Dogmatism is bad. If someone calls you dogmatic, an ideologue, he implies that you are irrevocably wedded to your ideology and your belief system. You refuse to consider stringent counterarguments and quibbling counterevidence. Instead of taking into account the arguments for and against, say, the support of a subsidy for the—surely incredibly important—chip industry, you, the dogmatist, proclaim that subsidies per se are reprehensible, illegitimate, or inefficient. Or all three things at once.
Proponents of the market economy have often been accused of being dogmatic. They’ve been called “ideologues.” And there certainly are free market ideologues. There are dogmatists who are committed to market fundamentalism. These people, if they want a government at all, hold that the government shall be constrained to very basic functions.
But it is not the content of your beliefs that makes you a dogmatist. Whether you’re a dogmatist depends on how you arrive at your conclusions and how your overall belief system is constructed and also adapted in light of new arguments and new evidence. This implies that when two people have the exact same beliefs about what the state ought to do, one may be a dogmatist while the other is not. What matters is not the content of our beliefs but its derivation and defense.
However, that is often misunderstood. When you hear critics denounce people like Ludwig von Mises or Milton Friedman as dogmatists, the case is often inspired and defended by the observation that they have radical views, that is, allow only for a minimal government (of course, Mises is more radical than Friedman). This is not to say that there may be no arguments that support the allegation that some adherents of free markets are dogmatic, nor is it to say that all those who label thinkers such as Mises as “dogmatists” rest their case (exclusively) on the radicalness of the political position. All I say is that, in my experience, it too often happens that people confuse radicalism for dogmatism.
Perhaps a case in point is the reception of an interesting quote by Hayek. In the Road to Serfdom Hayek opined that “probably nothing has done so much harm to the liberal cause as the wooden insistence of some liberals on certain rough rules of thumb, above all the principle of laissez-faire.” Read carefully! What Hayek says is that it is the wooden insistence that was so damaging, not the principle of laissez-faire as such (and it seems that some have misread Hayek’s words to mean the harm was done by the principle of laissez-faire, and not by the wooden insistence on it). It is true that the Hayek of 1944 rather rejected laissez-faire—the later Hayek, though, would take a different position, noting in a preface from 1976 that, back then, he “had not wholly freed [himself] from all the current interventionist superstitions.” But irrespective of Hayek’s own political position, his quote about laissez-faire suggests that the issue is not laissez-faire, that is, the policy conclusions or the content of our beliefs, but the way we defend them and deal with counterarguments—our “wooden insistence,” or the dogmatism, is the issue.
This is a lesson to hold dear. I agree that we ought not be dogmatists. However, I am convinced that you can be a staunch and radical proponent of laissez-faire without being, by any means, a dogmatist and ideologue. I mean this as more than a logical possibility. I think very practically that insights from the liberal strands of political philosophy but also from political economy undergird such a laissez-faire position.
Arguing this would probably demand writing another blog entry—or rather a book. So, I just want to close by pointing out the logical corollary of holding radicalism and dogmatism separate. And this is that those who eschew radicalism, embrace “the middle-of-the-road” and always demand to check each case on its own merits may well be the true dogmatists.
Anyways, you can be a radical supporter of laissez-faire without being dogmatic at all. And perhaps you should be!
Max Molden is a PhD student at the University of Hamburg. He has worked with European Students for Liberty and Prometheus – Das Freiheitsinstitut. He regularly publishes at Der Freydenker.
READER COMMENTS
Richard W Fulmer
Mar 2 2024 at 4:37pm
That is a dogmatic claim that is not necessarily true. By definition, dogma is “a principle or set of principles laid down by an authority as incontrovertibly true.” I see nothing wrong with the dogmatic declaration that slavery, child abuse, and torture are incontrovertibly evil. I see nothing wrong with enshrining individual rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to be faced by one’s accuser in a nation’s constitution so that they are beyond the reach of majority rule.
Max Molden
Mar 3 2024 at 3:15pm
Stimulating comment, I’ve thought quite a bit about it, thanks!
First, I believe there is a difference between dogmatism and dogma. Dogmatism, of what I spoke, at least in my linguistic understanding, has a negative connotation (hence I wrote dogmatism is bad). This is different with dogma.
Second, I don’t think it makes sense to speak of dogmas with respect to the examples you gave. To me, speaking of the dogma of the evilness of slavery sounds very, very odd. And, indeed, you did not write of the dogma of the individual right to free speech but of a “dogmatic declaration.” I think this suggests that to call value judgments dogmas is unfitting. What we call a dogma is a positive/descriptive belief about the world, e.g., that slavery is bad economically, that the pope is infallible, that tortue is ineffective, etc. We don’t call our judgments about what is good and bad dogmas.
Third, dogmatism to me is then, as I elucidate, about how we deal with new insights, evidence, etc. This has nothing to do with what we believe but is about how we form and change beliefs (and, as Jon adds, about the coherence of our beliefs). And it is this kind of dogmatism that I believe is commonly considered bad. Not the sheer adherence to dogmas (amongst which I would not count our value judgments).
Looking forward to hearing your thoughts!
Richard W Fulmer
Mar 4 2024 at 9:35am
One definition of dogma is: a doctrine or body of doctrines concerning faith or morals formally stated and authoritatively proclaimed by a church. So, the word “dogma” can be, and frequently is, used in relation to moral judgements about what is good and bad.
I don’t believe that those are issues of dogma (that is, a principle or set of principles laid down by an authority as incontrovertibly true) but rather empirical questions. Slavery is either economically more productive than free labor (as Karl Marx’s theories on surplus value implied) or it’s not (as Adam Smith held). At least one papal statement made ex cathedra was wrong or no such statement has ever been wrong. Torture works or it doesn’t, or it’s effective in circumstance A but not in circumstance B.
The statement that torture is evil is a dogmatic statement and does not depend upon its efficacy under any condition.
The dogmatic belief that slavery is evil does not depend upon new insights or evidence. Slavery would, according to my beliefs, still be evil even if the 1619 Project had proved that it is a necessary precursor to the development of a free, capitalistic society (contra the success of South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, West Germany, etc.).
What is a value judgement if not dogmatic? A value judgement, like dogma, is not subject to proof. I would believe that slavery is wrong even if you could prove to me that it is more effective than free labor.
Richard W Fulmer
Mar 7 2024 at 9:26am
I sometimes joke that I’m a (small “L”) libertarian on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays; a (small “C”) conservative on Tuesdays and Thursdays; and I give it a rest on Saturdays and Sundays. Today is Thursday, and one of the things I like about being a conservative is that we respect and appreciate Chesterton’s Fences, norms, or “dogmas.”
Mike Munger offered the following thought experiment: Imagine that you’re driving through a small town, and you get pulled over for driving through a green light. The police officer informs you that, in this town, people take justice seriously. Traffic lights are arbitrary and, therefore, unjust. People stopped on red may well have much greater need to get through the intersection than do the people sailing through on green. Therefore, the townspeople have decided that everyone must stop at each intersection and compare notes. Those with the greatest need are allowed to pass through the intersection first.
Munger points out that, while traffic signals are, indeed, arbitrary and unjust, by obeying them and following the norms, everyone gets through the intersection much faster than they would if they had to compare needs at every intersection.
Our last three presidents have demonstrated the problems that arise when national leaders violate norms. After an Obama, a Trump, or a Biden has barreled through the medicine cabinet and squeezed all the toothpaste out of every tube, putting it back in is messy and far from perfect.
Jon Murphy
Mar 2 2024 at 6:07pm
Good stuff. I’d add that another sign of a dogmatist is one who argues for the dogma even when the results of said dogma are contradictory.
For example, tariffs. Under various conditions and assumptions, tariffs can have different, and contradictory, results. Under the conditions of a price taker, a tariff will reduce imports and reduce the terms of trade, leading to a net welfare loss. But, under the conditions of a price setter, then a tariff could lead to a terms of trade improvement and possibly more imports! One who is dogmatic in their support of tariffs could justify tariffs under the terms of trade argument, but when that claim inevitably fails, switch to other justifications for tariffs (protectionism, for example). However, since the outcome of the tariff is contradictory, this suggests to us that the tariff per se is the goal, not some other result. The other results (terms of trade gain, protectionism, etc) is merely some justification.
Jon Murphy
Mar 2 2024 at 6:09pm
I should note here that my point is not hypothetical. In the early days of the Trump Administration, Peter Navarro made multiple contradictory claims about tariffs (they’d enchance welfare though terms of trade gains, they’d protect jobs by increasing prices of foreign goods [which implies a terms of trade loss], they’d protect the profits of firms, etc), sometimes within the same talk or article. He is clearly a tariff dogmatist.
Max Molden
Mar 3 2024 at 3:12pm
Thanks, Jon. I would add that demonstrating that someone contradicts herself is the strongest refutation I see. And it is perhaps also one of the most important things economists can do, that is, to show when people’s claims are contradictory.
David Seltzer
Mar 4 2024 at 4:24pm
Jon wrote: “He is clearly a tariff dogmatist.” Apparently you can’t teach an old dogmatist new tricks!
john hare
Mar 2 2024 at 6:59pm
Sometimes my opinions are shown to be incorrect in certain applications. I read of an organization that started rating doctors on their surgical success/problem ratio. (can’t remember exact details) I thought that was a fantastic idea. People would avoid surgeons with a bad track record.
I was wrong in this case. Surgeons started refusing high risk patients as it would hurt their rating. Likely the ones that needed the skilled the most.
I still believe there should be some means of sorting the good from the problem practitioners. Am I dogmatic?
Max Molden
Mar 3 2024 at 3:22pm
I think you were dogmatic if you continued to hold that “rating doctors on their surgical success/problem ratio” is a good idea while simply dismissing any counterevidence.
I also think you might (!) be dogmatic if you held that there is “some means of sorting the good from the problem practitioners.”
But as you ask whether you’re dogmatic if you believe that “p” should be the case — no, I don’t think you’re dogmatic then. As I wrote in my answer to Richard, this is normative as you express what ought to be the case, and this seems to me not to be within the bounds of dogmatism.
And as I now realise, this is perhaps the case because I am firmly convinced of the subjectiveness of value judgments. And if values are subjective, it follows that they are in a sense all dogmatic. They are beyond rational debate.
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