Public choice theory and its methodological-individualist foundations can be illustrated with a currently hot question: Will President Trump order an attack on Iranian military assets?

It is, of course, not “the American people” who will decide; nobody has had lunch with him or her. (On this point, see my Independent Review article “The Impossibility of Populism.”) Although Mr. Trump wields extraordinary power, he will be influenced by his entourage, that is, mainly courtiers, minions, and cronies around him, and some individuals in his party’s remaining centers of influence. He will, if only intuitively, take into account the deep divisions on war issues within his voters’ base, as well as his pacifist or isolationist electoral promises. But his choice will still depend on how he analyzes or “feels” the situation. He may try or claim to protect the “US interest,” but such a thing does not exist since the 260 million American adults have diverse preferences and interests that cannot be arithmetically added up. Mr. Trump would not know how to think in terms of some rule-based common interest as conceptualized by constitutional political economy (an offshoot of public choice theory). The “US interest” is what he defines or conceives or imagines as such.

Like on other topics—the results of the 2020 election, TikTok, presidential pardons, Haitians eating American pets, the compromission of the Department of Justice, the further militarization of the police, the decentralization of American federalism, the effect of tariffs, the growth of the public debt, the well-being and opportunities of ordinary people, and so on and so forth—Mr. Trump’s decision will be influenced by his own interests as he sees them.

This does not imply that another strongman—perhaps a saint or wise man cognizant of the considerations above—could not be guided by other motivations. For example, he (or she, of course) could incorporate in his decisions a true concern for his fellow humans and for the future of liberty and a free society, but it would still be his conception of such concerns. This being said, prudence and analytical rigor strongly suggest that we assume rulers typically follow their personal interests.

Note also that the considerations above apply whether one believes or not that, in the present case, destroying the Iranian state’s capacity to acquire nuclear weapons is justified.

All these considerations confirm how dangerous it is to leave important state decisions largely in the hands of one individual, even if he is a genius anointed by 49.8% of American voters. The classical liberal and libertarian doctrine, developed over the last three or four centuries, defends the necessity of constraining and dividing state power.

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One scenario for the Fordow enrichment site in Iran