”$1,670.8″,”$282,039″
Other Service,”6,160,000″,$603.3,”$97,938″
Construction,”7,899,000″,”$1,262.7″,”$159,856″
Transpo & Warehouse,”6,296,000″,$945.2,”$150,127″
Finance,”6,578,000″,”$2,052.0″,”$311,949″
Retail,”13,668,000″,”$1,817.8″,”$132,997″
Accom&FoodServ,”11,378,000″,$931.7,”$81,886″
Government,”21,157,000″,”$3,171.0″,”$149,879″
Professional Serv,”10,412,000″,”$3,687.0″,”$354,111″
Education ,”3,537,000″,$322.0,”$91,038″
Health,”19,758,000″,”$2,100.2″,”$106,296″
There are some surprising things here. Real estate is by far the most productive sector with each worker apparently account for $1.7 million in GDP. That figure must include a boatload of imputed rent, so we can disregard that.
Manufacturing productivity was $231K GDP/worker. If we fold in the weighted average productivity of mining/oil and utilities, average productivity is $274K. Excluding real estate and wholesale (that is virtually the same as the industrial sector at $282K), the only sectors substantially more productive were Information Services, Financial Services, and Professional services. Their combined GDP was $7.2 trillion compared to combined industrial (mfg, mines, util) GDP of $3.8 trillion.
Many of the sectors that Professor Watts lists as higher paying than manufacturing are actually far less productive. For example, Construction productivity was $160K; Government $150K; Education $91K; Health $106K.
Now, one could look at the GDP data and say, “See! The white collar sector has twice the GDP of the industrial sector. We should stick to our comparative advantage!” However, the question in economics is never what is. The question is what it otherwise could be. We ran a $1.2 trillion goods trade deficit in 2024. Thus conservatively assuming $231K GDP/worker for manufacturing workers, then to closing that gap would create 5.2 million new manufacturing jobs. Taking into account the multiplier effect, probably at least another 5 million new jobs would be created. Industrial GDP would increase to at least $5 trillion, probably more.
Kevin Corcoran
May 15 2025 at 3:52pm
This…just isn’t true, by a mile. Nothing in the theory of comparative advantage says that any given worker who loses a job to trade (or to technological improvement, or any of the other forces that drive economic progress) will therefore shift to a higher paying job, let along that all such workers will. You would absolutely flunk an Econ 101 course with a claim like that.
Comparative advantage, or technological progress, or economic growth more generally, produce a Kaldor-Hicks style improvement – there are losses and gains among different workers and companies, but overall the gains are larger than the losses. This is very different from being a Pareto improvement, where there are only gains and no losses for anyone. Taking as though comparative advantage says the gains from trade are Pareto improvements rather than Kaldor-Hicks is just making an elementary error.
Kevin Corcoran
May 15 2025 at 4:21pm
*Talking as though. Not *taking as though. Ugh.
Kevin Corcoran
May 15 2025 at 7:00pm
Again, this is just an embarrassingly elementary mistake and completely misses the whole idea of comparative advantage. Comparative advantage is not about what domestic sector produces more as measured by GDP. It can easily be the case that for a given country that Sector A produces twice as much output as Sector B as measured by GDP, and that the Sector B is where the country holds a comparative advantage. Talking about comparative advantage in international trade as though it’s related to relative levels of domestic production is the kind of comment that is so confused it’s not even wrong.
Warren Platts
May 16 2025 at 3:51am
Kevin, I would not have flunked your Econ 101 exam because I explicitly said that factory workers displaced because of trade do not generally shift into more productive sectors. However, I have seen people say that going all the way back to Ricardo himself. Remember? The English wine makers shifted to making cloth and the Portuguese cloth makers shifted to wine making, thus improving their respectively productivity?
And I agree that the fact that a given domestic industry is relatively big is not necessarily evidence that a country holds a comparative advantage in international trade in that sector. Nonetheless, I think I am on safe ground saying that a necessary condition for holding a comparative advantage is that that sector should be a net exporter. I should have been more clear: the U.S. runs a services trade surplus in sectors like information, finance, and professional services — and in accommodation, leisure, educational, and medical tourism services. Presumably, that’s because we hold a comparative advantage in those sectors.
What I have not seen is a proper explanation of how exactly did displacing millions of factory workers pave the way for the rather substantial services trade surplus? Was it really necessary to hollow out the industrial Midwest in order for Wall Street, Seattle, and Silicon Valley to thrive? Because I don’t see a necessary connection.
As for Kaldor-Hicks, there are a number of things to keep in mind here, number one being whether it’s actually the case that “overall the gains are larger than the losses.” How do we know that? And how do we measure that? Is there a mathematical theorem that proves that free trade must be Kaldor-Hicks improving? No there is not. In fact, there is a mathematical theorem that says that’s not necessarily the case (cf. Samuelson’s last paper). Certainly one measure that’s important is real GDP growth rates. Yet post-NAFTA real GDP growth rates averaged 2.5%/year whereas pre-NAFTA growth rates were 3.5%/year (p=0.90).
Nor have I seen a persuasive argument that the massive, chronic trade deficit is not causing a headwind to economic growth. On the face of it, the trade deficit looks like a net export of aggregate demand. And since labor is like any other commodity, if demand slackens while supply stays the same, the quantity supplied will decline along with the price. This translates into increased unemployment and lower wages.
Another data point is the European Union. The EU was supposed to transform the whole of Europe into a United States-sized free market zone. That should have caused a burst of economic growth, yet EU growth has been basically flat since 2010.
So it is not clear at all that the post-NAFTA free trade era has been Kaldor-Hicks improving. If we go by GDP growth, apparently, overall the losses are larger than the gains. There’s probably a fancy name for that. Moreover, even in such a situation, there will be winners who make out like bandits. In this case, who would those people be? Obviously, the elite class. Not only do they get a consumer surplus, they also get increased profits because of lower labor costs. Therefore, they have zero incentive to upend the status quo, even though there is no Kaldor-Hicks improvement. We are witnessing Buchanan’s public choice theory in action in real time.
Unfortunately for the working class, the increased consumer surplus does not outweigh the loss of income, and since 70% of U.S. citizens do not own stocks, they do not directly benefit from the increase in the share of the national income that flows to owners.
Bottom line: I actually agree with Professor Watts. No, “they” didn’t take our jobs. Rather, what happened is our own elite class gave away our jobs….
Kevin Corcoran
May 16 2025 at 10:25am
Well, no, this is what you said:
And it’s just flat out false to say that the theory of comparative advantage says that displaced industrial workers would shift to more productive sectors. The mix of labor overall would shift toward more productive sectors, but nothing in the theory of comparative advantage says or requires that the shift will consist of those industrial laborers in particular.
Have some people ever said that? I’m sure some have – you can find people saying any crazy thing you want, if you scour the internet long enough. However, it’s just flat out false to say Ricardo said that. Here’s what Ricardo actually said:
Ricardo talks only about the amount of men you’d need laboring to produce various outputs in various countries. At no point does he say anything that remotely implies that the specific workers making wine (or cloth) with transition to making cloth (or wine).
You introduced a number of new elementary errors in your additional comments – if I have time I may return to address those as well later, if I have the extra time!
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