The State Power to Discriminate

John Locke’s idea that tyranny is defined as arbitrary power as opposed to the rule of law seems to underlie the whole classical liberal tradition (see Locke’s Second Treatise of Government [1690, Chapter 18]). Arbitrary power allows the state or any other central political authority to discriminate among its subjects by bribing its supporters and harming its opponents. In reality, public discrimination (in the sense of state discrimination) is probably a synonym of arbitrary power.

The gradual discovery of the rule of law has come with the idea that the state should not discriminate among its citizens, residents, and often even foreigners. If, in your country, you kill a foreigner with no justification, your own liberal government will come after you. John Hicks, the 1972 laureate of the Nobel prize in economics, recalled a higher form of this ideal in the 19th century (“The Pursuit of Economic Freedom,” in E.F. Jacob, Ed., What We Defend: Essays in Freedom by Members of the University of Manchester [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942]:

The Manchester Liberals believed in Free Trade not only on the ground of Fairness among Englishmen, but also on the ground of Fairness between Englishmen and foreigners. The State, so they held, ought not to discriminate among its own citizens; also it ought not to discriminate between its own citizens and others.

Contemporary classical liberalism is solidly anchored in that tradition. Friedrich Hayek defended the rule of law as a set of abstract and typically negative rules applying equally to all individuals (see the first volume of his Law, Legislation, and Liberty, which I reviewed at EconLib). James Buchanan’s concept of “generality” represents the same ideal with different conceptual foundations. Buchanan’s theory defines a social contract with unanimously accepted rules that also bind the state (see his The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, which I reviewed at EconLib). He proposed constitutional amendments that would forbid government to discriminate through its expenditures (no cronies!), to incur budget deficits (in normal times), and to regulate free trade, internal and external (see his “Three Amendments: Responsibility, Generality, and Natural Liberty,” Cato Unbound, December 4, 2005).

A simple example of the generality or no-government-discrimination principle can be seen in how to determine the age of majority. If one looks at particular cases, it seems obvious that some individuals reach maturity and personal responsibility at different ages. But granting a government the power to decide individual cases would entail an unacceptable discrimination for individuals granted full individual liberty and those forced to remain in adolescence (and until when?). The only non-discriminatory solution has been (with some undefendable exceptions, such as drinking or buying tobacco) to determine a general rule, such as 21 or 18. Everybody—black or white, man or woman, rich and poor, etc.—is assumed to enjoy full liberty at the same age (or the same truncated liberty if full liberty does not exist).

Banning public discrimination is even more important given the power that contemporary states have acquired—even after the Civil War had stopped the power of governments to discriminate against the Blacks and to support slave owners in protecting their “property.” The state now seems capable of destroying any individual or group that the rulers hate. Even influential corporate executives grovel before the main ruler to avoid his wrath. We may even witness the state taking pride in its power to discriminate (sometimes under the excuse of non-discrimination), and even using the military to impose its will against some citizens.

Economist and political philosopher Anthony de Jasay refers to the discriminating state as the “adversary state” “taking sides” with some citizens against others (read his classic 1985 book The State, which I also reviewed at EconLib). The phenomenon has become so widespread that most people don’t even notice it. Just to take an example, why do governments want to reduce the price of housing (relative to other prices)? It takes sides against current homeowners, who typically have an important part of their savings in their houses. De Jasay also believed that the state is by nature discriminatory and that constitutions cannot change this—which puts him at odds with more mainstream liberals such as Hayek and Buchanan.

The objection that government discrimination is unavoidable by invoking bans on murder, theft, and other real crimes is a non sequitur. There is a virtual unanimity among citizens for banning these crimes. Even murderers don’t want to be murdered. Victimless crimes are another matter as well as the government harming Paul to help Pierre. Most drug consumers and dealers are adult citizens too!

The example of Harvard University, which has been threatened by the current administration essentially for the ideas defended there, is telling. For Buchanan and Hayek, government subsidies to Harvard are legitimate if they are also available to other universities; at any rate, they can’t be used to blackmail private institutions into accepting diktats from politicians. I suspect that de Jasay, who alas left our valley of tears in 2019, would use this case to repeat his argument that generality is impossible because the criterion to define the group of entities to be treated equally (universities? plus educational institutions? plus think tanks?) is itself discriminatory (see his book Justice and Its Surroundings, which I reviewed in Regulation). (My apologies for quoting again a book review of mine; sometimes, I get the false and dangerous impression that I have reviewed all the important books of the past 100 years.)

What is sure is that there is no classical liberal argument for supporting the naked discriminatory state. This reflection also suggests that three alternatives exist for the future of human societies: tyranny (of the left or the right, democratic or not), generality (standard classical liberalism), and anarchy (liberty without the state, if that can work).

 


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Referee taking sides with the Black team

Referee taking sides with the Black team

 

 

 

READER COMMENTS

Craig
Sep 11 2025 at 10:59am

“For Buchanan and Hayek, government subsidies to Harvard are legitimate if they are also available to other universities”

Why should individuals who won’t attend and/or didn’t attend college pay taxes to support institutions whose services they have no interest in buying?

Harvard’s endowment is $52bn! I don’t want to support that leftist institution!

“they can’t be used to blackmail private institutions into accepting diktats from politicians”

Fair comment of course, but I’d suggest the ship sailed on that a long time ago when the federal government told states to raise the drinking age to 21 as a condition of receiving highway funds or, another example, I recall my schools being told they had to permit military recruiters on campus. {Trump is losing Harvard case because he’s imposing conditions on them but not others, but in a like manner to your logic above that subsidies to universities are legitimate if available to all universities, likewise conditions places on universities for receipt of those subsides are, generally, valid if applied to all.}

Jose Pablo
Sep 11 2025 at 11:50am

“Canceling all subsidies and grants to universities would be great. People are free to donate their money if they so wish.

But that is not, by any stretch of the imagination, what the government is doing with Harvard. Instead, the government is arbitrarily targeting that left-leaning institution for the simple reason that it is not exactly a fan of ‘leftists.’

Pierre Lemieux
Sep 11 2025 at 11:57am

Craig: I agree that the ship of tyranny sailed a long time ago, but Hayek and Buchanan (and de Jasay and I) want to force it back–or to sink it. I also agree with your last bracketed comment, which showed that Trump does not have a classical liberal bone in his big, beautiful body (that some people don’t understand this is nearly beyond comprehension).

Craig
Sep 11 2025 at 12:22pm

I also recall the objections leftists made to voucher schemes to fund private schools which in many cases, particularly where I grew up, NJ, tended to be Catholic schools.

steve
Sep 11 2025 at 2:02pm

The establishment clause prohibits government from establishing or endorsing any religion. Seems like giving a religious group money to teach kids their religion is an endorsement. Personally, if religious schools agree not to teach religion or in any form practice religion ie its just the same as a public school but owned by the church, I am ok with them getting money. But then they wouldn’t really be a religious school would they?

Steve

Craig
Sep 11 2025 at 2:32pm

A nuance I always felt the voucher subsidizes the student. But for sure you are correct that it was felt the voucher schemes often ran afoul of the Establishment Clause

Jose Pablo
Sep 11 2025 at 12:03pm

Anarchy—liberty without the state, if such a thing can work”.

Well, I don’t know if anarchy can actually work. But I am certain that standard classical liberalism does not. Real liberal governments (as opposed to the theoretical kind) discriminate, take sides, regulate free trade, impose arbitrary taxes…

In theory, anarchy is far superior to liberalism. As for practical application, we simply don’t know: neither has ever truly been put into practice

Craig
Sep 11 2025 at 12:25pm

antifederaldisestablishmentarianism? 😉

I don’t think anarchy is feasible, but I think we could get rid of the federal government. Personally I think if they blow up the dollar its over, but who knows, I can’t predict the future and if I could my application to the billionaire boys club wouldn’t have been rejected.

Mactoul
Sep 12 2025 at 4:25am

On the contrary, anarchism is ungrounded in theory. Anarchism presumes private property but private property is necessarily grounded in  a state of laws–a state that anarchism denies.

There is no anarchist writer or authority or philosopher who does not hand-wave away from problem of where their precious private property comes from and what secures their property.

Jon Murphy
Sep 12 2025 at 9:15am

Anarchism presumes private property but private property is necessarily grounded in  a state of laws–a state that anarchism denies.

Historically, private property predates the state.  The causality looks reversed from the historical record: the state is grounded in private property, not the other way around.

Jon Murphy
Sep 12 2025 at 9:17am

Unless you mean “state of laws” to mean “the particular condition that someone or something is in at a specific time with regard to laws,” in which case it is not obvious that anarchism is incompatible or even “denies” such a state.

Mactoul
Sep 13 2025 at 5:33am

Let me define the terms more precisely. A state of law is when individuals recognize moral authority of the community in which they are embedded. Whether through inherited customs or a legislature or courts, the community defines what is right and what is wrong.

Anarchy is state of nature in which each individual is a moral authority to himself.

Perhaps you know of actual historic anarchies. I do not.

Jon Murphy
Sep 13 2025 at 7:58am

Anarchy is state of nature in which each individual is a moral authority to himself.

I do not know of any anarchist who would agree with that definition.

Perhaps you know of actual historic anarchies. I do not.

Oh yeah.  There are many.  Not just historic but contemporary as well.  Google ’em.  They’re fascinating.

Pierre Lemieux
Sep 14 2025 at 3:50pm

Mactoul: You write:

A state of law is when individuals recognize moral authority of the community in which they are embedded.

This would imply that the Talibans have the best “state of law” on the planet.

On anarchy and property, and the impossibility of organized central political authority to emerge in a propertyless society, you can’t ignore Anthony de Jasay. If I may repeat, read his Justice and Its Surroundings.

Mactoul
Sep 15 2025 at 2:29am

It may well be that Taliban conform to the religion and customs of Afghan people. I make no normative statements about which is best or not. Taliban law prevails in a certain territory and defines right or wrong in that territory (by definition).

As for Jasay, if one starts from individuals, and ignore that the individuals are ever embedded in a political structure, then naturally one is bound to derive or not derive certain conclusions.

This is like Huemer who has disproved political authority by noting that social contract theories have their own lacunae. But it is possible to have other accounts for political authority (apart from the fact that political authority is a very salient fact of world).

 

David Seltzer
Sep 11 2025 at 1:08pm

Pierre wrote; “For Buchanan and Hayek, government subsidies to Harvard are legitimate if they are also available to other universities; at any rate, they can’t be used to blackmail private institutions into accepting diktats from politicians.” The subsidies, financed by taxpayers, are often used to indoctrinate instead of applied research. As you state, there is no classical liberal argument for supporting the naked discriminatory state. The subsidies are not only discriminatory, the individual taxpayer, me in this case, is deprived of refusing to pay for university DEI programs or left-wing indoctrination. In the end, I see no reason to subsidize any public or private university, given they have large private endowments or are state tax-payer supported.

nobody.really
Sep 11 2025 at 3:04pm

1: Compare Lemieux’s post here, decrying arbitrary impositions of law, with his prior post praising legal loopholes. Should we value applying tax burdens uniformly or not?

2: A semantic quibble: I understand the word “discriminate” to refer to identifing distinctions. A government that did not discriminate could not hire people–or, alternatively, would have to offer jobs to people uniformly or at random, without regard to qualifications. No one objects to government discrimination; we object to UNDUE discrimination–that is, discrimination based on criteria that are unrelated to the specified objective.

3: Various commenters decry the practice of government “subsidizing” things they don’t like, but neglect to offer citations to the statutes or rules granting these subsidies. If we hunted them down, I suspect we would not find any statute/rule that says “The US Treasury shall transfer to Harvard University the sum of $X with which to do whatever it pleases.” Rather, I expect we would find government making grants to pursue specific purposes–researching cures to disease, for example.

And this invites the question, Who is engaging in undue discrimination? Does government engage in undue discrimination when it issues a request for proposal for people seeking funding to cure Parkinson’s disease, evaluates the requests, and picks a researcher affiliated with Harvard? Or do WE engage in undue dsicrimination when we say, “I have no objection to government funding Parkinson’s research–unless the researchers are affiliated with the plaid tribe, ‘cuz I’m a member of the checkered tribe!

Admittedly, the more discretion government has to pick “the best candidate” for anything, the more opportunity there will be for people to claim that the selection was unduely biased for tribal reasons.

The hardest cases may be judging speech: Awarding money to some artists/broadcasters, but not others.

K-12 education is an especially tough nut to crack, because the manner in which kids are educated cannot help but convey tribal values. NYC gives yeshivas about $250 million/yr to “educate” 50,000+ boys in a manner favored by Orthodox Jews–but the kids never seem to learn anything other than the Torah. Does this public funding represent undue subsidies for a politically powerful group and a violation of the Establishment Clause? Or would cutting off these funds represent undue discrimination against of minority religious/ethnic group?

4: Arguably 501(c)(3) tax deductions have the effect of subsidize the donations (including religious donations) of private parties. Will Lemieux praise these deductions as a loophole that permits people to lower their taxes–or will he condemn them as an undue public subsidy?

Pierre Lemieux
Sep 11 2025 at 4:56pm

Nobody: Your question about loopholes vs. the rule of law is a good and important one.

One way to approach it is through the model of Buchanan and Brennan in The Power to Tax. A law consistent with the rule of law could stipulate that everybody will pay an annual tax corresponding to 10% of his income. Assuming the pure (riskless) rate of return on capital is 5%, a fiscally equivalent law, also apparently consistent with the rule of law, could stipulate that everybody will pay a tax on his capital of 2.5%. The two systems are, it seems, fiscally equivalent: if your capital (including your human capital) is $100, your annual income is $5, and 2.5% of $100 is equal to 50% of $5.

If the rational signatories of the social contract were sure that the state they are also creating as an enforcer would always be manned by saints (whose only weakness may be to sleep with their pink unicorn dolls at night), they would be indifferent between the two systems. However, if they are not naïve and fear that “their” state could metamorphose into Leviathan, they would prefer the system with a loophole, that is, the income tax to the capital tax, because the former grants a smaller tax base to the government. With a capital tax of 100%, Leviathan could expropriate you in one year. With an income tax of 100%, Leviathan could only confiscate $5; the following year, you will have used the loophole: moving out with your capital.

This simple model is applicable to many other areas of taxation–like de minimis or optimal taxes on goods with smaller elasticity of demand (and therefore less avoidable). It is also applicable to many other areas of life–for example, it explains why a perfect ID system is perfectly dangerous.

nobody.really
Sep 14 2025 at 1:38am

[T]hey would prefer the system with a loophole, that is, the income tax to the capital tax, because the former grants a smaller tax base to the government.

I get the argument for limiting the power of government to tax.

That said, I think of a loophole as a more-or-less arbitrary failure to apply a principle uniformly. The choice to impose tariffs on imported goods unless those goods are valued at less than $700 seems like a loophole to me. The choice to tax capital gains except capital gains in a decedent’s estate seems like a loophole. The choice to subject everyone to income tax except people with low income would seem like a loophole; the choice to give everyone the option of reducing their adjusted gross income by a standard deduction does not seem like a loophole.

Maybe you could say that a choice to tax income but not capital is a failure to apply a principle uniformly, but that is not clear to me.

….if your capital (including your human capital)….

With a capital tax of 100%, Leviathan could expropriate you in one year.

Good point. I recall reading how the Nazis and the Soviets sought to take all the property of the Jews and the kulaks—but were stopped by the fact that that their laws did not provide for taxing capital. Whew, that was a close one, huh?

It had not previously occurred to me that governments could tax 100% of your capital, including human capital. But if you’re looking for a bureaucratic euphemism for death camps and gulags, I guess this might do.

Seriously, where taxation is concerned—just as where other law is concerned—we are all at the mercy of our fellow voters. I don’t know of many voters who would support a 100% tax on capital or income. So, so long as we enjoy equal protection of the laws, I expect voter self-interest to be my best defense.

This simple model is applicable to many other areas of taxation–like de minimis [taxes].

Not seeing how this model applies to de minimis exemptions from tariffs. Imagine government desires to raise revenues of $X. It could do so by imposing a tariff of Y% and granting exemptions for goods valued at less than $700, or imposing a tariff of (Y-Z)% without the loophole. Either strategy produces the same revenues for government. Why should we favor the former tariff over the latter?

2.5% of $100 is equal to 10% of $5.

???

Pierre Lemieux
Sep 14 2025 at 10:20am

Nobody: You write: “???” Of course you’re right. It should be, of course: “2.5% of $100 is equal to 50% of $5.”

The correct number is also an example much closer to an argument in the real world. For mainstream public finance, a capital tax of 2.5% is exactly equivalent to an income tax of 50%. In public choice and constitutional political economy, one has to factor in the expropriation capacity (“state capacity”) of Leviathan.

Thanks for catching that. I’ll make the correction in my comment.

Pierre Lemieux
Sep 14 2025 at 10:52am

Nobody: You write:

Imagine government desires to raise revenues of $X. It could do so by imposing a tariff of Y% and granting exemptions for goods valued at less than $700, or imposing a tariff of (Y-Z)% without the loophole. Either strategy produces the same revenues for government.

No, it will not. In the first case, many individuals who would have bought the stuff at Walmart will instead use the loophole (order from Etsy). So government revenues will be lower. Taxes change behavior. That’s the loophole (a built-in constraint) that prevents Leviathan from increasing Y even more.

As for your (and Buchanan’s) argument or hope that some rules imposed by the state can be general, de Jasay has a good counter-argument; quoting my Regulation review of de Jasay’s Justice and Its Surroundings (interior quotes are from de Jasay):

Similarly, the idea of equal treatment (treat like cases alike), sometimes called the generality principle, “leaves the justice of a treatment indeterminate.” Treating all like cases alike is either a tautology or else “equal treatment of cases according to one variable will normally entail their unequal treatment according to other variables.” If it is a matter of symmetry between the like cases, why should income or other rewards be singled out as the relevant variable for nondiscrimination instead of “pain, productivity, opportunity cost, benefit, or something else?” “Before like cases can be treated alike, it must be decided which case is like which other case. … Ultimately, however, all such observations are intrinsically subjective and can be reduced to my say-so against your say-so.” All ideas of equality amount to a call for collective choice—that is, what the state decides equality means. …

“Should everybody do military service, or only the young, or only able-bodied young males?”

That’s an important but complex issue.

nobody.really
Sep 15 2025 at 12:38am

>Imagine government desires to raise revenues of $X. It could do so by imposing a tariff of Y% and granting exemptions for goods valued at less than $700, or imposing a tariff of (Y-Z)% without the loophole. Either strategy produces the same revenues for government.

>No, it will not.

Permit me to rephrase: Assume for the purpose of this hypothetical that government desires to raise revenues of $X. Assume for purposes of this hypothetical that it could do so by imposing a tariff of Y% and granting exemptions for goods valued at less than $700, or imposing a tariff of (Y-Z)% without the loophole. Assume the insight that people alter their behavior base on taxation is not unique to Lemieux, but is also known to government agents. Based on this insight, they identify two taxing strategies—a Y% tariff plus the loophole, or a lower tariff (Y-Z)% without a loophole—and that either strategy would produce the same revenues for government.

Again, why should we favor the former strategy over the latter?

As I understand it, Reagan’s 1986 tax reform largely consisted of closing loopholes and lowering rates. Shall I conclude that you would have opposed Reagan’s tax reform? (Admittedly, I don’t recall whether government expected to raise the same revenues under the Reagan tax regime.)

nobody.really
Sep 15 2025 at 1:03am

All ideas of equality amount to a call for collective choice—that is, what the state decides equality means. …

Fair enough. Philosophy 101 describes deontology and Kant’s Categorical Imperitive: “Act on no principle that you would not wish to become universal.” This is yet another variation of the Golden Rule. But it invites the question, what qualifies as a principle becoming universal? I try to disuade Nazis from killing people by appealing to their desire to avoid being killed. But Nazis reassure me that those they kill don’t qualify as people–so problem solved!

In short, I concede the conceptual problem. And this helps to explain why Jasay was an anarchist.

I understand law as uniformly applied policies. Inexplicably, I–and most people–embrace the rule of law as an improvement over the law of the jungle, conceptual problems notwithstanding. Maybe law is one of those cases where most economists/philosophers say, “Sure, that may work in practice–but how does it work in theory?”

Pierre Lemieux
Sep 22 2025 at 11:22am

Nobody: You ask which tax strategy of equal revenues the government would pursue. If Leviathan is not constrained, it would prefer the strategy that maximizes the tax base because it would, next year or the year after, allow it to expropriate its subjects’ future income.

When you ask “Again, why should we favor the former strategy over the latter?” it depends who’s “we.” If it is “we” as the rulers, we would of course prefer the optimal exploitation strategy–optimal for us–including our flexibility in using it. If it is “we” economists as advisers of Leviathan, we would obediently agree with our client. But if it is “we” in the literal sense of all individuals, there is no way part of this “we” would accept to be exploited by the other part.

 

Mactoul
Sep 12 2025 at 4:17am

That strangers should not be murdered with impunity is not a discovery liberalism made. I am hard put even to imagine a state, ancient or modern,  where strangers could be murdered with impunity.

As for Manchester liberals, I guess, writing as they were in the heyday of British imperialism, they didn’t suppose the foreigners, present in few numbers,  were anything threatening. They would sing a different tune now.

José Pablo
Sep 12 2025 at 12:58pm

Well, the British imperialist strangers were few in number, yet they posed an immense threat.

Nowhere more so than in the US.

Monte
Sep 13 2025 at 9:54am

The example of Harvard University, which has been threatened by the current administration essentially for the ideas defended there, is telling.

The current administration shouldn’t discriminate against Harvard on the basis of the ideas they defend there, but this fellow provides a very good reason for why taxpayers shouldn’t subsidize this or any of the other Ivy leagues:

Research grants are not subsidies, because every dollar received has to be spent according to the terms of the grant. But for every dollar Ivy League universities receive for research, they charge the government an additional 64 cents, on average, for overhead. Ostensibly, overhead covers things such as the cost of the building where the research takes place and the electricity that keeps the lights on. But universities do not have to account for the use of these funds for overhead. They can be used for virtually any purposes that university administrators prefer, and, as past research has demonstrated, these discretionary uses of overhead funds include building diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) bureaucracies and indulging whatever other ideological activity they wish. The money that directly funds research may not be a subsidy, but the overhead—or, as it is often called, “indirect” money—is clearly a subsidy, because it is almost entirely fungible and unaccountable.

 

nobody.really
Sep 13 2025 at 11:05pm

Research grants are not subsidies, because every dollar received has to be spent according to the terms of the grant. But for every dollar Ivy League universities receive for research, they charge the government an additional 64 cents, on average, for overhead.

Respectfully, WHO CARES?

Have you never bought a car from a dealership? You select a car. You haggle over the price. Then the dealer returns with the paperwork listing your price–plus an additional fee for preparing the paperwork. And you say, “Forget it.” The dealer says, “But we incur costs for preparing this paperwork!” And you say, “I don’t doubt that you do. I don’t doubt that you incur costs for building maintenance and electricity. That’s why you charge more for the car than its wholesale price. We haggled and agreed to a bottom line price. We’re done now. Remove that paperwork thing or I walk.” The dealer has to go talk to his boss, but eventually removes the paperwork charge.

Federal agencies should award grants to whoever offers the best proposal. The bottom line price is a relevant consideration. How the applicant characterizes the various components that add up to the bottom-line price is IRRELEVANT.

Monte
Sep 14 2025 at 2:20am

So in other words, the use of the funds after the grant is awarded is none of the federal agency’s or taxpayers business?  I think it’s relevant because if universities are padding grants with high overhead, that’s a misuse )or at least a questionable use) of public funds.  Transparency matters.  It goes beyond just the bottom line for me as a taxpayer, anyway.

nobody.really
Sep 14 2025 at 11:58pm

As a taxpayer, you also finance public employees–so do you intend to police how public employees spend their paychecks? Stop trying to control other people!

Image you were the grant administrator, and you offer a grant to fund a test of a theory about Parkinson’s. You solicit proposals and review them. On that basis, you can pick the one you like best, or reject them all. But it doesn’t make sense to say that you think Proposal A offers the optimal–and acceptable–mix of benefits and burdens, but then reject it because you just don’t like the way they charactize the various line items in their proposal. So instead you’d award to grant to someone else that offers to produce a less-good result, or charge a higher price, or both? Or you’d reject all the proposals, even though Proposal A offered an agreeable mix of benefits and burdens? This is the essence of undue government discrimination: making decisions based on criteria that are tangential to the purpose of the grant.

Monte
Sep 16 2025 at 2:18am

As a taxpayer, you also finance public employees–so do you intend to police how public employees spend their paychecks? Stop trying to control other people!

False equivalence.  A public employee’s money is private income.  They’re entitled to spend it however they choose, just like any other citizen.  But when a private university receives taxpayer funding, the use of those funds remains a matter of public accountability.  If those funds are directed toward DEI programs or other idealogical pursuits, then it’s fair to scrutinize whether that aligns with the intended public purpose of the funding.  This isn’t about controlling people’s personal choices.  It’s about ensuring public money is used responsibly.

nobody.really
Sep 17 2025 at 12:05pm

Oddly, you couldn’t bring yourself to answer my hypothetical. So let’s try a different one: Imagine you’re a government grant administrator, and you issue two grants for the purpose of finding a cure to Parkinson’s. The recipient of the first grant then reports that they spent $0 on DEI programs; instead, they blew all the money at the racetrack. The recipient of the second grant reports that they spent 90% of the grant money on DEI programs–because after spending the first 10%, they found the cure of Parkinson’s.

I surmize that you’d be thrilled with the first grant recipient, because they refrained from spending money on DEI, and that’s your primary concern. You’d be furious with the second grant recipient becuase they spent money on DEI, which is your primary concern–progress regarding Parkinson’s be damned.

Bottom line: OF COURSE a grant administrator should seek accountability. And the thing grant recipients need to be accountable for is ACHIEVING THE PURPOSE OF THE GRANT. In the language of contract law, 100% of a price is offered in consideration for 100% of the performace. If performance is achieved 100%, then no amount of the price may be withheld. If they do that, then accountability has been served. But the time to dicker of the price was BEFORE the contract is signed, not after.

The boss calls a repairman to fix his machine which has frozen up. The repairman negotiates a repair price of $1000. Having done so, the repairman taps on the machine with a hammer, and it lurches back to life. The boss objects to having to pay $1000 for a moment’s work. The repairman says, “It’s $1 for the hammer blow, and $999 for knowing where to land it.”

All that said: IF a grant recipient seems to have ample funds for pursuing projects unrelated to a grant’s purposes, that may suggest other dynamics. Perhaps there is insufficient competition between grant applicants; otherwise, some rival grant applicant would have offered to provide the same services at a lower price–and eventually competitive forces would drive price down to cost. A solution may lie in advertising the requests for proposals more broadly, or relaxing/eliminating needlessly restricting bidding requirements.

Alternatively, the problem may arise because the grant administrator refuses to award the grant to the applicants that best promote the purposes of the grant and instead awards the grant to people who advance the administrator’s unrelated goals. A solution may lie in policing the grant administrator.

But in neither case would the fault lie with the grant recipient.

Monte
Sep 18 2025 at 1:15am

You seem to have little regard for ethics when it comes to grant money.  You also assume incorrectly that I would say the cure be damned for Parkinson’s in this case, or any case involving such a disease or condition.  However, I would insist there be accountability for malfeasance.  Is “the cure” your only concern, all else be damned?  And to suggest that a recipient bears no responsibility for misappropriation of funds (and I think we can agree that that includes DEI and racetrack bets) is irresponsible, to say the least.

How’s this for a hypothetical: How do you think an oversight committee would respond to potential recipients who admitted prior to consideration that it’s their intention to use the funds not only for research in finding a cure for x, but also for political purposes and maybe even prostitution and gambling after the fact?

Mactoul
Sep 15 2025 at 2:48am

Pierre Lemieux,

As there appears to be some problem at Liberty website loading Jasay book, I found its review at Cato. It contains a sentence that I do not understand at all.

De Jasay notes that law, notably tort law and the law of property, was “historically prior to any proto statal authority,” notably in medieval Venice and Genoa, and in many Renaissance towns including Ghent and Bruges.

Are medieval Venice, Genoa, Ghent and Bruges supposed to be any kind of  stateless anarchies? Or is it being said that the Venetian state did not concern itself with property disputes. Even that is hard to credit. A commercial republic not concerning itself in property disputes. A lot of Venetian law must have been grounded in far ancient Roman law.

In any case, one hardly looks to Venice for either origin of property or state, both pre-dating establishment of Venice by thousands of years. So I must ask you to make sense of this sentence.

 

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