
Despite Ronald Coase’s many contributions to economics, he is most famous for the co-called Coase Theorem, which is just one small part of his paper The Problem of Social Cost. Simply put, in a world of sufficiently low transaction costs, property rights, institutions, and the law don’t matter. If rights are assigned randomly, the result will always tend toward an efficient outcome: deterrence of a problem will fall upon whoever is the low-cost avoider. When transaction costs are high, however, then the assignment of rights absolutely does matter. Conflicts arise because of the interaction between two (or more) parties and thus, even if one party is “wrong,” they may not be the best to assign the duty to reform. As Coase himself explains:
The conclusions to which this kind of analysis seems to have led most economists is [sic] that it would be desirable to make the owner of the factory liable for the damage caused to those injured by the smoke, or alternatively, to place a tax on the factory owner varying with the amount of smoke produced and equivalent in money terms to the damage it would cause, or finally, to exclude the factory from residential districts (and presumably from other areas in which the emission of smoke would have harmful effects on others). It is my contention that the suggested courses of action are inappropriate, in that they lead to results which are not necessarily, or even usually, desirable.
Judges seem to be aware of the fact that assignment of rights matters significantly in a high transaction cost environment, at least in a de facto sense. Whenever a conflict arises between two parties, judges often push for a settlement: let the parties hash out among themselves what a desirable solution is. Judges seem to little want to be placed in a position where they must force a decision. (Of course, one could say that judges just want to reduce their workload as much as possible, and that is why they push for settlement. That’s likely the primary reason; judges are overworked. But the point remains: the judges are acting as if they value economic efficiency).
However, sometimes transaction costs (which include negotiation costs) do not allow for a settlement to come easily. One major way is that both parties, in a dispute, may be quite upset with one another. As George Mason University professor John Schuler and I pointed out in our 2019 Econlib article Have Coase – Will Travel,* anger, sadness, disappointment, etc., all make negotiation difficult; they are, indeed, transaction costs. Judges have limited means to reduce these transaction costs.
One method that has arisen over the past few decades to reduce transaction costs is mediation. Mediation is a private process, conducted under the shadow of law, to try and resolve conflict. Judges may suggest mediation or the process may be voluntarily sought by the parties. Either way, mediators seek to create a settlement by facilitating negotiation with both parties.
Mediators differ from judges insofar as they are not necessarily legal experts. They have no authority to bind parties. They have no authority to impose sanctions or outcomes. Further, they are active in the negotiation process: they can talk to the parties, try to convey the feelings of others, encourage parties to get creative in problem-solving, etc. In a sense, they are a therapist as much as anything.
The mediation process has arisen as a means to reduce transaction costs and reach mutually beneficial solutions. In that sense, they are very Coaseian. Just like other middlemen, they reduce transaction costs and seek to make the legal process more efficient.
Many common law scholars, from Richard Posner to modern times, argue that one of the virtues of the common law is that it tends toward economic efficiency. The emergence of mediation as a means to reduce negotiation-related transaction costs is additional evidence of that point.
*For a discussion on how to use this in the classroom, see Have Coase – Will Travel: New Ways to Teach Coase Using Old Media by Jon Murphy, John Schuler, and Jadrian Wooten (2020). Journal of Private Enterprise 25 (4), 71-86.
READER COMMENTS
Craig
Jul 3 2025 at 10:39am
“However, sometimes transaction costs (which include negotiation costs) do not allow for a settlement to come easily.”
Indeed, NJ courts change the costs to make settling an easier decision. After discovery cases are scheduled for an arbitration, which is really a misnamed non-binding mediation (but procedurally there is an earlier mediation!), but the arbitrator will come up with a number at which neither party needs to accept that number but if the non accepting party does NOT do as well at trial that party is responsible for the other party’s attorney costs subsequent to not accepting the arbitrator’s decision. Parties can also send the other party an ‘Offer of Judgment’ which carries similar consequences.
Robert EV
Jul 3 2025 at 6:10pm
This sparked a tangent line of thought:
Working with others to settle a grievance is also a transaction cost – a cost that is higher to some (especially those without habituation and training). This may be, in part, why murder is still resorted to in grievance resolution. As, despite the harsh penalties meant to reduce this form of grievance resolution, the murderer still sees it as the lowest cost option.
As tort ‘reform’ and limited liability raise transaction costs to settle a grievance by way of limiting possible gains, they would tend to increase the murder rate. OTOH by limiting the possible losses they also disincentivize a strong defense on the part of the tortfeasor, which would tend to lower the murder rate.
Where this all balances out, I don’t know. But I wonder if we’ve yet hit the murderous minimum.
Thomas L Hutcheson
Jul 3 2025 at 8:33pm
“It is my contention that the suggested courses of action are inappropriate, in that they lead to results which are not necessarily, or even usually, desirable.”
An opinion I have heard repeated many times but without argument.
Jon Murphy
Jul 4 2025 at 8:17am
Well, The Problem of Social Cost would be a good place to start to find the argument. The quote appears in the opening paragraph. The remaining 44 pages of the article develop the argument. I suggest starting there.
You’ll also find the argument in almost any book on property rights or Law & Economics. Another good place would be Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen’s Law & Economics (free online here). Pages 81-87 give the argument in a straightforward manner. The rest of the chapter develops it.
Mactoul
Jul 4 2025 at 1:19am
Isn’t the concept of economic efficiency in a bit of tension with the idea that one enters into a transaction to satisfy one’s subjective preferences?
What if an economically efficient solution subjectively very unsatisfying to a party? Such as might be occurring in eminent domain situations.
Jon Murphy
Jul 4 2025 at 7:21am
Then, by definition, it’s not economically efficient.
Jon Murphy
Jul 4 2025 at 8:08am
As I reread, I think I need a little more information. What do you mean by “very unsatisfactory”? Do you mean in absolute terms (this transaction the person is unhappy with) or in net terms (this person’s dissatisfaction is not compensated by something else that at least offsets, if not exceeds, the dissatisfaction)?
Mactoul
Jul 5 2025 at 11:54pm
In eminent domain situation, what if the property holder is unwilling to sell at all but the government wants to acquire?
Jon Murphy
Jul 6 2025 at 7:46am
As long as the gains to one party (in your case, government or the public) are less then the costs to the other party (in your case, the property owner), then it is economically inefficient.
Knut P. Heen
Jul 4 2025 at 6:07am
Counting to ten is not a significant transaction cost. Neither is counting to 1000.
Feelings are merely attempts to extract more from the deal. People tend to sweeten the deal when the counterparty seems disappointed. It is therefore more appropriate to view feelings as counter offers.
Jon Murphy
Jul 4 2025 at 7:22am
I’m not sure I understand your point.
Knut P. Heen
Jul 8 2025 at 10:42am
Transaction costs are generally low enough for the Coase Theorem to hold unless we are in a public good context, but economic efficiency is not the prime goal of the law. Justice and fairness is more important.
Consider legalized rape and no transaction costs. Without transaction costs, rape can be avoided by the potential victim proposing money to the potential perpetrator to go away. The potential perpetrator can then take the money and go to a prostitute instead. This is economically efficient. The rape does not occur and the potential perpetrator gets what he wants. Yet, we don’t want to live in such a society because it is highly unfair to the victim who has to pay and therefore forgo what she wants. We have therefore banned it.
Even with no transaction costs, justice will make most of us pick one law over the other. Moreover, notice that moving from one law to the other is not a Pareto improvement here. It simply transfers money from one party to the other. Hence, we need to invoke some kind of fairness criterium to choose the preferred law.
Suppose transaction costs were much lower under legalized rape (no prisons, no court, no police, etc.). Would we choose it? No, I think most people would say that we are willing to pay for justice.
Robert EV
Jul 11 2025 at 9:43pm
I agree with what you say here, but in your opening comment feelings can behave counterintuitively in a Veblen/Giffen manner. I have become more angry when a person has tried to soothe my feelings. I have seen others become more angry when another seeks to “sweeten the deal” on a matter that the first person thinks should not be a monetary transaction.
Not all boundary violations are negotiable or forgivable. Though I guess this is a matter of the Overton window, or maybe just a matter of changing the transaction type from monetary to some sort of barter or behavior based trade.
I presume in this alternate world that prostitutes have protectors, or else why would the rapist pay them if non-compensated rape is legal? So then wouldn’t all women have protectors that they pay to both not rape them and to protect them from other rapists? Kinda sorta like female-as-male property that is in old laws.