In our more or less free societies, we regularly see confirmations of an idea well defended by Friedrich Hayek and by Anthony de Jasay. The idea is that remunerations determined by politics, that is, by coercive authorities under the threat of punishment, are not only less efficient but also more conflictual than if determined only by impersonal markets.
In a recent example, the International Longshoremen Association (ILA), a government-protected union (as they all are by labor laws and government bureaus), called a strike. Its leader, Harold Daggett, haughtily threatened 200 million consumers. Of the many employers of his members (container carriers and terminal operators), he said: “We’re going to show these greedy bastards you can’t survive without us!” On their side, the greedy longshoremen are not proletarians: they earn between nearly $100,000 to more than $250,000 a year, much above the average salary in the US (about $60,000). In 2020, 665 dockworkers at the Port of New York and New Jersey were in the more-than-$250,000 category. As a union apparatchik, Daggett himself earns over $900,000 a year; his son, who works for the same unions, earns more than $700,000. ILA temporarily settled the strike for a more than 60% wage increase but still wants to stop automation. This is in a context where the most productive port in America (Charleston) is ranked 53rd in the world. (See “A Ports Strike Shows the Stranglehold One Union Has on Trade,” The Economist, October 2, 2024; “A Dockworkers Walkout Would Close Ports From Maine to Texas and Slam the U.S. Economy,” Wall Street Journal, September 30, 2024; and “The Profane 78-Year-Old Leading the Dockworkers Strike,” Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2024).
Similar phenomena can be observed in all countries where governments or their trade-union proxies exert a direct influence on wages. It extends to public sector unions, who have their hands directly in the public treasury. Consider unions representing employees of the London Underground, the subway system run by a local government body in the UK capital. The secretary general of one of the unions said that the pay offer to its members fell “short of what [they] deserve” (“London Underground Workers to Strike Over Pay,” Financial Times, October 16, 2024). In France, employees of the government’s public transport organizations regularly go on strike for more money and benefits; the strikes are respectfully called “social movements” (mouvements sociaux).
An individual naturally thinks that his value “to society” is not well enough recognized by his fellow humans and especially by his fellow citizens. The phenomenon is analogous to how an individual not familiar with economics thinks the prices he pays for what he buys are too high while the price he receives for his labor services is too low. The complaint takes many forms: I am not fairly remunerated according to my needs, my talents, or what I deserve according to this or that criterion; I don’t get the respect owed to me. Before its members rejected the latest offer from Boeing, which is in deep financial trouble and is cutting 10% of its workforce, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers declared (“Boeing Workers to Vote on Ending Strike in Critical Week for Plane Maker,” Financial Times, October 20, 2024; also “Boeing Factory Workers Reject Latest Contract Offer,” October 24, 2024):
Workers will ultimately decide if this specific proposal is sufficient in meeting their very legitimate needs and goal of achieving respect and fairness at Boeing.
In a free society, with wages and other benefits determined on markets, this temptation is countered by the fact that the determination is not made by an organization. An employee’s bosses may appear to make it, but it is an illusion: the employee is free to move to another employer or to become self-employed; if he doesn’t, it is because he suspects he could not gain more (at constant risk). There is no identifiable authority that underestimates his value. Remuneration is impersonally determined.
This mechanism does not work when politics determines remuneration. An organization—either a democratic assembly or some strongman—is able to determine by law or diktat the value of your services. The process is typically called “social justice” according to some criteria or other. When it supports richer individuals, the process is called “industrial policy” or something similar. Because everybody thinks he deserves more, the game consists in staking your claims more forcefully to have them politically enforced. The individuals who win are those who are better organized and more politically powerful. In the meantime, the game has changed from impersonal to personal, from voluntary exchange to government commands, from a positive-sum game to zero-sum and eventually negative-sum.
Perhaps one can persuade oneself that the market is more efficient and just than politics with the following thought experiment. Imagine a perfectly democratic system whereby remunerated occupations would be divided into a certain number of categories and an online referendum would be held regularly (every quinquennium or every year or every month or every day) to determine the remuneration to prevail in each category. Would you prefer this system to free agreements on markets?
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The quest for social justice

READER COMMENTS
Roger McKinney
Oct 29 2024 at 11:25am
Theologians in the early church baptized Aristotle’s nonsense about just prices, including wages. But in the 16th century, the theologians at the tip university, the University of Salamanca, determined that a just price or wage can only be found in a free market. Coercion to determine wages is immoral. They also opposed a minimum wage.
Student
Oct 29 2024 at 12:40pm
This is not quite correct. Aristotle’s aim was not to define a “just price” but rather he was concerned with morality as it applied to exchange. He though it was important to ensure that exchanges were proportionate and equitable.
For example, in his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle introduces commutative and distributive justice. Distributive justice concerns how goods are distributed in society while commutative justice focused on balancing exchanges.
He believed that fair exchanges were essential for social harmony and that people should engage in transactions that leave both parties satisfied, maintaining balance rather than exploitation. His approach to fairness meant that goods or services should not have wildly differing values within an exchange; instead, each good or service should “equalize” the relationship between buyer and seller, creating a sense of proportional justice.
Consider… Aristotle used a mathematical analogy: he suggested that exchanges should follow a proportional relationship. For instance, if a builder provides a house to a shoemaker, the value of that house should correspond to the number of shoes that would “equalize” the exchange. This way, each party feels they’ve received fair compensation. This concept was further developed in his example of how different professions could relate to one another through trade, creating a web of balance in the marketplace.
From Ambrose/Augustine through Isidore and up to Aquinas tthey didn’t articulate a systematic theory of just price as Aquinas would, but their teachings shaped the moral landscape. Their writings stressed that Christian ethics demanded fairness, honesty, and charity in economic transactions, opposing usury and condemning exploitation, especially of the poor. This foundational emphasis on morality in exchange deeply influenced the Scholastic thinkers of the 12th and 13th centuries, particularly in the development of a more formalized theory of just price within the framework of canon law and economic thought.
Aquinas attempted to develop a theory of prices but failed. He essentially posited what is basically the labor theory of value. He also didnt seem to get the concept of opportunity cost. This lead him to draw incorrect conclusions.
The discussion of usury is actually quite interesting in the Summa (for example question 78 in the second part of the second part).
“I answer that, To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself, because this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads to inequality which is contrary to justice. In order to make this evident, we must observe that there are certain things the use of which consists in their consumption: thus we consume wine when we use it for drink and we consume wheat when we use it for food. Wherefore in such like things the use of the thing must not be reckoned apart from the thing itself, and whoever is granted the use of the thing, is granted the thing itself and for this reason, to lend things of this kin is to transfer the ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted to sell wine separately from the use of the wine, he would be selling the same thing twice, or he would be selling what does not exist, wherefore he would evidently commit a sin of injustice. On like manner he commits an injustice who lends wine or wheat, and asks for double payment, viz. one, the return of the thing in equal measure, the other, the price of the use, which is called usury.
On the other hand, there are things the use of which does not consist in their consumption: thus to use a house is to dwell in it, not to destroy it. Wherefore in such things both may be granted: for instance, one man may hand over to another the ownership of his house while reserving to himself the use of it for a time, or vice versa, he may grant the use of the house, while retaining the ownership. For this reason a man may lawfully make a charge for the use of his house, and, besides this, revendicate the house from the person to whom he has granted its use, as happens in renting and letting a house.
Now money, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5; Polit. i, 3) was invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange: and consequently the proper and principal use of money is its consumption or alienation whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its very nature unlawful to take payment for the use of money lent, which payment is known as usury: and just as a man is bound to restore other ill-gotten goods, so is he bound to restore the money which he has taken in usury.”
Objection 5 is quite interesting as it seems to anticipate opportunity cost:
“Objection 5. Further, it does not seem to be in itself sinful to accept a price for doing what one is not bound to do. But one who has money is not bound in every case to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is lawful for him sometimes to accept a price for lending it.”
His reply to the objections shows he didnt consider opportunity cost nor borrowing for the sake of profit.
“Reply to Objection 5. He that is not bound to lend, may accept repayment for what he has done, but he must not exact more. Now he is repaid according to equality of justice if he is repaid as much as he lent. Wherefore if he exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has no other use but the consumption of its substance, he exacts a price of something non-existent: and so his exaction is unjust.”
What the Salamanca school and the second scholastics did was develop the field of economics in order to better understand exchange and prices. They then applied Scholastic morality to a more developed field of economics and concluded that voluntary exchange in a free market results in morally just prices.
Roger McKinney
Oct 29 2024 at 7:42pm
Theologians called it the search for a just price, which is a moral question.
Aristotle’s distributive justice was not about distribution of goods. He never cared about that. Church fathers redefined it as distribution of goods. Aristotle meant by it the distribution of honor according to one’s status of birth.
Aristotle’s notion of prices was that no one should profit in a market exchange. And the honor of a thing should determine its price. Things had intrinsic value.
By abandoning Aristotle’s nonsense and investigating markets, the Salamancan theologians invented capitalism and launched the hockey stick graph of per capita GDP.
Pierre Lemieux
Oct 30 2024 at 12:38pm
Roger: According to economic historians, the “hockey stick” did not start until the 19th or perhaps 19th century; see the graph on my short Regulation piece “Why the Great Enrichment Stated in the West.” Of course, something in the 16th and 17th centuries probably had a preparatory influence as the High Middle Ages had; on the last point, see “The Middle Ages’ Contribution to Liberty,” my review of review of Salter and Young’s The Medieval Constitution of Liberty.
Roger McKinney
Oct 30 2024 at 5:07pm
That’s true because they leave out the Dutch Republic, which began its great enrichment in the early 17th century. See The First Modern Economy by Jan de Vries..
Roger McKinney
Oct 30 2024 at 5:12pm
De Vries wrote that the Industrial Revolution began in the Dutch Republic. And Angus Maddison wrote that the Dutch were the first nation in history to establish real property rights.
Roger McKinney
Oct 30 2024 at 5:13pm
Finally, Adam Smith wrote that the Dutch had most fully implemented the system of natural liberty.
Pierre Lemieux
Oct 30 2024 at 9:47pm
Roger: The Low Countries are indeed the close competitor of the UK for the start of the industrial revolution. However, if I remember correctly from the Maddison data, the UK was still first. It may be true that the Low Countries were the richest in the 16th and 17th century. They were for a while at the forefront of the development of the capital market. In my Regulation linked to above, I write:
Roger McKinney
Oct 31 2024 at 9:47am
Good points! Peter de la Court, writing in the 17th century credited their wealth to manufacturing.
Roger McKinney
Oct 29 2024 at 7:47pm
Here is Aristotle’s view of distributive justice:
The basic principle of distributive justice is to treat equals equally and unequals unequally.
Distributive justice is concerned with the distribution of benefits and burdens, such as political power, offices, honors, and goods.
From Google’s AI
John Smith
Oct 29 2024 at 2:08pm
I am stating my election forecast in writing here on 30 October 2024, ahead of the election itself on 05 November 2024.
I forecast that Trump wins the election, with 296 electoral votes and hence a margin of victory of 54 votes.
For my margin of error, I forecast that the upper limits as a Trump victory with no more than 317 electoral votes and hence a margin of victory of 96 votes.
For my margin of error, I forecast the lower limits as a Harris victory with 270 electoral votes an hence a margin of victory of 2 votes.
The above prediction will be based on the consensus of reporting from the New York Times, Washington Post, CNN, and BBC, independently of any claims from Trump (or Harris).
Pierre Lemieux
Oct 29 2024 at 3:36pm
John: You have found the right place to have your opinion broadcasted urbi et orbi. I am however not sure how it relates to my post!
John Smith
Oct 29 2024 at 4:35pm
This is a reputable establishment and I think it will serve well as a keeper of records
John Smith
Nov 6 2024 at 12:39pm
I am pretty damn good, amn’t I?
John Smith
Nov 6 2024 at 12:42pm
Think I was pretty damn accurate!!!
Roger McKinney
Oct 29 2024 at 7:44pm
Economic indicators are the best predictors and they point to a Harris victory.
John Smith
Oct 30 2024 at 5:33pm
Let’s see in 6 days
John Smith
Nov 6 2024 at 12:40pm
Guess not!!!
Laurentian
Oct 29 2024 at 4:37pm
Is this the case for Bryan Caplan’s beloved UAE?
Also Caplan is an excellent example of the horseshoe theory in effect. The only difference between him and Curtis Yarvin and Adrian Vermeule seems to be on who the ideal benevolent despot is.
Mactoul
Oct 30 2024 at 12:23am
UAE is a part of global economy par excellence. The Emirs don’t and can’t set remunerations.
Pierre Lemieux
Oct 30 2024 at 12:40pm
Mactoul: I know very little about the UAE, but I bet you are right (perhaps with certain caveats).
David Seltzer
Oct 30 2024 at 11:54am
Pierre: Politicians have determined remuneration in the US with minimum wage laws. I suspect there is a silent market for remuneration here. If minimum wage is $17 dollars per hour, a prospective hire must produce $17 plus per hour. If they can’t, they will find under the table employment for less so long as their productivity exceeds their remuneration. Rent control laws spawn underground markets for apartments. When I lived in NYC, I sublet my Riverside Drive apartment for nearly twice my rent. I took the net and moved to Hoboken and rented an apartment for the surplus I made. I’m convinced in one form or another, spontaneous order in markets countervails, parry, political mandates for remuneration. The very fact that one can be prosecuted for violating minimum wage laws in these circumstances is the real immorality of statists.
Pierre Lemieux
Oct 30 2024 at 9:50pm
David: You are broadly right but there is a cost to participating in black markets. Those have always existed, but the rise of the markets in the 18th and 19th centuries whitened them.
David Seltzer
Oct 31 2024 at 10:46am
Pierre: Thanks for your comment. Yes there are costs to participating in black markets. But I suspect they are less than the costs associated with political mandates. Otherwise, why trade in black markets.
Pierre Lemieux
Oct 31 2024 at 11:58am
David: Yes, you are right. The first-best is that there be no motivation for black markets. The second-best is that there be black markets to partially reduce the cost of dirigisme. The third-best is total dirigisme and no black market.
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