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The Demand and Supply of Public Goods

By James M. Buchanan
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Book Cover
First Pub. Date

1968

Publisher

Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc.

Pub. Date

1999

Comments

First published in 1968 by Rand McNally & Company. Foreword by Geoffrey Brennan.

Copyright

The text of this edition is copyright ©: 1999 Liberty Fund, Inc. Picture of James M. Buchanan: File photo detail, courtesy Liberty Fund, Inc. James M. Buchanan, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1964.

Table of Contents
  1. Foreword
  2. Ch. 1, A Methodological Introduction
  3. Ch. 2, Simple Exchange in a World of Equals
  4. Ch. 3, Simple Exchange in a World of Unequals
  5. Ch. 4, Pure and Impure Public Goods
  6. Ch. 5, Many Private Goods, Many Persons
  7. Ch. 7, The Publicness of Political Decisions
  8. Ch. 8, The Institutions of Fiscal Choice
  9. Ch. 9, Which Goods Should Be Public
  10. Ch. 10, Toward a Positive Theory of Public Finance
  11. Supplementary Reading Materials
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Supplementary Reading Materials

In the Preface I noted that this book represents a written version of discussions carried on over a decade in my graduate seminar at the University of Virginia. An appropriate addition to the text may be a listing of reading materials that students in the seminar were assigned as supplementary to the discussion. These are indicated below. Note that some general material is included in this listing that is not contained in the specific references to the literature at the end of the earlier chapters of the book. Similarly, note also that some of the more specific references included in the bibliographical appendices are not included in this general listing.

BOOKS

American Economic Association,
Readings in the Economics of Taxation, edited by R. A. Musgrave and C. Shoup (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1959).

Kenneth J. Arrow,
Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1951; Revised edition, 1963).

William J. Baumol,
Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952; Revised second edition, 1965).

Duncan Black,
The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

Duncan Black and R. A. Newing,
Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation (London: William Hodge, 1951).

Howard Bowen,
Toward Social Economy (New York: Rinehart, 1948), pt. IV.

James M. Buchanan,
Fiscal Theory and Political Economy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960).

———,
Public Finance in Democratic Process (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967).

James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock,
The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962).

Anthony Downs,
An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957).

J. de V. Graaf,
Theoretical Welfare Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957).

International Economic Association,
Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, edited by R. A. Musgrave and A. T. Peacock (London: Macmillan, 1958).

R. A. Musgrave,
The Theory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959).

Mancur Olson,
The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

MONOGRAPHS

M. Z. Kafoglis,
Welfare Economics and Subsidy Programs, University of Florida Monographs in Social Science, No. 11, Summer 1961.

Charles Plott,
Generalized Equilibrium Conditions Under Alternative Exchange Institutions, Research Monograph No. 9, Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy, University of Virginia, December 1964.

Earl Thompson,
The Perfectly Competitive Allocation of Collective Goods, MR-49, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles, September 1965.

ARTICLES

James M. Buchanan and Milton Z. Kafoglis, “A Note on Public Goods Supply,”
American Economic Review, LIII (June 1963), 403-14.

James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, “Public and Private Action Under Reciprocal Externality,” in
The Public Economy of Urban Communities, edited by J. Margolis (Resources for the Future, 1965).

Otto A. Davis and Andrew Whinston, “Some Foundations of Public Expenditure Theory,” Mimeographed. Carnegie Institute of Technology, November 1961.

J. G. Head, “Public Goods and Public Policy,”
Public Finance, XVII (No. 3, 1962), 197-221.

———, “Lindahl’s Theory of the Budget,”
Finanzarchiv, XXIII (October 1964), 421-54.

———, “The Welfare Foundations of Public Finance Theory,”
Rivista di diritto finanziario e scienza delle finanze (May 1965), 3-52.

———, “On Merit Goods,”
Finanzarchiv, XXV (March 1966), 1-29.

Leif Johansen, “Some Notes on Lindahl’s Theory of Determination of Public Expenditures,”
International Economic Review, IV (September 1963), 346-58.

Paul A. Samuelson, “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,”
Review of Economics and Statistics, XXXVI (November 1954), 387-89.

———, “Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure,”
Review of Economics and Statistics, XXXVII (November 1955), 350-56.

———, “Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories,”
Review of Economics and Statistics, XL (November 1958), 332-37.

———, “Pure Theory of Public Expenditure and Taxation,” Mimeographed, July 1966.

Robert H. Strotz, “Two Propositions Related to Public Goods,”
Review of Economics and Statistics, XL (November 1958), 329-31.

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